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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to explain and analyze the policy dynamics behind implementation 
patterns in multi-level policy settings using the EU as an example. It does so by examining 
the implementation of EU environmental policy in member states in light of the recent 
economic crisis. The analysis of implementation patterns in the EU seeks to provide an 
updated approach and an in-depth understanding of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic, namely 
the distinction between those states that are ‘frontrunners’ and ‘laggards’ in their 
environmental policy performance. The key issue captured is the various regulatory 
trends and policy outcomes at the EU level in terms of implementation performance. Two 
case studies one of a reputed ‘leader’ (UK) and one of traditional ‘laggard’ (Greece) are 
employed to better define and interpret this dynamic in practice. In this analysis, the use 
of federal theory as the main theoretical framework is very crucial for a contemporary 
theorization of implementation in the EU as a multi-level polity. Having the advantage that 
it is not dependent on a state-centric ontology, federalism provides an understanding of 
multi-level political relationships that are neither purely domestic nor purely international. 
Drawing on this analysis, the main findings show that the impact of economic crisis on 
environmental policy implementation was dependent on the economic level in member 
states, i.e. the less wealthy Southern member states performed worse than the richer 
Northern states. Moreover, there has been strong pressure in many states to relax 
environmental standards in the name of growth. A closer look at the case studies 
demonstrates that the issue of cost is very important. In this light, the pro-growth agenda 
is dominant considering the government priorities of the UK and Greece. Besides these 
factors, the better economic position, the well-functioning public administration, the strong 
administrative and institutional capacity of the state also allow the UK to better implement 
EU environmental policy in comparison to Greece. In this regard, the use of federal theory 
captures the importance of domestic political context in the implementation of EU 
environmental policy.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
Some have argued that the 2008 economic crisis1 has put pressure on environmental 
policy in the name of economic growth2 (see Antal and Van der Bergh, 2013; Geels, 2013; 
Lekakis and Kousis, 2013). In the midst of huge public deficits3 and the Euro-zone crisis4, 
many voices such as the European Commission or some member states (e.g. the UK 
and Poland) have pushed for a change of Europe's orientation to a more pro-growth 
agenda. Within this context, government and business actions at the national and EU 
level have seemingly placed pressure on environmental policy as something that is too 
costly within the current fiscal environment (ENDs Report, July 2012). That being said, 
some Eastern European states have complained many times about the rising cost of the 
environmental and climate policy. This thesis explores whether and how the fallout from 
the 2008 economic crisis has impacted upon environmental policy in the EU. In this 
regard, EU environmental policy and its implementation are the specific focus of the thesis 
as the transition to a more sustainable economy model as outlined in the highly-publicized 
Europe 2020 strategy. Against this backdrop, some of the main reasons for the use of a 
broader approach to implementation in this thesis are that the success or failure of 
individual policies do not provide insights into the wider administrative and social trends 
impacting on environmental policy implementation. As seen in the past and more recently, 
                                                          
1 By definition, the economic crisis is referring to a situation in which the economy of a country or the EU, 
in this case, is subject to an unexpected downturn caused by a financial crisis, particularly, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in 2007 in the US. Access date: 22/2/2017, http://www.businessdictionary. 
com/definition/economic-crisis.html, https://www.voca bulary.com/dictionary/economic%20crisis  
2 Economic growth is referring to the increase in a country's productive capacity, as measured by comparing 
gross national product (GNP) in a year with the GNP in the previous year. This also includes the increase 
in the capital stock, technological developments, improvement in the quality and level of education and 
sustainable development. Date of access: 19/03/2017, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition 
/economic-growth.html  
3 The public deficit, alternatively known as government deficit, reflects the difference or variation between 
revenues and outlays in a certain period of time. Date of access: 12/03/2017, http://economictimes.india 
times.com/definition/fiscal-deficit  
4 The European sovereign debt crisis broke out in 2008 with the collapse of the Iceland's banking system 
and spread out to the weaker economies of the southern European periphery due to high government 
debts. Date of access: 10/02/2017, https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-sovereign-debt-crisis-with-
examples-3305748 and The Sovereign Debt Crisis – Placing a Curb on Growth, Anton Brender, Florence 
Pisani and Emile Gagna (2012), Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, https://www.ceps.eu 
/system/files/Sovereign%20Debt%20Crisis%20e-version.pdf  
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specific policies such as air, nature conservation, water and waste management have 
been applied differently by the member states and produced different outcomes (EEA, 
2015). For example, some studies have shown that the performance of a ‘leader’ or 
‘laggard’ varies across a number of policy fields at given points in time (Liefferink et al., 
2009; Knill et al., 2012). It is telling, though, that for some ‘leader’ states their 
environmental ambitions do not match with their policy outcomes despite their fame, while 
for the ‘laggards’ the opposite is true. A good example is Germany which is generally 
regarded as a ‘leader’ but has not always conformed to EU laws, such as their non-
compliance with the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (see Börzel, 2000). 
Although Germany is ‘leader’ in energy efficient cars, they do not have a speed limit on 
highways. It is thus likely that a ‘leader’ state can be a ‘laggard’ in individual fields. 
Consequently, looking at economy-wide and country effects of the credit crunch and at 
individual policies can give a misleading picture of the broader patterns. From a more 
critical perspective, the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic is the means that largely exemplifies 
these discrepancies among the member states as will be shown below. In this sense, EU 
environmental policy provides the context where successes and failures are linked to the 
implementation process and filtered through the performance (policy outputs and 
outcomes) of the member states. 
 
1.1. EU Environmental Policy and the Economic Crisis 
 
Environmental policy as Andrew Jordan (2001, 2008, 2012) explains in his seminal works 
has been one of the strong pillars and success stories of the EU since its establishment 
(Burns and Carter, 2013; EEA, 2015). Despite the lack of reference to the environment in 
the founding Treaty of the EU (1951), environmental policy emerged from a relative 
obscurity to a prominent pillar of EU policy (Haigh and Baldock, 1989; Hildebrand, 1992). 
The subsequent impact of successes then provided the grounds for more detailed and 
comprehensive developments culminating in the sophisticated and voluminous EU 
environmental policy frameworks seen in the 2000s (Jordan, 2012). The evolutionary 
progress of EU environmental policy has shown that amid many differences and disputes 
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a wide range of great policy achievements have been accomplished, namely: the increase 
of the ‘acquis communautaire’5 with the adoption of a large number of environmental 
regulations and directives, the integration of the environment with other policy areas such 
as economy as a key component of the single market and sustainable growth, and the 
increase of environmental standards in almost all the member states with significant 
improvement of environmental protection and the public health of citizens (Connelly and 
Smith, 2003; Lenschow, 2005).  
However, this is not to say that there have not been flaws or shortcomings in the 
development of EU environmental policy. Key challenges still remain in many 
environmental sectors, such as water and waste management, air pollution, nature, and 
resource conservation (EEA, 2015). That being said, the positive assessment of the EU's 
overall environmental performance6 over time accredits Europe as one of the most 
advanced systems of environmental protection worldwide. As a result, ambitious 
initiatives and long-term strategic plans have increased the EU’s standing in international 
relations, thus making it a global leader in the promotion of a green agenda and 
progressive environmental policies (Jordan, 2012). In this context, the success of 
environmental policy seems to be strongly contested in the wake of the credit crunch7 
(Lekakis and Kousis, 2013). It appears that economic uncertainty and fiscal instability 
have outstripped political developments with a clear dominance of the economic sphere 
in decision making. Under the weight of economic pressures, the outbreak of financial 
                                                          
5 Based on the definition of the European Parliament, ‘the acquis is the body of common rights and 
obligations that are binding on all the EU member states. It is constantly evolving and comprises the content, 
principles and political objectives of the Treaties; legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case 
law of the Court of Justice; declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; instruments under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy; international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered 
into by the member states among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities’. Date of access: 
15/3/2017, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en  
6 By the term of performance, I refer to the assessment of the progress a country made in terms of meeting 
the environmental targets and international environmental commitments as set by the EU and its member 
states. In this thesis, the term of performance has a two-pronged approach. First, it is defined in terms of 
policy outputs, for example, how and in what way the transposition of a policy was executed by the member 
states. Second, it is characterized by the outcome, which means that the intent and content of the policy 
was delivered with success or failure.  
7 A credit crunch is characterized as the economic condition in which investment capital seems very difficult 
to obtain. In this case, banks and investors are very cautious in lending funds to corporations, which 
consequently increase the price of debt products for borrowers. In the EU, the ensuing credit crunch made 
lending almost impossible for some countries like Greece due to low levels of solvency and high exposure 
to public debt. Date of access: 21/02/2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/credit crunch  
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crisis overtly called into question the existing status quo, the resulting cost of 
environmental policies and the prospects of the European integration project (Bowen and 
Stern, 2010). Consequently, the notions of economic competitiveness8 and state 
budgets9 forthrightly came into the spotlight (Burns and Tobin, 2016). The creation of an 
unstable political landscape amid many economic controversies essentially paved the 
way for further questioning of EU environmental policy by arguing that it has far exceeded 
its mission and already gone too far. For example, David Cameron, the former Prime 
Minister of the UK, called for a roll-back of EU environmental legislation as part of the 
renegotiation deal with the EU (ENDS Report, Jan-Feb 2013). Indicatively, the statements 
of other prominent politicians such as, the former United Kingdom Chancellor, George 
Osbourne, are moving on the same wavelength: 
“I do not want Britain to be a world leader in fighting climate change because the UK 
should not price itself out of international energy markets by placing too heavy an 
environmental burden on suppliers” (The Guardian, 28 September 2013).  
Similarly, at the EU level, the joint statement of the 21st Meeting of the Ministers of 
Environment of the Visegrad Group10 countries, followed by similar statements from 
Bulgaria and Romania, was very scathing towards the 2030 Framework for the EU’s 
climate change policy (2014). Reasonably, the above positions reflect a growing 
skepticism about the efficiency11 of environmental policy. More explicitly, there is a clear 
intention not to bear additional financial burden considering the economic challenges and 
national circumstances in their regions. In this context, the pronouncement of the 
President of the European Commission comes as a corollary to formalize the strong 
                                                          
8 It is the capacity of a corporation or a nation to provide products and services that meet the quality 
standards of the local and world markets at prices that are competitive and offer sufficient returns on the 
resources employed or consumed in producing them. Date of access: 12/04/2017, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/competitiveness.html  
9 The State Budget is the analytical financial plan for the fiscal year which determines the means of financing 
and expenditures. Date of access: 17/03/2017, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/budget.html   
10 The Visegrad Group (also known as the "Visegrad Four" or simply "V4") consists of four countries of 
Central Europe, that is, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia that have common interest and 
goals in various areas in the context of the European integration project. Date of access: 13/07/2016, (For 
more information please see the official website of the Visegrad Group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/).   
11 Efficiency means the comparison of what is actually produced or performed with what can be achieved. 
Date of access: 19/05/2017, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/efficiency.html.  
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concerns over the impact of the economic crisis on the EU’s competitiveness at the 
highest political and institutional level. 
“My first priority as Commission President will be to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness 
and to stimulate investment for the purpose of job creation. I intend to present, within the 
first three months of my mandate and in the context of the Europe 2020 review, an 
ambitious Jobs, Growth and Investment Package”, (Jean-Claude Juncker, Head of the 
European Commission, in his political manifesto for the elections of the EU Commission 
on 15th July 2014).  
Reasonably, the above quote serves as a ‘signaling device’ of the dominance of economic 
forces on the increasing competitiveness and economic activity to tackle unemployment 
without, however, explicit reference to the environment. However, it seems to deviate 
significantly from the long-term objectives of the EU. 
"In 2050, we live well, within the planet’s ecological limits. Our prosperity and healthy 
environment stem from an innovative, circular economy where nothing is wasted and 
where natural resources are managed sustainably, and biodiversity is protected, valued 
and restored in ways that enhance our society’s resilience. Our low-carbon growth has 
long been decoupled from resource use, setting the pace for a safe and sustainable global 
society", (EC: Europe 2020). 
In spite of the much-publicized and ambitious objectives of the EU - as seen above - with 
the declaration of Europe 2020, there is a strong sense of environmental backtracking. 
What looks to dominate in the political and public discourse is the worry and fear of a 
severe impact of the economic crisis on growth. The adoption of the 7th Environment 
Action Program (EAP) (see Chapter 2) essentially pledges the EU to a certain course by 
changing the current economic model to that of a green economy. On the other hand, 
many actions by the EU and European Commission (EC) appear to undermine these 
goals by adding further pressure on the existing environmental policies and future 
planning. An example of that is the introduction of the so-called ‘REFIT’ process12, that 
                                                          
12 The REFIT process (Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme) as part of the Commission's better 
regulation agenda focuses on simplifying EU law and reducing regulatory burdens, for the benefit of civil 
society, business and public authorities and attempts to make recommendations to the Commission, taking 
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is, the European Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance program. Its main 
action is to make EU law simpler and reduce regulatory costs, thus contributing to a clear, 
stable and predictable regulatory framework that supports growth and jobs. In other 
words, the main criticism lies in the review of environmental legislation within this 
programme and concerns the weakening of environmental policy in an attempt to 
decrease administrative and economic burdens. 
Following this and considering the tight economic constraints faced by member states 
suffering from budget cuts, there is the question of whether they have the capacity or will 
to implement EU environmental policy in the frame of the 7th Environment Action 
Programme and Europe 2020 (Burns and Carter 2012). Although the economic crisis 
primarily brought to the fore the economic differences among the member states, a key 
factor that has not drawn so much attention is the actual capacity of the member states 
to ‘download’ and implement environmental policy efficiently. Arguably, the institutional 
and administrative capacity of the state combined with strong policy structures are a good 
indicator of success, but existing studies (Jordan, 1998; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 
Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2002; Liefferink et al., 2009) show that this is seen by a small 
number of member states usually the Nordic countries, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and the UK (see Chapter 2).  
On the contrary, a large number of member states are still confronting many challenges 
in the workings of their state and public sector, particularly, those on the southern and 
eastern peripheries of Europe (Börzel, 2000; Knill et al., 2012). Simultaneously, strong 
political will is also a factor of great scientific interest but, more specifically, is dependent 
on the ambitions, aims, and priorities of each national government (see Chapter 2). 
Acknowledging that willingness alone is not enough and strong leadership skills are also 
required, this makes the task of implementation more difficult for those states that lack 
one or both. In this regard, those that are equipped with the above-mentioned elements 
are more likely to perform better and induce others into a 'competition' over efficient and 
correct implementation (Burns and Carter, 2012). By this means, the predominance of 
                                                          
into account suggestions made by citizens and interested parties. Date of access: 16/03/2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-891_en.htm  
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economics and fiscal measures as analyzed above under the guise of economic recovery 
and growth should not be overlooked.     
In such a context, the relationship between the environment and economy is strongly 
tested. Considering that EU environmental policy has been through various stages since 
its official commencement in the 1970s, the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 has 
shaken that delicate balance by dispersing a fear of further dismantling of the body of EU 
environmental policy (Jordan et al., 2012; Jordan and Huitema, 2014) (see Chapter 2). 
Given these circumstances, it could be argued that the EU is more inclined to address 
fiscal consolidation and sovereign debts than dealing with issues of apparently less 
importance, such as the environment (Lekakis and Kousis 2013). On a more critical tone, 
although this behavior was heavily criticized, for the majority of member states it was quite 
understandable at the time as public budgeting was at the top of the agenda. 
Given the diversity in the national economies and political culture of the 28 Member 
States, the adoption of a single approach to environmental policy has been and remains 
very difficult (Jordan 1999; Gehring 2006; Golub 2013). This is distinctly seen in the 
actions of member states such as Poland and the Eastern bloc countries generally, known 
as the V4 group, opposing the imposition of any environmental measures (Dangerfield, 
2008). Likewise, the Southern member states in the vortex of severe economic problems 
were more concerned about fiscal consolidation thus making the discussion about 
environmental measures almost prohibitive (Lekakis and Kousis, 2013). In this context, 
the implementation of environmental policy in a multi-level or federalizing polity such as 
the EU becomes more challenging. The oxymoron is that the convergence of views of 
both the EU Commission and some member states about injecting a new economic 
impetus is at odds with the highly-publicized environmental strategies. Hence, the 
environment erroneously seems to gain the reputation of being a brake on growth while 
retreating under the pressure of a strict economic agenda in favour of economic growth. 
Consequently, implementation, against this backdrop, has a disproportionately heavy 
burden to carry entailing in practice with the degree of performance. As Andrew Jordan 
(1998:69) argues: “Implementation lies at the 'sharp end' of the European Union (EU) 
environmental policy process. The success of the EU's policies must ultimately be judged 
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by the impact they have on the ground but despite many institutional initiatives, poor 
implementation remains a fact of life in Europe”.  
Simultaneously, implementation, as will be analyzed below, has always been a vexed 
issue, particularly for political reasons, and is frequently considered as the poor relation 
of policy analysis (Jordan, 1999). One might, reasonably, argue that implementation and 
policy making are separate and do not interact with each other. In an attempt to avoid 
generalizations or misconceptions, I argue that implementation may be affected by policy 
making and constitutes the cornerstone of EU environmental policy because the progress 
and success of policies lie in the efficient application by the relevant stakeholders (Jordan 
and Liefferink, 2004). What makes implementation even more important for this thesis is 
the fact that in the past the evaluation of the EU environmental policy was largely based 
on the amount of legislation adopted rather than the degree of effectiveness13 of 
environmental issues (Jordan 1999; Börzel, 2000; Liefferink et al., 2009). This key 
difference substantially explains the dominant political symbolism and the different 
treatment and responsiveness of the previous years on environmental problems. The 
gradual shift from isolated to more integrated approaches comes at a cost that any 
setbacks or piecemeal approaches occurred bring about delays and significant impact on 
the overarching aim of integration (Jordan 2009). Indicatively, the conditions shaped after 
the outbreak of the economic crisis showed great variance (Knill et al., 2012). Hence, one 
of the main objectives of this research is to illuminate this variance on the basis of different 
implementation patterns by the member states in light of the economic crisis.  
Given that implementation is a complex process, unsurprisingly, the advent of the 
economic crisis has made it even more difficult for some member states (Knill et al., 2012; 
Lekakis and Kousis, 2013). Undoubtedly, different dynamics emerge over the pace of 
implementation of environmental policies between the state and non-state actors at the 
domestic and supranational level (Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012). This is clearly 
seen in the cases of Southern and Eastern member states that have been most heavily 
                                                          
13 It means the extent to which goals are met and the extent to which problems are solved. Alternatively, 
this is the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result. In comparison to efficiency, 
effectiveness is not defined in terms of costs. Date of access: 19/05/2017, http://www.business 
dictionary.com/definition/effectiveness.html  
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hit by the economic crisis. As a result, austerity has seemingly put more pressure on 
administrations to cope with policy implementation. Additionally, in many cases, stark 
opposition and purported high costs in states, such as in Greece, have been influential in 
shaping the implementation deficit (Heritier, 1996; Börzel, 2003). In the same context, 
apart from the economic factors, administrative and institutional incapacity through the 
public administration played a key role. A general assumption is that correct 
implementation is dependent on a nexus of different endogenous (economic condition 
and costs, organizational and administrative capacity, and environmental awareness) and 
exogenous factors (transboundary environmental problems, internal market, and 
international treaties and conventions) (see Chapter 5 and 6). Therefore, there is a strong 
belief that further improvement and strengthening is necessary (IEEP, 2012; EEA, 2015; 
IMPEL, 2015). 
By outlining some of the general traits of implementation above I aim to make clear that 
the main subject of study explored will be the implementation of EU Environmental policy 
after the advent of economic crisis, namely, seeking below to explain how this fits into 
wider implementation studies, to provide some definitions of implementation and 
implementation deficit, and to explain its utility in the context of this thesis.  
 
1.2. Implementation Research 
 
Outlining the condition of EU environmental policy, one might question whether and to 
what extent implementation can remain unaffected by all these rapid developments at 
political and economic level. On the grounds of a more contemporary theorization and for 
the purpose of this thesis, I give a brief analysis here on the different waves and schools 
of thought that have affected the implementation studies. The definition I provide for 
implementation originates from the wide and rich literature characterized as a process 
where interplay between the various actors (public administration, environmental 
agencies, political leadership) is vital and not only drastically affects the application of 
policies but also evaluates the policy outputs and outcomes of EU policies. In doing so, I 
seek to look into the underlying causes and factors of implementation deficit or failure that 
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plague member states. Similarly, I attempt to elucidate performance not only as an 
economic term but one that is highly politicized which touches upon endogenous and 
exogenous factors. Henceforth, I will explain that implementation can be a domestic issue 
and member states undertake the implementation of policies in light of the economic 
crisis.  
Research on implementation has been influenced by three disciplinary fields. More 
specifically, Regime theory, Europeanization research, and Implementation in policy 
studies have made significant contributions to explaining the different levels, the interplay 
among the actors and how they shape the process by setting out the theoretical context 
for the understanding of policy implementation.  
 
1.2.1. Regime theories 
 
Regime theory is concerned with environmental issues and also focuses on the affairs of 
power, interests, and knowledge in the shaping and operationalization of international 
regimes. Much of its literature is structured around the shaping, effectiveness, and 
changes of regimes (Andresen et al. 1995; Victor, 1998; Weiss and Jacobson, 2000; Hanf 
and Underdal, 2000; Miles et al., 2001; Breitmeier et al., 2006). First, scholars 
concentrated their efforts on the formation and emergence of regimes with a view to 
exploring the various problems arising on the international agenda and how actors reach 
agreements (Victor et al. 1998a; Breitmeier et al. 2006). Second, particular weight was 
attributed to the concept of effectiveness as a key dependent variable and third, there 
was an attempt to pinpoint and explain the changes occurring in regimes, along with the 
driving forces that affect their development across time. Some scholars such as Najam 
(1995), Victor et al., (1998a) and Andresen et al., (1995) characterized the domestic 
implementation of international obligations as a new topic until the mid-1990s. A renewed 
interest in the late 1990s brought to the fore the examination of the relationship between 
international agreements and domestic policies. In doing so, domestic policies gain 
significant recognition and become more centralized in explicating how international 
obligations can come into the fruition at the domestic level and shape actors’ stances 
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(Hanf, 2000). A careful consideration of the nature of the problem along with costs and 
benefits; the power formation between the states; the nature of the agreements and its 
commitments, exogenous (economic and political) factors and public concern sought to 
highlight how effectiveness is influenced.  
Overall, the domestic implementation of international regimes needed more subtle 
analysis (Andresen et al., 1995; Victor et al., 1998a: 8-15; Weiss and Jacobson, 2000). 
However, the analysis of the implementation of international agreements, institutional 
resources, and national politics are the two fields that receive the most attention. 
Particularly for the latter, national politics is a decisive factor in the correct application of 
policies. However, as Andresen et al., (1995) put forward, there is a tendency of 
disregarding the particularities of the national perspective. Notably, there has been a 
significant effort since the mid-1990s to point out some domestic factors regarding the 
implementation of the regimes such as the institutional capacity, participation, conflict and 
exogenous socio-political influence (Underdal & Hanf 2000; Weiss & Jacobson 2000; 
Miles et al., 2001).  
 
1.2.2. Europeanization research 
 
Following the historical development of European integration and the increased 
importance of the supranational level, Europeanization studies emphasized the 
implementation of community legislation. The milestone of this field is the concept of 
Europeanization which started to develop in the mid-1980s. According to Héritier (2001: 
3), Europeanization is perceived as the process of influence that stems from decisions at 
the EU level. Correspondingly, Falkner et al., (2005) described it as the resulting domestic 
response to the issue of adjustment and change of the domestic framework of policies 
generated by legislative actions at the supranational level. For some others, such as 
Radaelli (2003), Europeanization is a process which institutionalizes policy paradigms, 
namely, the design and formulation of EU policies, that are determined at the EU level 
and from there are embodied in national policies.  
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The concept of Europeanization is used in this thesis to portray the permeation and 
incorporation of changes into the domestic framework by EU adaptation pressures. More 
explicitly, it casts light on the attempts and difficulties of the member states in 
‘downloading’ EU environmental policy as policy recipients that have to be implemented 
according to the EU treaties. Similarly, this happens because a number of member states 
find themselves in a rather weak economic condition thus entailing more hindrances as 
regards to the level of responsiveness and compliance with the EU stipulations. 
Simultaneously, it also encompasses characteristics of structural change as 
Featherstone (2003a) aptly mentions. More specifically, this structural change essentially 
transforms the domestic policy practices and the institutional and administrative 
structures where the incorporation of EU policies is ensured (Héritier 2001: 1). 
Starting from the mid-1980s, the study on the implementation gap set the foundations of 
a large-scale research to identify and tackle the causes of non-compliance as a policy 
output and look into the application of EU legislation (Knill and Lenschow, 1997). In this 
regard, there has been concerted action to interpret the impact of EU policies on the 
domestic policy framework as well as the variation and extent of domestic adjustment in 
the member states. A significant policy innovation is that apart from the practical effects 
induced on the member states, the EU is also considered as a polity within which 
implementation can be tested in order to enhance the existing knowledge and capture the 
main dynamics that ease or obstruct the application of policies. From this perspective, the 
examination of the EU as a multi-level polity and its inherent factors on the progress of 
implementation are of great interest to this thesis. 
Based on the literature three waves are discerned. The first wave of implementation is 
reflected in a number of studies as more apolitical. However, for some scholars such as 
Mastenbroek (2005), this revealed a substantial absence of solid theoretical context. 
Therefore, the ‘top-down’ approach according to Falkner et al., (2005:15) serves the need 
to depict the effective organization and structure as well as the hierarchy that determines 
the chain of command and control. Admittedly, this viewpoint epitomizes the crucial role 
of national administrations in facilitating implementation along with their organizational 
and administrative shortcomings. The ‘bottom-up’ approach rests on the idea that 
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implementation actors and target groups can be integrated into the process of decision-
making. More explicitly, the participation of domestic actors such as interest groups, sub-
national authorities and parliaments can play a pivotal role and ease the implementation 
of policies by taking part in decision-making at the EU level Falkner et al., 2005).  
The second wave since the late 1990s dealt with the politicization of implementation in 
the EU context by taking into account the adaptation costs. A dominant perception was 
that a failure by the member states to ‘upload’ their policy predilections and patterns at 
the EU level would induce increased opposition in the implementation process. Notions 
such as ‘the goodness of fit’ aimed to explicate the extent of resistance through the lens 
of compatibility between the EU and national institutional framework (Risse et al., 2001; 
Börzel, 2003). However, some of the critiques are centered on its restricted interpretive 
merit due to the fact that pressures provoked by the EU policies hinge on whether national 
actors seek to change or retain the current system irrespective of the level of fit or misfit 
of the domestic structures.  
In the third wave, the intricacy of national politics is more crystallized and provides a more 
detailed account of compliance as a policy output and how member states can meet the 
European requirements. Views such as of Héritier et al., (2001) reasonably give a more 
nuanced analysis by portraying the EU policies as an input in the national policy 
procedures. Therefore, domestic reform capacity is seen as a driving force for the policy 
implementation that relies on the existence of a strong political leadership to prompt or 
stall changes. Alongside this, another interesting view expressed by some other scholars 
(Haverland, 2003) is the mobilization of domestic political parties, public administration 
and civil society which may affect the implementation of policies. The analysis of Risse et 
al., (2001) practically combines the two main arguments stated above following a three-
step process where Europeanization, ‘goodness of fit’ and mediating factors influence 
policy implementation. In this sense, Europeanization is presented as an institution-
building procedure at the supranational level having set up a rich institutional context 
including regulations, laws, and processes for particular policy fields. The extent of 
compatibility between the domestic and supranational structures, unavoidably, 
determines the adaptation pressures. However, domestic characteristics seem to have a 
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strong influence in the formation of policy outcomes. This is corroborated by the fact that 
each state faces different difficulties and needs thus making domestic adaptation very 
challenging.   
On the other hand, despite the explanatory framework provided as to what extent EU 
affects the national systems, Radaelli (2003) puts forward a rather more assertive 
approach. He stated that the machinery that seeks to interpret Europeanization is at a 
premature level. Hence, there are two main challenges arising from Europeanization 
studies. Greater emphasis on the issue of policy outcomes is required due to the 
involvement of different stakeholders and manifoldness of actions, and a more 
transcendent and inclusive research is necessary to more accurately illustrate the 
interplay and causes (Falkner et al., 2005; Sverdrup, 2005). One of the goals of this thesis 
is to address these two challenges explaining the potential policy outcomes in tandem 
with outputs and construing the nexus of actors and causes that lead to implementation 
deficit. 
 
1.2.3. Implementation in policy studies 
 
Implementation lies at the crossroads of various policy fields such as public administration 
and management and organizational theory (Parsons, 2003). To better understand the 
evolution of implementation studies, the distinction of the three different generations will 
give an outline of the main developments through time (Pülzl and Treib, 2007). 
Implementation was ignored by policy studies due to the fact that it is not closely related 
to a procedure where policy decisions were executed ipso facto and desirably by the 
central administration (Younis & Davidson 1990: 4). The emergence of implementation 
studies back in the 1970s, primarily in the US, was a response to the increasing concerns 
on the issue of effectiveness targeted at a set of reform programs. By the end of the 
1960s, the dominant perception was that implementation was dependent on the intentions 
of decision makers (Parsons, 2003). The attempt towards a more inclusive consideration, 
such as ‘translating policy into action’ based on the analysis of Barrett (2004: 251), offered 
a new opportunity in the study of this field given that policies appeared to fall short of 
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policy plans, ambitions, and expectations. Against this backdrop, the first generation of 
implementation studies culminating during the 1970s was depicted by a rather pessimistic 
tone. This bleak picture was underpinned by an array of examples that led to 
implementation failure. The main exponents of this period that pointed out the main 
shortcomings and weaknesses in their seminal work are Derthick (1972), Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1973) and Bardach (1977). The approach of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) 
essentially set the modern foundations of a more critical analysis and triggered a new 
interest by increasing the existing body of literature. Interestingly, prior studies perhaps 
did not highlight its importance so much. Furthermore, Jenkins (1978: 203) and Hupe 
(2003) described implementation as a process of change emphasizing how this can be 
provoked and take place. For some scholars, such as Hargrove (1983), the avoidance or 
negligence of making such links essentially kept the value of this interplay in the shadows 
thus presenting a gap in analysis and research. Overall, the aim of the first generation 
was to raise awareness and express the need for other approaches in the academic 
environment and public sphere.  
Given the above context, it could be said that theory building was not an overarching 
purpose of the first generation but there was a serious attempt in the second generation 
with the employment of more advanced theoretical contexts to address that issue. It is 
telling that many of the debates are defined by a strong nuance of how the ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ perspectives can be used to explain the implementation study. The separation 
of these schools of thought brought to the fore how the execution of implementation 
should be made. The ‘top-down’ model was mainly expressed by scholars such as Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), Mazmanian and Sabatier 
(1983) with the use of a more hierarchical model, that is, the exercise of policy intentions 
that are determined at the central level. Simultaneously, the ‘bottom-up’ model articulated 
a different form of reasoning with a particular focus on the issue of implementation as part 
of an ordinary action plan to problem-solving such as the “street-level bureaucrats”. The 
main proponents of this model were scholars such as Lipsky (1971, 1980), Ingram (1977), 
Elmore (1980), Hjern and Hull (1982). As a more intermediate link, the third generation 
sought to identify and fill the gaps between the two models by encompassing the main 
features of both schools of thought in its theoretical frame. Moreover, this paved the way 
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to formulate a slightly different approach manifesting its more scientific character in 
comparison with the other two generations (Goggin et al., 1990). According to Pülzl and 
Treib, (2007: 90) ‘third-generation scholars thus lay much emphasis on specifying clear 
hypotheses, finding proper operationalizations and producing adequate empirical 
observations to test these hypotheses.’ Nevertheless, scholars such as DeLeon (1999) 
and O’Toole (2000) argued that only a limited number of studies have based their 
analyses on that pattern. 
 
1.2.4. Implementation in this thesis  
 
The summary of the main models presented above offers distinct insights into the study 
of implementation. More explicitly, my analysis on implementation in this thesis builds 
more on the traditions of Europeanization by explaining how the member states 
‘download’ policies from the EU to the national level through the ‘top-down’ model. The 
study of implementation of EU Environmental policy during the economic crisis fits very 
well into that school of thought because it gives me the opportunity as researcher to 
investigate the manifoldness and operation of a multi-level polity such as the EU, the 
relationship and interactions between the national and supranational level, the adaptation 
pressures induced by the EU to the domestic framework, and the degree of compatibility 
‘goodness of fit’, as well as the capacity of domestic actors (member states) and public 
administration in the application of policies. Accordingly, I refer to implementation as the 
process of transposing, imposing and applying the community law at the domestic level 
by the member states as dictated by the relevant EU treaties. More specifically, this 
process shows that policies are initiated at the EU level but it is the responsibility of the 
member states to implement them. Concurrently, the nature of these policies and 
directives lies in general but not exclusive frameworks providing high flexibility in the 
means by which targets are met. Therefore, at this stage, there are two critical points 
worth a mention. First, I explain implementation in terms of policy outputs, that is, the 
actions that the national governments actually follow, such as transposition14, 
                                                          
14 It is the incorporation of EU directives into an EU country’s national legislation. Date of access: 
04/05/2017, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al22021  
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conformity15, enforcement16 and application17 of EU policies at the domestic level. More 
explicitly, I seek to define how and in which way policies are executed and applied by the 
member states. Second, I refer to policy outcomes as the results that are caused by the 
outputs or the condition which demonstrates whether a policy has been successfully 
implemented or failed to meet the targets agreed at the EU level. In simple words, policy 
outcomes regard environmental quality. Additionally, by the term of implementation 
deficit, I focus on the policy failures or weaknesses of the member states in terms of 
achieving specific policy outcomes and complying with the EU requirements and 
legislation. Given that the existing literature and many studies attribute particular weight 
to the administrative character and capacity of the state machinery for the policy 
implementation (Knill, 1998; Jordan 1999, 2001, 2012; Börzel 2000; Knill and Lenschow, 
2001, 2005; Liefferink and Jordan 2005; Hill and Knill, 2006), from the empirical evidence 
in this research I demonstrate that implementation is not simply a mechanistic legal 
process but is in many instances, a big financial and political process for the member 
states (see also Knill and Lenschow, 2001; Jordan, 2012). More explicitly, it is a financial 
process that includes internal and external costs. For example, high costs of 
implementation are likely to be more of a problem for countries with smaller economies 
or bigger debts such as Greece. Likewise, it is a complicated political process that 
demands strong political and administrative capacity. Countries that have political 
stability, strong will and political leadership as well as strong public administration, usually 
the Nordic countries (see Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Jordan and Lenschow, 2000; 
Knill et al., 2012), are more likely to implement more efficiently policies. Between these 
two, the human dimension is also very critical. That is an exchange of experience, best 
practices, skills, learning, and understanding of implementation actors (see also Jordan 
1999, 2002; Knill and Lenschow 2001; Wilson and Buller, 2001; Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, 2002; Thomson et al., 2007; Knill et al., 2012).  
                                                          
15 It is compliance with the EU rules, laws and standards. Date of access:19/05/2017, http://ec.europa.eu 
/ipg/content/tips/words-style/jargon-alternatives_en.htm  
16 The act of imposing observance of or compliance with a law, rule, or obligation. Date of 
access:19/05/2017, http://ec.europa.eu /ipg/content/tips/words-style/jargon-alternatives_en.htm  
17 It is the action of putting, for example, a law or policy into operation. Date of access:19/05/2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu /ipg/content/tips/words-style/jargon-alternatives_en.htm  
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1.3. ‘Leader-Laggard’ dynamic and federalist explanations   
 
The analysis of the main developments of the implementation studies and the main 
approach of this thesis above will help us understand with clarity some of the 
implementation challenges during the economic crisis. However, the study of 
implementation indisputably - as seen above - cannot ignore or dismiss the basic 
component of this analysis, that is, the performance as policy outputs and outcomes of 
the member states at the international level. Within the context of Europe 2020, the 
debate on the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamics of environmental policy has become very 
meaningful. In light of costs, many of the weak performers and implementers of EU 
environmental policy, as the countries who have been most affected by Europe’s 
economic problems, are under severe pressure to weaken environmental plans, actions, 
and legislation. This condition would suggest that the EU may struggle to meet the Europe 
2020 targets of a competitive environmental growth on the back of environmental 
sustainability and low carbon growth. 
In this context, the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic is the means or the vehicle to help analyze 
these developments both at national and supranational level under the condition of a 
systematic classification. In a general sense, the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic could be said 
to be derived from the Europeanization research, as a comparative evaluation of the 
degree and speed of adoption and implementation of EU Environmental policies by the 
member states at the international level (Liefferink et al., 2009) (see also the discussion 
on implementation above in this chapter). Therefore, it follows a comparative approach 
on the overall trend of the adoption and implementation of specific environmental tools 
and policies across time (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Knill et al., 2012). More 
specifically, ‘leaders’ are the member states that have progressive environmental policies 
at the domestic level seeking to upgrade their domestic policies to the EU level and induce 
a regulatory competition. This also means that they are good implementers and can 
introduce effective policies by adopting innovative approaches (Jänicke, 2005). On the 
other hand, ‘laggards’ are those member states that fall behind with their environmental 
policy targets due to systemic institutional weaknesses and implementation failures 
(Börzel 2000). The classification of ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ rests mainly on the analysis 
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of the amount of environmental legislation adopted, the strictness of the regulatory 
framework, policy innovations, implementation deficits and policy outputs by the member 
states at the EU or international level (Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012).  
Given the economic downturn, the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic operates as a channel for 
further investigation on the ongoing controversy regarding the EU environmental policy 
implementation patterns since the 1970s. Although the ‘leader-laggard’ debate 
contributes greatly to a better understanding of EU environmental policy, it exhibits some 
big gaps in terms of a more contemporary theorization (see Chapter 2). A large part of 
the literature is outdated and includes descriptive accounts based on assumptions which 
have not fully considered the changing context, structure, and priorities of the EU that 
occurred after 2000 and particularly after the advent of the economic crisis (2008). The 
traditional perception includes aspects such as ‘The Mediterranean Syndrome’, which 
depict weak environmental policy implementation as a general phenomenon of a regional 
area (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993). However, this approach contains generalizations 
and stereotypical perceptions of specific EU regions based on old-fashioned studies 
mainly conducted in the 1990s (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993). In a wider sense, the 
majority of the European states are confronted with compliance problems in many policy 
areas, even those with advanced domestic structures and progressive environmental 
policies (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Jordan, 2000; Börzel, 2003; Jänicke, 2005; 
Wurzel, 2008).  
In this light, this thesis argues that the theorization of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic finds 
a more interesting expression in the face of federalism as the theory which more explicitly 
describes the current form of the EU as a system of multi-level governance (see Chapter 
3). Concurrently, the federal theory has the advantage and ability to identify, interpret and 
analyze the existing regulatory and implementation trends as well as the relation and 
interactions between the two levels - in this case - the EU and its member states. The 
rebirth of federalism in the last decades has introduced a different way of thinking about 
and analyzing the EU as a binary system with clear competencies. According to Jan Erk 
(2006: 4) “federalism has experienced a remarkable renaissance in the recent decades, 
as an alternative way to accommodate ethnic differences, as a way to combat remote, 
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undemocratic, and ineffective central governments, and lastly as a way to bring together 
members of the European Union”. Although the theories of Intergovernmentalism and 
Neofunctionalism provide a good account of EU policy making and integration, they have 
in fact been criticized for failing to explain the EU as a multi-level system of governance 
in terms of distribution of powers, task allocation between the national and supranational 
level and, ultimately, policy implementation (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and 
Flinders, 2004; Benson and Jordan, 2011) (see Chapter 3).  
This assumption is distinctly reflected in the seminal work of Börzel and Hosli (2002:5), 
“The EU may be described as a system of multi-level governance, where sovereignty 
rights are shared and divided between supranational, national, and subnational 
institutions. While traditional theories of International Relations and European integration 
have difficulties in capturing the multi-level nature of the emerging European polity, the 
constitutional language of federalism appears to be helpful in order to analyze and 
discuss the ways in which the division of power is organized among the different levels of 
government in the EU”.  
According to some other scholars (Sbragia, 1993; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2001) 
federalism is a strong is a strong theoretical and interpretative tool in the examination of 
EU integration, particularly as a step forward for those who consider the notion of the 
nation-state as the foundation of the international system (see Chapter 3). Similarly, as 
Quermonne (2001) contends the federal perspective is a critical pathway for those who 
aim to explain the dynamics between the domestic and supranational levels of 
governance. A direct link emerges between federalism and the implementation theories 
(Europeanization) according to the above description. Federalism seeks also to explicate 
not only the distribution of power but also the relations and interactions at both levels with 
a specific focus on policy making and implementation. In a sense, this theory gives a clear 
understanding of how the idea of a de-territorialized political plan affects the relationship 
with the traditional nation-states as well as the shaping of interests in view of new political 
developments (Lequesne, 2004). 
Considering that a number of scholars (Hooghe, 1996; Marks et al., 1996b; Armstrong 
and Bulmer, 1998; Kohler-Koch and Larat, 2009) see in the EU a model that is beyond 
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the state-centric approach surrounded by multiple driving forces and interests, they 
arguably highlight the gradual abandonment of exclusiveness and supremacy of the 
nation-state. Likewise, as Ackerman (1997) argues, federalism is not constrained to a 
state-centric analysis on the distribution of power between the centre and the constituent 
units. Therefore, it encompasses the study of a procedure where the centre has a 
dominant role and seeks to build special relations with the constituent units. Drawing on 
that idea, EU policy making is subject to broader collaborations between the EU 
institutions, member states, and interest groups. Through the lens of governance, a shift 
of problems and decisions from the domestic level to the EU emerges. A similar 
interpretation given by Chang (2005) suggests that federalism is focused on the process 
and ways the center and the constituent units interact and collaborate with each other 
over time. Lastly, a more precise explanation is provided by Benson and Jordan (2011) 
that stresses the evolution of federalism as a political practice, namely the means of 
adjusting the distribution of power in multi-level systems and a theoretical perspective 
whose aim is to illuminate integration and define its final stage within a more normative 
context.  
Consequently, the theory of federalism seems to be a more comprehensive and well-
suited to the contemporary demands of the EU as it successfully deals with the functional 
and peripheral role of political power in multi-level systems of governance. Similarly, it 
better interprets European integration under a more normative framework (see Chapter 
3). In this regard, the current status of the EU is in a process of federalization with a 
vertical distribution (‘top-down’ process) of competences between the EU and member 
states which constitute significant elements for the consideration of the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic (Auer, 2005; Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2007; Vogel et al., 2012). Hence, it may 
be argued that interaction between the actors at national and supranational level 
discloses the influence of the various endogenous and exogenous factors in the 
implementation of EU environmental policy (see Chapter 5 and 6). In a more nuanced 
analysis, the different types of federalism (cooperative, regulatory and fiscal) shed light 
on particular functions and parts of the EU which are deemed very important to 
understand European integration and the implementation of EU Environmental policy 
respectively (see Chapter 3 and 7).  
22 
 
More explicitly, cooperative federalism explains the relationship between the EU and 
member states through joint actions. It also focuses on how the competencies are 
distributed efficiently between the two levels by pointing out the importance of 
collaboration when implementing the environmental policy due to the existence of 
spillovers (Ellickson, 1979; Elazar, 1964, 1991; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; Sarnoff, 
1997; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Burgess, 2006; Benson and Jordan, 2011). Regulatory 
federalism examines how social, economic and environmental implications derive from 
different environmental standards and lead to politics of ‘competence and discretion’ 
between the two levels with the aid of ECJ to better policy implementation. Therefore, it 
analyzes the distribution of regulatory tasks, that is, the EU to set standards and the 
member states to choose the combination of tools to meet those standards (Bagnall, 
1985; Hedge et al., 1991; Majone, 1992; Rodden, 2002; Kelemen, 2000, 2004, 2009). 
Finally, fiscal federalism deals with the vertical structure of the public sector by focusing 
on the operations and provision of fiscal instruments in terms of what tasks are best 
centralized or assigned to the decentralized levels of government to implement a policy 
due to different standards. It also investigates, in a normative context, the role of the 
different levels of government in optimizing well-being and achieving a high-quality 
provision of public services by reducing the fiscal imbalances between the jurisdictions 
through the use of intergovernmental grants. More specifically, this theory suggests that 
when market failures such as environmental degradation emerge the EU intervenes to 
rectify these problems by internalizing the externalities and helping financially (funding) 
the member states to implement the environmental policy (Musgrave, 1959; Obinger, et 
al. 2005; Ahmad and Brosio, 2006; Sellers and Lindstrom, 2007; Oates, 1999, 2005, 
2008; Majocchi, 2008; Wildasin, 2008; Weingast, 2009). By this account, the theorization 
and analysis of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic through the different versions of federalism 
illuminates the distribution of powers in the EU, task allocation, and the endogenous and 
exogenous drivers of the environmental policy implementation in EU member states (see 
Chapter 3 and 7). 
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1.4. Aims and objectives  
 
1.4.1. Aims 
 
Given the above context, this thesis aims to re-examine the EU environmental policy and 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic since the 2008 economic crisis using a federal theory 
perspective. In doing so, it will provide insights into the feasibility of the EU’s plans to link 
economic recovery to strong or high environmental standards as outlined in Europe 2020. 
Drawing on the interpretative context of the three federal approaches (cooperative, 
regulatory and fiscal) I will explain and evaluate the implementation of environmental 
policy in a multilevel system of governance, such as the EU. 
 
1.4.2. Objectives 
 
The main objectives of the thesis are to: 
1) Map the environmental policy implementation patterns in EU member states and the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic following the 2008 credit crunch. 
2) Produce two in-depth case studies, in the context of the EU, on the environmental 
policy implementation including one purported ‘leader’ (UK) and one traditional ‘laggard’ 
(Greece). 
3) Use federal theory perspectives to explore the influential factors shaping the ‘Leader-
Laggard’ dynamic in EU environmental policy. 
4) Use the theory of federalism for a more contemporary theorization of the EU. 
 
1.5. Case Study Selection 
 
In conducting social research, the case study approach is offered as one of the many 
ways of empirical inquiry (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2013). Alternative ways are 
mainly expressed through experiments, histories, surveys and archival information (Yin, 
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1994). The use of case studies has been very challenging in social sciences (George and 
Bennett, 2005). Despite the critiques of the case study as a research method, its 
contribution is very important to the knowledge of socio-political, individual, group, 
organizational and other issues (Simons, 2009; May, 2011). One of the main benefits of 
this approach is the production of wider inferences and generalizations on the dynamics 
and trends of the society (Stoecker, 1991; Harvey, 2010). Furthermore, the scope of this 
approach extends to many disciplines such as political science, sociology, psychology 
and economics (Gilgun, 1994; Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2002).  
Different types of case studies help more accurately define the content of study according 
to several authors. Initially, Stake (1995) distinguishes them as intrinsic, instrumental or 
collective, Bassey (1999) as theory-seeking and theory-testing, story-telling, picture-
drawing, and evaluative and Merriam (1988) based on their character as descriptive, 
interpretative, and evaluative. Similarly, Yin (1994), in the frame of evaluation research, 
discerns five categories, that is, explanatory, descriptive, illustrative, exploratory and 
‘meta-evaluation’. Of particular interest is the explanatory type, which seeks to interpret 
the causal links in real-life occasions. According to Helen Simons (2009), there are 
another three types of case studies: theory-led or theory-generated, evaluation and 
ethnographic. The selection of case studies is always a difficult process but a strong tool 
for a thorough study in comparative analyses which I will use in this thesis (George and 
Bennett, 2005; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
Many have argued (Merriam, 1988; Stake, 1995; Simons, 1996, 2009) that a case study 
research approach has provided valuable insights into the analysis of a phenomenon and 
specific context in the social sciences by bringing a kind of ‘quiet methodological 
revolution’, as described by Denzin and Lincoln (1994: ix). Although a case study is 
basically determined by its uniqueness, namely the phenomenon being examined, the 
selection of method is relevant to that. However, the definition of a case study encounters 
a wide diversity of views across different disciplines (MacDonald and Walker, 1975; 
Merriam, 1988; Stake, 1995; Gomm et al., 2004). For the purpose of this thesis, the 
definition of Yin (1981,1994, 2013) is preferred: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
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boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1994: 13). For the 
majority of scholars and the author of this thesis, the selection of case studies has an 
intentional character. The type of case study employed is theory-testing aimed at 
providing a descriptive, interpretative and evaluative account of the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic. Therefore, the selection of case studies has, for the conduction of this research, 
met the following basic criteria: 
• First and foremost, to include two EU member states that fit to the descriptions of 
the existing literature as a purported ‘leader’ (UK) and a traditional ‘laggard’ 
(Greece) in EU environmental policy. While much of the literature is analyzing the 
‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’, the primary goal is to test whether these characterizations 
are still valid in the recent economic crisis for Greece and the UK. Broadly, 
according to the ‘leader-laggard’ classification, the UK is quite often referred as 
‘inbetweener’ and Greece as a ‘laggard’ (see Chapter 2). Given that the main focus 
of this thesis is placed on implementation I only make the case for the UK being a 
‘leader’ in this area as it has a very good reputation and record of compliance with 
EU policy and is seen as one of the best implementers (Jordan and Lenschow, 
2009; Jordan, 1998, 2012). On the other hand, Greece does not deviate from the 
existing classification, which means that is well-positioned at the lower end of the 
ranking. This also shows that their poor implementation record reflects the 
structural, institutional, administrative and economic problems in complying with 
EU standards (see Chapter 2). Additionally, from a geographic point of view, 
Greece represents the Southern European region as less developed compared to 
the industrialized and rich North. The UK, as part of Central and Northern Europe 
shares more similar features with Germany and the Scandinavian countries 
regarding the level of economic prosperity, development, and organization. In this 
context, this thesis aims to present an in-depth and updated version of both 
countries.  
• Second, to more accurately identify the discrepancies in implementation patterns 
focusing on policy outputs and outcomes. Given that the selected countries appear 
to have a different starting point as members of the EU, this gives the opportunity 
to explore the domestic dynamics, to capture the implementation trends and make 
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strong comparisons over their actual performance after a severe economic crisis 
that hit mostly the Southern periphery and to a lesser extent the other European 
regions.  
• Third, to examine the endogenous and exogenous factors in EU member states 
that affect the implementation of policies and lead to implementation deficits. 
Consequently, particular weight is attributed to the role of national actors and 
practices for the correct application of policies including also the political, economic 
and cultural aspects  
 
1.6. Outline of the chapters 
 
To address the above-mentioned aims and objectives, the main structure of this thesis 
unfolds in the following way. Chapter Two reviews the existing literature on the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic and the history of the EU Environmental Policy by providing a full 
explanatory context. More specifically, the first part analyzes the most important phases 
in the evolution of the EU environmental policy by separating them into three distinct 
periods. Then, the second part examines and clarifies the definition of the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic, key characteristics, and its relation to EU environmental policy. In addition, an 
analytical account of the main features of each of these groups (‘leaders/laggards/in 
between’) is outlined. Finally, the implications of this research are analytically explained 
in order to substantiate the reasons for the study of policy implementation during the 
economic crisis.       
Chapter Three constitutes the theoretical foundation of this thesis by analyzing the 
different theoretical perspectives on the EU and the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic. Initially, a 
discussion of the traditional understandings of the EU through Intergovernmentalism and 
Neofunctionalism along with the main critiques is provided. The main scope is to highlight 
why these theories have, to a large extent, been unable to provide strong explanations 
on European integration and policy implementation in a multi-level governance system 
such as the EU. Consequently, this paves the way for the analysis of the federal theory 
as the theoretical basis for the thesis which can provide a more contemporary theorization 
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and explain more accurately the relations between the national and supranational level, 
distribution of power, task allocation and policy implementation with the aid of the three 
federal approaches (cooperative, regulatory and fiscal) upon which the discussion on the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic takes place.  
Chapter Four outlines the methodological approaches for the conduct of this research. 
The aim of this chapter is to deploy in detail all the research steps in data collection and 
analysis. The first section is concerned with the philosophical context of this study, that 
is, the influence of epistemological positions and critical realism in this study. After that, 
the second section explores elite interviewing and the different techniques used (e.g. 
semi-structured questionnaire and open-ended discussion) as the main method of this 
research. Following that the third and fourth part focus on the utility of the documentary 
analysis and descriptive statistics in the form of environmental infringements as 
complementary to elite interviews. The fifth section examines the data validity through the 
process of triangulation and other validation methods to enhance the reliability of the 
analysis. Finally, the importance of ethical considerations based on anonymity, 
confidentiality, and data protection are highlighted.  
Chapter Five introduces the first set of empirical findings by developing and mapping out 
the broader implementation patterns of EU environmental policy after the financial crisis 
in 2008, - the first objective of this thesis. The main scope of this chapter is to illustrate, 
to what extent, the economic crisis has affected the implementation of environmental 
policy with the aid of 26 elite interviews, documentary analysis, and descriptive statistics 
(environmental infringements). Initially, it breaks down the policy outputs and outcomes 
at the EU level considering also additional factors. Next, it compares the above-
mentioned policy outputs and outcomes with the policy outcomes at the level of EU 
member states. Thereafter, the distinction of endogenous and exogenous drivers takes 
as criterion the Member state level in order to more accurately capture and deploy the 
different dynamics in member states. Concluding, an evaluation of the EU implementation 
performance is provided.    
Chapter Six presents the second set of empirical findings - the second objective of this 
thesis - by comparing a ‘reputed’ leader (UK) and a ‘traditional’ laggard (Greece) in the 
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implementation of EU environmental policy. The basic aim of this chapter is to shed light 
on the implementation patterns of each country and compare them in light of the economic 
crisis. First, to better understand the environmental background and framework of both 
countries, the historical context and relationship with the EU is given. Second, the 
analysis of policy outputs is based only on data from elite interviews and documentary 
analysis. Third, an analytical overview of the policy outcomes is given with the aid of 
descriptive statistics (environmental infringements). In this context, a comparative 
approach unfolds for the UK and Greece with the EU-average. Fourth, the assessment 
only of the endogenous drivers reveal the differences in implementation dynamics 
between the case studies. Fifth, a concise description of the implementation performance 
of the UK and Greece is deployed based on the aforementioned. 
Chapter Seven provides the context of the theoretically informed discussion of the 
research findings on the basis of objectives 3 and 4 of this thesis. More explicitly, the use 
of the three federal approaches (cooperative, regulatory and fiscal) as the main 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, tests the applicability of federalism in the 
study of the implementation of EU environmental policy during the economic crisis and 
checks whether the research findings and the 'leader-laggard' dynamic are compatible 
with the theory. Finally, a concise review and some basic reflections on the utility and the 
main critiques of federal approaches are developed focusing, simultaneously, on the gaps 
of the theory and two of the main research findings. 
Chapter Eight as the final chapter offers the concluding remarks of this thesis. It starts 
with how the basic aims and objectives have been addressed throughout this research 
as outlined in the introduction. Following that the brief analysis on the understanding of 
the impact of the economic crisis reflects the political and economic challenges in the 
implementation of EU environmental policy. The summary of the main research findings 
aims to stress the importance and the theoretical value of this research in policy 
implementation and the study of the 'leader-laggard' dynamic during the economic crisis. 
With the inclusion of future research, alternative ways are suggested for the study of the 
'leader-laggard' dynamic. Finally, it is evaluated the novelty and the contributions of this 
thesis to scientific knowledge in comparison to other studies. 
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Chapter 2 - The ‘Leader-Laggard’ Dynamic: A History of 
EU Environmental Policy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the establishment of the EU in 1957 did not include any specific reference to the 
environment, the environmental policy did not take long to officially come to the fore. For 
many, the environmental policy is considered as one of the most rapidly growing policy 
areas of the EU that has led to high legislative and regulatory expansion, the adoption of 
various policy innovations and increase of the environmental standards (Knill and 
Lenschow, 2000; Carter, 2001; Wurzel and Connelly, 2010; Jordan, 2012; Holzinger and 
Sommerer, 2013). First, in this chapter, I will start off by deploying the historical context 
of the environmental policy and the different evolutionary phases. A detailed analysis of 
each period will provide a better insight and understanding of the gradual progress. 
Second, I will analyze the academic debate on the 'leader-laggard' dynamic, definitions, 
basic characteristics, current trends, various factors and actions of member states in EU 
environmental policy. Third, I will explain the ‘Pull and Push’ model, namely, the ‘top-
down’ approach used in this thesis. Fourth, I shall develop the implications of this 
research. 
 
 
2.1. Evolution of Environmental Policy 
 
There are three important phases in the evolution of environmental policy in the EU 
(Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). Officially, the first phase commenced with the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in the same year (1957) (Vogel, 1998). With the founding of the European Union (EU) 
there was no official context for developing environmental policies and laws, as well as 
no reference to the notion of the environment in the Treaty of Rome (1957) (Jordan, 1999, 
2002). The Stockholm conference on Human Environment in 1972 was the last important 
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event of this period. The second phase was marked by the approval of the first Community 
Action Program on the environment in the Council of Ministers, which came into effect in 
1973 and lasted until the end of 1985 with the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA). 
During the second phase, EU environmental policy started with limited legislative action. 
The third phase coincides with the confirmation of the SEA that came into force on the 
1st July 1987 and continues until to date (Jordan, 2005). 
The goal of the first period was focused on the harmonization of laws in order to abrogate 
the various trade barriers among member states (McCormick, 2003). Some observers 
assume as incidental the fact that the bulk of environmental legislation was adopted due 
to spillovers from the economic policy (Haigh and Baldock, 1989; Hildebrand, 1992). 
Although, Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) has referred to ‘a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase 
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between 
the states belonging to it’, it led to vague interpretations of environmental policy 
implications, stressing only the aspects of improved standards of living and quality of life 
(Liefferink and Jordan, 2004). As a result, the main idea of environmental protection was 
promoted by those countries with a more sensitive approach to environmental issues and 
high domestic environmental standards. Between 1964 and 1975 a major legislative effort 
took place on the principle of prevention such as the excessive subsidization on the 
regeneration or incineration of used oil (Rehbinder and Steward, 1985). For the first time, 
a directive set a specific context concerning issues such as packaging, classification, and 
labeling of dangerous materials. There were only nine directives and one regulation which 
dealt with economic issues and ‘the establishment or functioning of the common market’, 
rather than environmental concerns. In a sense, the period prior to 1973 heralded many 
changes at the institutional and political level which will now be discussed (Jordan, 2002).  
The second period of the environmental legislative action began in the early 1970s. The 
milestone of this period was the Paris Summit Conference on the 19th and 20th October 
1972, in which the Commission launched the Community Action Programs on the 
environment (Jordan, 1999, 2000). The various Environment Action Programmes (EAPs) 
outlined the core of EU environmental policy, on the basis of the main aims, principles, 
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plans, measures and priorities for the strategic planning and management of the 
environment (Jordan and Lenschow, 2008). More explicitly, the first EAP aimed to 
improve the quality of the living conditions of people residing in the European Community 
(Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Jordan, 2002). The principle of preventive environmental 
action was prominent. The adoption of 11 principles (Prevention, Action at source, 
Integrated Pollution Control, Resource Conservation, High Level of Protection, 
Precaution, Appropriate Level of Action, Subsidiarity, Polluter pays, Environmental Policy 
Integration) reflected those overriding objectives (Weale et al., 2000). Given that the 
decade of the 1970s was considered as a very turbulent period with numerous 
environmental disasters in all over the world, in 1973, there was an attempt to consolidate 
the frame of environmental policy of the European Community through specific and 
relevant measures and actions (Zito, 2005). Similarly, public pressure played a key role 
in mobilizing national governments regarding the continuing degradation of the 
environment (Knill and Liefferink, 2007).  
Following the first EAP, environmental protection gained significant recognition and 
became a key component of the political agenda (Wurzel, 2002, 2003). After having 
successfully completed the first EAP, it was high time and fertile ground for the 
development of the next action programs. The duration of the second EAP was from 1977 
to 1981 (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). The main scope was to continue on the path 
outlined by the previous EAP. Particular attention was paid to the notion of pollution and 
the rational management of natural resources. The third EAP was announced in 1982 
and lasted until 1986 (Lenschow, 2000). The aim of that programme was to forestall the 
introduction of different environmental standards by the member states and lead to 
market distortions (Jordan, 2002). That action program was infused by the intake of new 
policy tools such as the environmental evaluation. The adoption of the articles 130r, 130s 
and 130t reinforced the formulation of environmental legislation (Connelly and Smith, 
2003). The central theme of this action program was that environmental considerations 
have a great impact on other community policies such as agriculture, energy, industry 
and transport and vice versa (Jordan, 2002). By 1985, 40 directives, 8 decisions and 10 
regulations on the environment had been adopted (Jordan, 2005).   
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The third phase of EC’s environmental policy was known as the ‘initiative phase’, which 
commenced with the fourth EAP, from 1987 to 1992, with the notion of ecological 
modernization (McCormick, 2001; Baker, 2007). The fourth EAP was the continuation of 
the previous programs seeking to reinvigorate the structure and directions of 
environmental policy-making based on educational and technological advancements 
(Wurzel, 2003a,b). Moreover, the clear orientation towards integration of the main 
disciplines of agriculture, economy, society and industry, as emerged in the previous 
EAP, was seen necessary (Connelly and Smith, 2004). At the same time, the revision of 
the original Treaty of Rome predicted a potential enlargement of the Community. The 
form of the new Treaty was the subject of long discussions among different stakeholders 
(Weale et al., 2000). As a result, the main aim was the completion of the internal market 
under specific provisions and terms (Holzinger et al., 2006). This led to the birth of the 
Single European Act (SEA), which had an influential and prominent role in shaping the 
environmental policy. Under the SEA, the environmental policy of the European 
Community acquired more consistent legal features (Connelly and Smith, 2003). Dirk 
Vandermeesch (1987: 407) aptly recognizes the provisions and the aims of the SEA as 
the constitutional base of European environmental policy. 
The SEA was signed on the 1st July 1987 and gave a new impetus in policy making by 
setting out the environmental protection as the overarching goal and key component of 
the Community’s policies. In this context, new environmental directives and multilateral 
environmental agreements were formulated (Wurzel et al., 2013). The main institutional 
changes included the adoption of a qualified majority voting18 and co-operation 
procedure,19 along with the aim of the completion of the internal market (Wurzel 2008b, 
c). The new treaty also included some important provisions such as Article 130, which 
                                                          
18 Qualified majority (QM) regards the number of votes needed in the Council for a decision to be adopted 
when issues are discussed based on Article 16 of the Treaty on the European Union and Article 238 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council 
acts by QM, in co-decision with the Parliament. 
19 The co-operation procedure allowed the European Parliament to affect a small section of lawmaking for 
the EU according to Article 252 TEC of the Nice Treaty. This procedure emanates from the Single European 
Act of 1987 but has been abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon. With the replacement of this procedure it 
introduced the co-decision and consultation processes instead. This procedure remained mostly in the area 
of economic and monetary policy. If the European Parliament suggested amendments to proposed EU 
laws, the Council was entitled to reject them only by a unanimous vote. 
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added a legal footing in environmental policy. Furthermore, Article 100a defined the 
details of harmonization in light of the internal market by qualified majority voting and 
those under Article 130s by a unanimous vote in the Council (Jordan and Lenschow, 
2008). Also, it strengthened the idea of integration, ‘Environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other 
Community policies’ (Article 174). That meant that the formulation and implementation of 
the environmental policy were not separate but interlinked policy areas (Knill and 
Lenschow, 2000). Finally, there was a delegation of powers to the European Parliament 
to cooperate with the Environment Council in policy making (Lenschow, 2003).   
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) reinforced the Community’s commitment to the promotion 
of sustainable development and environmental protection. Correspondingly, it sought to 
clarify that environmental protection should be incorporated into other EC policies by 
stressing the integration aspect. Qualified majority voting hereinafter was rendered the 
norm for environmental measures (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). In a similar vein, the 
legislative capacities of the European Parliament were amplified through the co-decision 
procedure (Lenschow, 2005). Also, the rulings of the European Court of Justice played a 
key role in the effective enforcement of environmental legislation (Wasserfallen, 2010). 
Similarly, the allocation of funding was intended to assist in the capacity building and 
bridge the gap in terms of economic inequality among the member states (Bache and 
Andreou, 2013) (see fiscal federalism in Chapter 3 and 7). The task of promoting 
sustainable development and non-inflationary growth with respect to the environment was 
a very important aspect (Jordan, 2008). In addition to this, the adoption of the 
precautionary principle meant that ‘preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay’ (Article 
130r (2)). Equally important was the principle of subsidiarity20, which defined the actions 
                                                          
20 According to European Parliament (2016), in areas which do not fall within the Union’s exclusive 
competence, the principle of subsidiarity, laid down in the Treaty on European Union, defines the 
circumstances in which it is preferable for action to be taken by the Union, rather than the member states. 
In other words, the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality govern the exercise of the 
EU’s competences. In areas in which the European Union does not have exclusive competence, the 
principle of subsidiarity seeks to protect the capacity of the member states to take decisions and to take 
action, and authorizes intervention by the Union when the objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the member states, but can be better achieved at Union level, ‘by reason of the scale and 
34 
 
taken at the EU level in cases where national and local governments were unable to 
cooperate (see cooperative federalism in Chapter 3 and 7) (Begg, 2009; Schutze, 2009). 
Sustainable development has evolved gradually in the EU Treaties. Initially, this idea was 
voiced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and then in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, calling 
for ‘balanced and sustainable development of economic activities’ with the adoption of 
Environmental Policy Integration (Hopwood et al., 2005). The Amsterdam Treaty 
incorporated and made the idea of sustainable development as one of the basic 
objectives of the community (Jordan, 2002). Practically, it gained a salient position as a 
guiding principle for further integration. Afterward, the Treaty of Nice in 2000 confirmed 
that action. The draft treaty sought to establish a constitutional framework for Europe by 
promoting sustainable development (Carter, 2007). These amendments rendered 
sustainable development as the norm of EU’s environmental policy (Baker and 
McCormick, 2004).  
Environmental action between the years 1973 to 1992 was characterized by a ‘top-down’ 
approach (Vogel, 1998; Jordan, 2005). The emergence of environmental problems and 
the taking of measures at the EU level revealed the need of adopting further actions and 
setting new targets (Weale et al., 2000). The advent of the fifth EAP set the target of the 
integration of environmental protection with other governmental policies across all the 
levels of governance (Benson and Jordan, 2010). More explicitly, that EAP covered the 
period from 1993 to 2000 and coincided with the completion of the Rio Earth Summit, the 
aim of which was sustainable development (Connelly and Smith, 2003). Notably, the fifth 
EAP focused on economic growth as an instrument of environmental reforms during the 
period from 1992 to 2000 (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). Being the main policy document 
for sustainable development went a step further by connecting the environmental 
protection and economic growth with common objectives. The short term and long-term 
objectives aimed for eco-efficiency for the benefit of European industry. The White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment summarized the basic lines of a ‘benign’ 
development (Connelly and Smith, 2003). Thereafter, the Cardiff Process recognized the 
                                                          
effects of the proposed action’. The purpose of including a reference to the principle in the European 
Treaties is also to ensure that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as possible. 
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significance of sustainability indicators and control mechanisms in pursuit of sustainable 
development through specific sectoral integration strategies. In the same vein, the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2000 intended to make the EU one of the most dynamic and competitive 
economies in the world until 2010 (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). 
The fifth EAP was also responsible for the promotion of the Agenda 2121 and UNCED 
agreements. In a broader context, this EAP marked a significant change in the content of 
EU environmental policy, reflecting clearly the sustainable target (Liefferink and Jordan, 
2004). However, this seemed to deviate from the conventional way of legislative action 
by putting more emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity and shared responsibilities, 
deregulation and market-based policies (Begg, 2009; Wurzel and Connelly, 2011a, b). 
Subsequently, the concept of integration, namely the incorporation of the environment 
into the realms of growth and implementation, attributed particular weight to the objective 
of sustainable development (Jordan et al., 2003; Baker, 2007). This consisted of five main 
domains such as agriculture, energy, industry, transport, and tourism, along with a set of 
other issues such as climate change, acidification, nature and biodiversity, water 
resources, the urban environment, coastal zones and waste (Jordan and Liefferink, 
2004). In a similar fashion, the next EAP recognized that sustainable development 
required a strong commitment primarily to policy coordination. In a broader frame, the 
sixth EAP was characterized by the principles of ecological modernization, that is, the 
disengagement of economic development from environmental degradation (Baker, 2007). 
Therefore, this action program was the result of the assessment of the fifth EAP, known 
as Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice extending from 2000 to 2010. The 
                                                          
21 On the basis of UNCED (1992), Agenda 21 is an inclusive action plan to be adopted at global, national 
and local level by organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every 
field in which there is a human effect on the environment. Notably, Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, and the Statement of principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests 
were signed by more than 178 Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992. The Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) was created in December 1992 to ensure effective follow-up of UNCED, 
to monitor and report on the implementation of the agreements at the local, national, regional and 
international levels. It was agreed that a five-year review of the Earth Summit’s progress would be made in 
1997 by the United Nations General Assembly meeting in a special session. The full implementation of 
Agenda 21, the Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Commitments to the Rio 
principles were strongly reaffirmed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002. 
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evaluation of the fifth EAP demonstrated that the implementation of environmental policy 
was ineffective at both the EU and member states level (Jordan and Lenschow, 2008).  
The ‘implementation deficit’, as it is known, is directly connected to the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic, of which a more detailed analysis will follow below in this chapter (see also the 
definition in Chapter 1). Hence, the Commission committed itself to increasing pressure 
on member states for better implementation performance. Besides that, the adoption of 
voluntary agreements and the greening of markets regarding the production and 
consumption model induced environmental and economic gains (Jordan et al, 2007; 
Wurzel et al., 2013). Equally important was the significance of environmental information 
and awareness. With the beginning of the seventh EAP (2014-2020), the EU has officially 
laid down the targets of becoming a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy by 202022, 
aided by policies and actions that have as a principal aim its transformation to a low 
carbon and resource efficient economy (EC: Europe 2020). Acknowledging that the sixth 
EAP Program was completed in July 2012, a significant part of its actions continues in 
the current EAP. The final review of the sixth action program has shown that although 
many benefits have been delivered for environmental policy, there are still important 
challenges in four areas: climate change; nature and biodiversity; environment and health 
and quality of life; and natural resources and waste.  
Amid rapid changes at the global level, linked to overpopulation, urbanization and 
unsustainable use of natural resources, many risks by the ambitious objective of 
sustainable development are posed. In order to secure the long-term well-being of the 
EU, more efforts to effectively tackle these challenges are required. In this light, the EU 
has committed itself to achieving its priority objectives for 2020, accompanied by a strong 
environmental vision until 2050. The main rationale lies in setting a strong basis for the 
completion of sustainable investment and growth respectively (European Commission: 
                                                          
22 Europe 2020 is the European Union’s ten-year jobs and growth strategy launched in 2010 by the 
European Commission under the presidency of José Manuel Barroso to deliver growth, that is smart 
through more effective investments in education, research and innovation; sustainable, to a decisive move 
towards a low-carbon economy; and inclusive, with a strong emphasis on job creation and poverty 
reduction. Although, the strategy is focused on five ambitious goals in the areas of employment, innovation, 
education, poverty reduction and climate/energy. Date of access: 10/08/2016, (For more information, 
please see the following report), http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20 
BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf   
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General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020). Therefore, the seventh EAP is 
grounded in a set of plans and policies such as the Europe 2020 strategy, encompassing 
the EU’s Climate and Energy Package, the Commission Communication on a Roadmap 
for moving to a low carbon economy in 2050, the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, the 
Roadmap to a Resource efficient Europe, the Innovation Union Flagship Initiative and the 
European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development (European Commission: General 
Union Environment Action Programme to 2020:7). The three main objectives are the 
following. First, to protect, maintain and reinforce the natural capital of the EU; second, to 
make the EU a resource efficient, green and competitive low-carbon economy; and third, 
to secure prosperity and prevent the citizens of the EU from environmental pressures and 
health hazards. However, to help the EU meet these objectives, the effective 
implementation of environmental legislation is necessary.  
Looking back and evaluating the overall performance of EU environmental policy, it is 
evident that, to date, a remarkable progress on the environmental legislation has been 
achieved (Jordan, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 2000). The bulk of legislation and regulatory 
expansion adopted helped significantly the development and modernization of 
environmental policy. The introduction of more stringent standards and measures 
essentially highlighted the importance and desire to better address the growing 
environmental issues and problems (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). In a broader frame, the 
European environmental policy was not based on a specific exemplar but had many 
intermittent and important stages of major changes that affected its evolutionary process. 
The progress achieved through the various EAPs added a more integrated way of action, 
with more sophisticated policies (Jordan and Lenschow, 2009).  
 
2.2. ‘Leader-Laggard’ Dynamic 
  
The basic features for the definition of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic lie in the differences 
between the member states in the set of adopted environmental tools and policies, the 
strength of the regulatory framework – including how efficiently a policy has been 
implemented - and the environmental outcomes generated (Knill et al., 2012). In this 
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sense, the normative definition of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic thus far has been the 
comparative evaluation and the extent of variations in the performance of countries and 
not the actual policy outputs (Börzel, 2000). The main reasoning of the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic rests on the implications at the international level (Knill et al., 2012). The three-
way relationship, more specifically, implies that ‘leaders’ seek to impose their higher 
standards through the European Commission and ‘laggards’ are faced with a weak 
implementation of EU environmental policy. According to the literature, the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic would be characterized by the implications of the alterations in the 
efficiency and rapidity of environmental policies at the international level (Börzel, 2000; 
Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012) These variations in policy performance can be 
generated by an array of factors which are pertinent to multi-level governance systems, 
such as the implementation deficit and shifts in economic, political and social aspects, 
along with rapid change in environmental behavior (Liefferink et al., 2009) (see also the 
discussion of implementation in Chapter 1).  
Interest in the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic has drawn the attention of many scholars 
(Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Börzel, 2003; Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012). 
The classical debate of ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ has its roots in the dawn of EU 
environmental policy. Despite the fact that a number of efforts were pursued to classify 
states according to their environmental performance, only a few have attempted to look 
at this pattern in terms of policy outputs (see Liefferink et al., 2009). The usual association 
of this dynamic with the implementation deficit shows a unilateral approach that springs 
mainly from the simple observation of the role of states at the international level and their 
implementation record (Knill et al., 2012). Although the ‘leader-laggard’ characterization 
is seen or assumed as a comparative approach and a regulatory trend over the 
implementation of environmental policy between states, it also includes the combination 
of environmental policy performance, that is, policy outputs and innovations that extend 
beyond the EU or international policy stipulations. The current classification of the existing 
literature implies a temporal dynamic which is more oriented to environmental 
performance (Knill et al., 2012).  
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When referring to ‘leaders’ or ‘laggards’ in EU environmental policy, this includes both 
individual and groups of countries. For instance, the literature on ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic 
singles out as ‘leaders’ countries such as Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Germany, Austria and the UK23 (Börzel, 2003; Jänicke, 2005, Knill et al., 2012). Also, 
belonging to the same group are non-EU members Norway and Switzerland. On the other 
side, ‘laggards’ in environmental policy are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain 
(Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012). In the middle of this condition, there is Belgium, 
France, and the UK (see footnote below) (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997a; Börzel, 2003). 
‘Leaders’ and ‘laggards’ exercise varying degrees of pressure on the EU. The ‘top-down’ 
approach is the means of a broader understanding of this dynamic. The two-way 
relationship and interaction between the EU and ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ bring about many 
changes in the regulatory context and the implementation of policies across all member 
states. From a ‘top-down’ perspective, the ‘downloading’ of policy stemming from the EU 
finds the policy recipients, namely the member states, facing implementation difficulties 
and compliance issues due to public pressure, structural inefficiencies, administrative 
incapacity and high adaptation costs.  
States may change their policy preferences over time depending on the political and 
economic circumstances, thus highlighting the instability and fluidity of the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic. The behavioral change of a state may rest on the domestic or external 
pressures which formulate a specific political context. Being a ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ has, by 
and large, been seen as a stable characteristic or static condition backed by outdated 
assessments and stereotypes in much of the existing literature. For example, recent 
studies have shown that the performance of a ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ varies across a number 
of policy fields at given points in time (Knill et al., 2012). It is telling, though, that for some 
‘leader’ states their environmental ambitions do not match with their policy outcomes 
despite their fame and the opposite for the ‘laggards’ respectively. A good example would 
be Germany, which although has, generally, the reputation of a ‘leader’, it has not always 
conformed to EU laws, such as their non-compliance with the Environmental Impact 
                                                          
23 In some studies, the UK is characterized as ‘leader’ and others as ‘inbetweener’. In this research, I 
consider the UK as a purported ‘leader’ due to their very good record of compliance and implementation of 
EU policies.   
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Assessment Directive (see Börzel, 2000). In a similar fashion, while Germany is a ‘leader’ 
in the sector of energy efficient cars, they lack a speed limit on highways. It is, thus, likely 
that a ‘leader’ state can be a ‘laggard’ in individual fields. Consequently, some policy 
windows have emerged leading to the use of a particular approach and explain these 
reasons (Börzel, 2003; Jänicke, 2005). For example, the role of ‘leader’ encompasses 
strategic factors such as ‘the will and skill’ for a specific competence (Jänicke, 2005).  
In a wider context, the lack of inclusive and in-depth empirical research and the study of 
specific case studies have created confusion and a blurred picture of this dynamic. This, 
however, reveals certain weaknesses in the objectivity and transparency as well as the 
measurement, of the samples (Crepaz, 1995; Jahn, 1998; Scruggs, 1999, 2003). Based 
on prior studies, it can be mentioned that each research has developed its own 
methodology and patterns to draw conclusions. Indicatively, the ranking of ‘leaders’ and 
‘laggards’ has been underpinned by a more generalist approach in which environmental 
estimations are dominant over the actual performance (policy outputs and outcomes) of 
the states. The use of a wider range of qualitative and quantitative indicators and 
measures would explain more accurately the mobility of ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ based on 
actual policy outputs and outcomes and not only on the environmental ambitions or 
expectations as occurred in the past (Liefferink et al., 2009).  
What is suggested by the current literature as a ‘leader’ is a condition in which a country 
in comparison with others within a specific period of time seeks to promote the strictest 
environmental policy whereby it can be a guide or pattern for emulation to other states 
(Jänicke, 1998, 2005; Liefferink et al., 2009). In this regard, those countries with higher 
environmental standards are inclined to engage with other states in a regulatory 
antagonism. This would mean that they aim to influence international regulation, introduce 
policy innovations and affect the implementation of policies as their ‘downloading’ is 
accompanied by fewer adaptation costs (Holzinger et al., 2008a, b; Knill et al., 2012). 
Conversely, a ‘laggard’ state in environmental policy seems to have comparatively lower 
expectations from other states within a specific time frame for the environmental 
protection (Knill et al., 2012). Similarly, it shows significant unwillingness and opposition 
over a more advanced regulatory framework and a sluggish interest in existing regulatory 
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tendencies due to high adaptation costs. This is also reflected in the selective application 
of policies, slow pace or deliberate avoidance. The low level of policy strictness, inter alia, 
affects the overall performance by exhibiting significant variability but it does not prevent 
improvements at a more advanced regulatory level.  
 
2.3. Pull and Push Process 
  
One of the most crucial points when considering the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic is what 
processes and paths are followed. The relation of the EU with the member states is 
bidirectional based on interstate bargaining (Andersen and Liefferink, 1998). Member 
states are not only recipients of European calls for domestic change but also actively 
participate in the formation of various policies and procedures (Bomberg and Peterson, 
2000). The necessity of domestic change and policy adaptation includes different types 
of pressure at both domestic and European levels (Cowless et al., 2001; Risse et al., 
2001; Radaelli, 2003). The rationale of ‘top-down’ approach is used here to explain the 
actions of the member states in ‘downloading’ (implementation) policies (Börzel, 2003). 
A clearer view is provided by the cooperative and regulatory federalism in the theory 
section (see Chapter 3). At the national level, domestic actors pressurize their 
governments to push for policies at the EU level that are favorable to their interests. At 
European level, member states seek to promote policies that fit into the domestic 
pressures as well as reducing the implications at the national level (Risse et al., 2001; 
Börzel, 2003). Consequently, policy compliance is also intertwined with implementation 
costs which domestic actors are not willing to take on (Holzinger and Knill, 2008). This, 
however, may create additional problems for national governments as receivers of 
complaints regarding the costs of European policies imposed on them. Therefore, this is 
mainly seen through the lens of the degree of effectiveness of the implementation and 
compliance of European policies at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Falkner 
et al., 2008).  
From a ‘top-down’ perspective, the impact of Europe is construed by ‘the goodness of fit’ 
and the intervening factors that differ across policies and member states (Börzel, 2003). 
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The ‘goodness of fit’ between the national and the European level defines the extent of 
pressure for adaptation caused by Europeanization on the member states (Risse et al., 
2001). More specifically, the high degree of pressure for adaptation is dependent on the 
low extent of compatibility between the EU level and the existing domestic procedures, 
structures, and policies. There are two kinds of ‘misfit’ (Börzel, 1999) or ‘mismatch’ 
(Heritier, 1996) to member states. First, policy ‘misfit’ is caused by European regulations 
and domestic policies (Schmidt, 2001; Börzel, 2003) and, second, institutional ‘misfit’ is 
created by the domestic rules and processes opposed to the regional institutions, thus 
altering the collective understandings (Börzel, 2002b). Policy ‘misfit’ is gauged by taking 
into account EU policy and the respective domestic policy in tandem with the compatibility 
of their policy tools and patterns (Börzel, 2003). If these principles cannot be met, then it 
may lead to the imposition of costly adaptation measures, which unavoidably raise the 
administrative difficulties. Therefore, domestic change hinges on the action of domestic 
actors to push or hinder these policies (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 64).  
 
2.4. ‘Leaders’ 
 
One of the first questions arising when considering the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic is what 
makes a country act as a ‘leader’. Liefferink and Andersen (1998) developed a certain 
typology over the action of ‘leader’ states by pointing out that a ‘leader’ country is 
environmentally advanced at the domestic level, namely a step forward from the 
established EU environmental policy. More specifically, a ‘leader’ state has developed 
progressive policies for environmental protection. The strategy of ‘pushing’ is dominant 
and has either direct or indirect action in environmental policy-making by adopting market-
based policies such as the Emissions Trading Scheme which makes, arguably, the 
implementation of policies easier as they are implementing their own standards (Jordan, 
2002).  
First, if a state acts as an intentional ‘leader’ and exerts pressure directly, it results in 
taking action on its own to affect EU environmental policy making. This is called ‘pusher-
by example’. In this context, Denmark is depicted as a good example in the introduction 
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of the CO2 tax. Second, a member state becomes a ‘leader’ by gradually harnessing its 
domestic power without ignoring the EU procedures. Also, it affects environmental policy 
making by forging links with other countries or institutions, such as the European 
Commission (Jordan, 2002). This tactic is widely known as a creative pusher strategy, 
which focuses on trade-offs by considering EU environmental standards to be lower than 
the domestic ones. A good example is the wastewater management in Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. Third, a member state opts to be a ‘leader’ intentionally 
by acting indirectly in EU policy-making and avoiding one-sided actions (Liefferink and 
Andersen, 1998). However, there is influence from other policy areas combined with 
internal market approaches. This type is referred to as a defensive ‘leader’ because the 
protection of the environment is a high priority for the member state but disregards the 
EU context. A typical example is a ban on the Danish bottle system by the European 
Commission (Jordan, 2002). Fourth, there is indirect action in EU environmental policy 
and the gradual development of ‘leader’ status. In a similar fashion as the previous type, 
strong domestic standards and the operation of the internal market may affect EU policy-
making. When domestic standards are significantly below the EU average, some member 
states may opt out. An example of this category are the prohibitions of Germany and the 
Netherlands on wood preservative pentachlorophenol (PCP) (Andersen and Liefferink, 
1998). From a ‘top-down’ perspective, they show good compliance with the EU 
stipulations and their implementation efficiency is comparatively higher as a consequence 
of better administrative structures, political and institutional capacity and economic 
condition to afford the adaptation costs (Holzinger and Knill, 2008).  
According to this typology, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and 
Austria and the UK are considered as ‘leaders’ in environmental policy, having stricter 
domestic standards, an advanced regulatory framework and a large industry (Jordan and 
Lenschow, 2000). By harnessing their environmental policy framework, they seek to 
introduce more rigorous environmental policies at the international arena as it facilitates 
the implementation of policies due to their own standards (Jacob and Volkery, 2004). 
Their advanced regulatory framework provides joint action between the state and the 
private sector for tackling trans-boundary issues such as pollution and environmental 
degradation (Busch et al., 2012). Furthermore, they have strong economic incentives to 
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defend their domestic industry and seek competitive advantage through generating 
technology and expertise known as ‘best available technology’ (Jänicke, 2005). 
The existence of the EU institutions and various networks at the international level offers 
the opportunity for comparative evaluation on competitiveness in the environmental 
sector (Busch et al., 2012). That kind of competition may generate innovation through 
which small countries can gain significant economic benefits, such as extra funding 
sources through selling technology. The practice of policy innovation lies mostly in 
domestic factors such as the power of the ‘green advocacy coalition’ and the nexus of 
institutional, economic and informational factors (Sabatier, 1999; Jänicke, 2005; Liefferink 
et al., 2009). The effect of small countries like Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands 
on environmental policy shows that their role is more significant nowadays than before, 
given that sustainable growth is a key component of their economy with the development 
of a very promising environmental market (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Jänicke 2005). 
The advanced regulatory framework is a kind of safety net for the ‘leaders’ because it 
provides economic incentives and significant profits to the domestic industry for the 
generation of policy innovation. Simultaneously, it maintains the domestic regulatory style 
high with the prospect of preventing others from importing policy innovation and expertise 
from abroad (Eisner, 2007). In this context, the regulatory competition offers the 
opportunity to promote policies to the EU under the prism of more advanced and 
comprehensive environmental policies.  
‘Leader’ countries are, in general, more economically developed. This is seen in the 
dynamics of national income and economic affluence coupled with a high level of 
education (Jacob and Volkery, 2004). The higher the degree of economic development, 
the greater the environmental awareness takes place (Jänicke, 2005). Based on that, it 
is more likely to form a better understanding of the problems. It could be argued that the 
complexity of environmental problems can be more efficiently evaluated by better-
educated people as they have better managerial, financial, professional and technological 
skills (Börzel, 2000). Economic factors such as economic crises and political changes 
such as frequent elections or an overthrow of government may provoke significant 
instability (Jänicke, 2005). The advent of economic crisis (2008) showed that even very 
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developed and wealthy states have been quite hesitant in pushing and implementing 
further environmental policies because there is a perception that green issues imply 
additional costs, as seen below with the case of the UK. That being said, the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne stated clearly: 
"I am worried about the combined impact of the green policies adopted not just in Britain, 
but also by the European Union … if we burden [British businesses] with endless social 
and environmental goals – however worthy in their own right – then not only will we not 
achieve those goals, but the businesses will fail, jobs will be lost, and our country will be 
poorer." (The Guardian, 2011)24          
 
2.5. ‘Laggards’ 
 
‘Laggards’, on the other hand, are considered to be those states that fall behind in 
environmental policy (Börzel, 2003). In a sense, they demonstrate limited domestic 
political capacity which either just conform to the EU norms or fail to implement the agreed 
policies. Reasons cited in the literature for their poor performance include a weak capacity 
to implement policies because of a weak economy, less sophisticated public 
administration, lack of interest, or a more intentional obstruction to gain economic 
advantage through non-compliance (Pridham, 1994; Börzel, 2000). At the same time, the 
poor representation of green parties and the lack of environmental activism and 
awareness may be another factor shaping the ‘laggards’’ performance (Börzel, 2000). 
Their poor implementation record reflects the need to receive financial support (side-
payments, package deals or exemption) in order to advance their regulatory framework 
and actions and to reach the same level of EU policies as the other countries (see fiscal 
federalism in Chapter 3 and 7). In a broader classification, Portugal, Ireland/Italy, Greece 
and Spain are viewed as those countries that lag behind and deploy considerable gaps 
in environmental policy (Knill et al., 2012). These countries are reported to have a loose 
                                                          
24 Date of access: 29/11/2011, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/nov/29/autumn statement-george-
osborne-green-policies.  
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and weak regulatory framework that fails to meet the environmental standards set by the 
EU while demonstrating strong opposition to the adoption of more stringent standards 
(Holzinger and Knill, 2008). Consequently, the existence of stringent regulation may 
operate as a barrier. Under these terms, environmental protection may be seen as a brake 
on economic growth because the main objective remains the decrease of unemployment 
and job-creation. Furthermore, the building of new structures may entail higher costs. 
Consequently, non-compliance may be preferable and less costly in economic terms, for 
example by importing technology, knowledge, and expertise from abroad.  
From a ‘top-down’ approach, the ‘downloading’ of policies from the EU to the national 
structures is estimated to be quite high in terms of economic cost (Holzinger et al., 2008a). 
In this regard, building up new structures and the application of an extensive set of 
domestic and structural changes necessitate significant costs giving the impression that 
the implementation of environmental measures is a very expensive procedure (Börzel, 
2003). Additionally, there may be a significant impact by the legal and administrative 
inflexibility, the sluggish political interest and the lack of financial resources. Therefore, 
the high pressure for major institutional changes within a more advanced regulatory 
framework for the ‘laggards’ increases the chances of non-compliance with the EU 
requirements. (Liefferink et al., 2009). The partial or ineffective implementation of policies 
may dictate financial assistance to comply effectively. Finally, in light of severe economic 
conditions such as an economic crisis, ‘laggards’ may perceive the environmental 
framework as an additional cost or an imposition of power by the rich northern countries 
to the poorer southern states (Börzel, 2001). 
It may be argued that the extent of compliance of many of the member states with the 
environmental legislation is quite far from the desired point, whereby considerable 
discrepancies have been noticed, particularly with Southern European member states 
(Börzel, 2000; Falkner et al., 2008). These countries are assumed to be confronted with 
chronic delays and systemic inadequacies in the implementation of environmental policy 
stemming from structural weaknesses and pathologies of their state apparatus (Pridham, 
1996; Börzel, 2000; Knill et al., 2012). Some of the main reasons are focused on the 
administrative inefficiency and fragmentation of agencies that may cause lack of 
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coordination (Aguilar Fernandez, 1994; Börzel, 2003). Similarly, there is a lack of human 
resources, expertise and infrastructure in combination with weak economic growth, high 
rates of unemployment and strong economic interests (Pridham and Cini, 1994; Liefferink 
et al., 2009). Broadly, ‘laggards’ prioritize economic growth for tackling poverty and 
employability issues over environmental protection, which in a first reading translates into 
a very expensive policy. Equally important is the fact that environmental awareness and 
green movements have a weak presence and do not enjoy high recognition and support 
from the people (Börzel, 2000). Cliental practices, individualistic mindset, corruption, 
piecemeal and party prevalent culture are also considered to be key factors hampering 
the full compliance and effective implementation of environmental policy (Pridham, 1996; 
Börzel, 2003).  
Of particular interest is the description given by some scholars with regard to the 
institutional and administrative shortcomings of these states on environmental protection, 
reported as the ‘Mediterranean syndrome’ (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993). On the one 
hand, this description reflects the various problems facing these countries; on the other 
hand, it shows a kind of bias and stereotypical approach possibly derived from the 
northern European states. It should not be omitted that sometimes the vague and 
complicated character of the EU policies may intensify the implementation problems of 
its member states and widen the imbalances among them. The discrepancies existing 
between the Mediterranean states bring to the fore the economic, cultural and political 
particularities of each state. Although the traditional perception is based on the idea that 
the political systems of Southern Europe are permeated by conservatism, cliental 
practices, and indifference to formal institutions, which may be true to some extent, this 
looks like more of a generalization and feeds into the reproduction of outdated analyses 
which ignore the anthropo-geography and socio-political conditions of the southern 
member states. Admittedly, some of these features are dominant in specific regions but 
not across all of the Mediterranean countries. This arguably strengthens the belief that 
the southern political culture is in direct conflict with the northern, as part of the different 
patterns in society, politics, and environmentalism (Liefferink et al., 2009). 
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2.6. ‘In-between’ or ‘fence-sitters’ 
 
‘In between’ or ‘fence-sitters’ are those countries that neither pursue to introduce or push 
particular policies to the European level nor inhibit other states to proceed with it (Börzel, 
2001). They primarily take a moderate stance, which is perceived as a passive condition. 
Their way of action and coalition building with other countries varies according to the 
circumstances and their national interests. France, Belgium, Italy and the United 
Kingdom25 (see the selection of case studies in Chapter 1) belong in this group (Andersen 
and Liefferink, 1997:6). These states lack the motivation and capacity of ‘leaders’ and 
their regulatory framework combines elements of both ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ (Liefferink 
et al., 2009). This is mainly reflected in the process of ‘downloading’ European policies 
with lower costs of implementation (see regulatory federalism in Chapter 3 and 7). 
Furthermore, their industrial sector does not necessarily show particular competitive 
benefits from the adoption of stringent environmental measures (Knill et al., 2012). The 
lack of a specific action plan and vague policy preferences to a certain extent causes 
inertia and hesitation thus leading to a more neutral position (Börzel, 2003). States in the 
middle of this classification have considerable economic development, present a quite 
advanced regulatory context but have weak action capacity (Liefferink et al., 2009). In this 
vein, they seek to abstain from ‘laggards’ because they usually oppose European policies 
that are against their rationale for further integration. From a ‘top-down’ perspective, their 
implementation performance resembles the features of ‘laggards’ than of ‘leaders’. The 
regulatory framework may be affected by strategic preferences and action capacity linked 
to the economic growth of the state. Moreover, they seek to diminish the cost of 
adaptation by avoiding the implementation of policies that bear high costs (Liefferink and 
Andersen, 1997; Börzel, 2000).  
 
 
                                                          
25 In some studies, the UK is characterized as ‘leader’ and others as ‘inbetweener’. In this research, I 
consider the UK as a purported ‘leader’ due to their very good record of compliance and implementation of 
EU policies.   
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2.7. Implications for this research 
 
The approach taken for this thesis aims to add and build upon the existing literature for 
two main reasons. It seeks to consider the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic under a more 
contemporary prism by focusing on the period of economic crisis and its impact on the 
implementation of environmental policy in EU member states. The existing research 
includes studies that have used a number of different methodological approaches but 
have mainly drawn on 'leader-laggard' conceptualizations first outlined in the 1990s. But 
how do these conceptualizations hold up in the modern EU which is still dealing with the 
impact of the economic crisis?  
The main focus of this thesis is on the implementation of EU environmental policy as it 
turns out to be the most obvious effect of the economic crisis, followed by the lack of will 
for further environmental measures due to perceived costs. There are also other 
academic reasons for this focus such as the need to investigate the policy outputs and 
outcomes along with the main drivers at the domestic and supranational level affecting 
the implementation of environmental policies. In the same vein, considering that EU 
Environmental policy has been greatly characterized as a success story, the economic 
crisis provides the opportunity to test in practice the applicability of this policy amid strong 
economic pressures and financial uncertainty.  
In such a context, implementation is a key factor that not only defines how a member 
state performs but also contributes to the overall performance of the EU. Hence this thesis 
seeks to map the broader patterns of environmental policy ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ 
(objective 1) in the EU and provide two in-depth case studies (objective 2) in light of the 
2008 economic crisis. Second, it seeks to give a more thorough theorization of the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic under a federal perspective. Much has been written about the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic, but the lack of clarity, concrete theorization and a lack of recent 
literature have been major limiting factors for a more in-depth analysis of the fluidity and 
volatility of actors and the actual environmental policy outcomes. Although the current 
literature is surrounded by a strong political nuance, it neglects the effects of the economy 
and its potential implications amid periods of instability and wider discontent. Focusing on 
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the blend of politics and the economy, a more clear-cut picture of the basic variables may 
emerge to better understand the current situation. In this vein, the theoretical impasse 
and the need for more consistent theorization and deeper explanation of the variations at 
domestic and EU level are more explicitly couched in the theory of federalism (see 
Chapter 3).  
Therefore, objectives 3 and 4 of this thesis, namely the use of federal theory perspectives 
explore the influential factors shaping the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic within a more 
contemporary context. This also enhances and enriches our approach to consolidate a 
profound and substantial basis for a detailed EU multi-level governance analysis. Federal 
theories are potentially a valuable tool to think in different political terms than in the past 
because they perceive multi-level governance as a two-way relationship between the 
federal and state level while being more capable of analyzing the ‘downloading’ of 
policies. Furthermore, federalism is more directly intertwined with the increased interest 
of task allocation and distribution of power at the EU level. The collaborative and 
competitive spirit in the relationship between the EU and member states regarding policy 
making and implementation discloses the different dynamics and trends in EU 
environmental policy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
From obscurity to full recognition, EU environmental policy was subject to many variations 
in the speed and content of its policies. Although the sluggish beginning of EU 
environmental policy did not foreshadow a rapid growth, the incremental way and 
expansionist ambitions very soon became the driving force for a total transformation 
backed by the momentum of European Integration. The detailed analysis of the 
evolutionary path provided aimed at defining the peculiarities, different dynamics, and 
objectives of each time period. Each phase is distinct and reflects clearly the main 
problems and factors for the adoption of policy measures, action plans, and strategies. 
Although today it can be argued that the legislative action was very successful, ineffective 
implementation is a constant threat not only to environmental policy but also to the project 
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of European integration, thus leading to significant differences in the implementation 
patterns and ultimately to the so-called ‘implementation deficit’ among member states. 
Hence, this problem has inevitably led to the distinction between ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ 
in environmental policy. The analytical context of the debate on the 'leader-laggard' 
dynamic attempted to investigate, identify and shed light on this under-researched issue, 
especially in recent years which appears to have particular importance in a period of strict 
austerity and recession. The emergence of various aspects, such as political, economic, 
cultural and institutional factors, along with the way of action, influence and position of 
‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’, contributed to a thorough understanding and a clearer view of 
how EU environmental policy is shaped. Finally, having examined the literature on the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic and highlighted the weak theorization, the next chapter goes on 
to explore the main theoretical approach taken in this thesis for the understanding of the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in terms of ‘downloading’/ implementation from a federal 
perspective.  
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Chapter 3 - Theorizing the environmental ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic in the context of EU environmental policy. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the traditional approaches of Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism set 
the guidelines and greatly influenced the academic debate on the evolution of the EU, 
they were unable to conceive and interpret the transition to a new model and policy 
implementation respectively, whereas the renewed interest in federalism has provided a 
more contemporary theorization of the EU. The aim of this chapter is to identify, illustrate 
and analyze the importance of federal theory in the study of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic 
and the implementation of EU environmental policy during the economic crisis. More 
specifically, I will start off by introducing how we conceive the EU nowadays. Then I will 
move on to explain the theories of Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism along with 
their main critiques and why they are not suitable for this research. Thereafter, I will give 
a detailed account of the definitions of federalism, federal systems, and European 
federalism by pointing out their utility in this thesis. Finally, I will provide an analytical 
overview of the types of federalism and develop how the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic is 
positioned within it.   
 
3.1. How can we understand the EU analytically? 
 
The European Union (EU) is a group of countries that bear liberal-democratic values and 
operate jointly (Hix and Høyland, 2011; Blair, 2014). The member states participating in 
the EU share common values related to democracy, human rights, and social justice, and 
respect the legal and institutional context (Cini and Borragán, 2016). Within the 
institutional environment of the EU, the diversity and unity of all member states are 
secured. The establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (the 
predecessor to the EU) triggered a big debate about the nature and inherent features of 
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this political entity (Beetham and Lord, 2014). In a broader frame, the EU is often regarded 
as something novel and unique, encompassing all the basic features of a traditional 
international organization combined with some state-like characteristics (Smith, 2005; 
Howorth, 2005, 2010). Furthermore, the EU is based on an international treaty by which 
sovereign states ceded a number of their competencies to that supranational organization 
(Bache et al., 2014). Some argued (Wallace, H. 2001; Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith, 1999; 
Majone, 2005) that the EU resembles a state because it includes a wide range of state 
functions and institutions, such as the European Commission, Council of Ministers, the 
European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. On the other hand, an 
international organization is focused primarily on specific policies or issues. In this light, 
the bulk of its activities is depicted as closer to the state (Follesdal and Koslowski, 2013). 
Alongside, the EU faces some deficiencies that are considered as fundamental issues of 
state sovereignty, such as taxation, the army and the police, and the heavy dependence 
on its member states. Moreover, a lack of adequate representation, low voting 
participation, public accountability and authorization of the EU’s institutions from the 
European citizens has been noticed (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002: 401). Laffan et al. (2000: 
74-8) assert that a key component of the EU is the blend of domestic and European 
features into one body. Drawing on this perspective, a system of international governance 
has emerged in which both the EU as the main political arena and member states as 
actors represent domestic and supranational interests (Laffan et al., 2000: 84-7). Hix 
(2005: 4) infers that the EU is a political system but not a state, mainly due to the absence 
of exclusive implementation competence that characterizes a state. The EU has also 
acquired all the appropriate policy features of a modern state, such as influencing policy-
making and generating a large number of legislative acts (Hix, 2005). Additionally, the 
precedence of EU law empowers the EU regarding the obligatory character of policy-
making.  
Traditional theorization of the EU originates from the field of international relations and 
elaborates on the issues of international collaboration and regional integration. Two 
different perspectives summarize the dominant perceptions. First, some scholars 
conceive the European Union as an international or interstate organization (Laffan, et al., 
2000; Moravcsik, 1998; Scharpf, 1999; Wallace, 2001). Second, some analysts like Hix 
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employ a wider conceptualization of the European Union as a type of polity resembling a 
state. Hix asserted that the EU is not a Weberian state but lacks the right to the monopoly 
of legitimate force. Moreover, he stressed that the EU could be characterized as a political 
system by developing strong relations between the institutions and harnessing the binding 
character of its policies across the European framework (Hix, 1994, 1999, 2005). This 
trend was mainly expressed in federalism presenting the connection of the EU to the 
systems of Germany, Switzerland and the US (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Hoornbeek, 
2004). Also, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) pointed out that the EU as a political system 
involves political requests, governmental action, and public policies. The outcome of this 
debate is that some scholars (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2004; Schmidt, 2006) have 
argued that more attention should be paid to the issues of governance and less to a 
government. Based on this point, the EU has been characterized as a reformative 
exemplar of governance followed by a progress of institutional adjustments and 
procedures. It has also been observed that policy-making penetrates all the levels of 
governance involving various stakeholders, such as national governments, member 
states, supranational actors and interest groups (Laffan, 2000; Stone Sweet, 2004).  
Some scholars such as Jupille et al., (2003) argued that the separation of international 
relations and comparative studies would provoke a significant rupture in the overall 
theorization of the EU but ultimately this did not occur. Globalization, international 
development, and domestic politics offered the possibility of considering the EU context 
from an integration perspective. While the EU has not since the very beginning been a 
federal union or a fully-fledged federation, nowadays it is regarded by some scholars 
(McKay, 2001; Weiler, 1999; Bache, 2007; Benson and Jordan, 2008; Panara, 2015) as 
a federation comparable to other federations but there are still doubts about its current 
form. The EU was originally planned as an international institution to facilitate and 
promote the trade of goods and services without constraints. Drawing on this point, a 
large number of studies based their analysis on the idea that the EU is not considered to 
be a system of governance by nature but a new political entity. Major exponents of this 
rationale as a unique entity were the rival perspectives of Neofunctionalism and 
Intergovernmentalism. The effect of Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist 
approaches on the current debate about the development of the EU integration has been 
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very significant, thus consisting of the first stepping stone of a coordinated effort towards 
a more comprehensive understanding of European integration and policy-making. In the 
context of the above analysis, what makes implementation a key component of EU policy 
is, first, the interplay between the supranational (EU) and national level (Member States) 
that affects and defines their relationship in terms of task allocation and distribution of 
powers through strong collaborative bonds. Second, the idea of integration is associated 
with high levels of performance, that is, good compliance and implementation records as 
policy outputs and effective delivery of policies as policy outcomes with regard to 
environmental quality.   
 
3.2. Neofunctionalism 
 
Neofunctionalism is considered as one of the first theories of European integration which 
seeks to explain the new regional cooperation resulting from the termination of the 
Second World War. This theory is concerned with issues of regional collaboration and the 
role of societal groups and political parties adopting an elite-driven approach towards the 
European integration process (Risse, 2005; Risse and Rosamond, 2005; Jensen, 2009; 
Börzel, 2013). The key characteristics of this theory are summarized in four points:  
a) additional weight is attributed to the state                   
b) there is a wider area of activities associated with interest groups and actors compared 
to those domestically                                     
c) non-state actors obtain greater importance at international level                     
d) the process of European integration is forwarded by spillovers (functional, political and 
institutional) (Haas, 1958, 1975, 1976)         
Neofunctionalists contended that economic integration would be catalytic in the way 
states were engaged and this would thus advance political integration. Of great 
importance is the fact that international relations are not a zero-sum game but everyone 
can benefit when states are actively involved in the economic and political integration. 
Political integration constitutes the milestone of this theory despite an array of various 
perceptions enunciated (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1971). Lindberg (1971: 59) conceived it 
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as a supranational and collective decision-making procedure, while Haas (1958: 16) put 
it forward as a change in loyalty, anticipation and political activity.   
Spillover is a condition in which a specific action is linked to a concrete objective and 
generates a state in which the initial aim can be determined by a set of further actions 
(Lindberg, 1963; Schmitter, 1969). There are three types of spillover: functional; political; 
and institutional or cultivated (Rosamond, 2005; Moravcsik, 2005; Niemann, 2006). 
Functional spillover unfolds the idea that modern economies are composed of various 
parts linking each other. As a result, it is difficult to seclude individual sectors from others. 
Based on that, Neofunctionalists believed that if state governments proceeded to 
integrate their financial sectors, the association of this sector with other sectors would 
create a spillover. An example of functional spillover would be the single market. The 
single market is associated with common rules that define the labour market. The 
corollary of setting up the single market and the removal of trade barriers was the adoption 
of common regulations in particular fields at the European level, although this had not 
been their initial goal or priority (Jensen, 2009).     
Political spillover reflects the intentional political procedure in which political elites or 
interest groups consider supranational cooperation to be indispensable for problem-
solving (Niemann, 2006). It also explains how the existence and concentration of political 
pressures push for integration within the context member states participate. The 
integration of one economy’s sector prompts the interest groups to exercise pressure at 
the supranational level, especially to the body which is responsible for that particular 
sector. The shift of interest groups’ operations at the European level can have a positive 
effect as regards the benefits they receive by better calculating the potential implications 
(Lindberg, 1963). Considering that the integration of sectors is a vital part of this process, 
potential inefficiencies would compel interest groups to demand further actions for 
integration by putting additional pressure on their governments (Jensen, 2009). An 
example of a political spillover would be the economic union, which is centrally controlled 
and deals with the common monetary policy over currency stability and macroeconomic 
policy for the single market (Bache et al., 2014). Similarly, another example would be the 
integration of environmental policy with other policies. Considering that environmental 
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issues such as cross-border pollution require transnational cooperation due to their 
nature, addressing these challenges at the EU level secures a common ground and 
approaches through increased cooperation (Lenschow, 2002; Jordan and Liefferink, 
2004; Jordan, 2012).     
Institutional or cultivated spillover occurs when supranational institutions such as the 
European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament 
promote political integration by maintaining their mediating role between the member 
states (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991; Niemann, 2006). Moreover, these institutions 
encourage the building up of transnational associations and assist national governments 
in collaborating effectively for the promotion of joint interests and agreements (Haas, 
1961). Given that supranational actors have the benefit of good and comprehensive 
information, they want to expand and share it with state governments to achieve optimal 
results (Bache et al., 2014). Increased interest in a specific policy, such as agriculture or 
environmental policy, by more than one member states, requires hard bargaining. In this 
context, the European Commission undertakes the role of mediator to carry out the 
negotiations (Jensen, 2009).   
There is also the view that the pluralistic way that states act which affects decision making 
mainly derives from the pressure of diverse interest groups and bureaucracy. Alongside, 
it could be argued that due to their pressure on governments, interest groups would 
facilitate the integration procedure (Risse, 2005). At its core, Neofunctionalism gives an 
explanation about the development of relations of domestic interest groups with their 
counterparts abroad (trans-nationalism) and those government sectors with the same 
sectors in other countries (trans-governmentalism). Moreover, this theoretical perspective 
highlights the actions of multinational corporations as non-state actors in the international 
political arena (Rosamond, 2005). Despite the existence of an explanatory context over 
spillovers, regional collaboration and the role of societal groups and political parties 
towards integration, a little or no connection to implementation is observed. This 
unavoidably shows a fundamental weakness to explain how the ‘downloading’ process 
operates. 
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3.3. Intergovernmentalism 
 
The counterweight to Neofunctionalism was the theory of Intergovernmentalism 
expressed by Stanley Hoffmann (1964, 1966) and Andrew Moravcsik (1998). Its origin 
derives from the field of International Relations (IR), and particularly from the realist 
(Morgenthau, 1985) and neo-realist perspectives (Waltz, 1979). From an 
intergovernmental perspective, the criticisms of Neofunctionalism are focused on three 
points:                                                                                          
a) European integration should be considered in an international framework. Territorial 
expansion was just one part of the emergence of the international system. 
Neofunctionalists anticipated an inexorable push for integration, which was based on 
domestic actions, given that international factors and dynamics were predetermined. This 
was reflected mainly with the change of the economic climate in the 1970s (Goldsmith 
and Page, 2010). 
b) The degree of European integration is constrained primarily by state preferences in 
autonomy, self-support of domestic bureaucracies, the diversity of state cultures, the 
prevalence of national identity and the influence of external factors (Fabbrini, 2013).  
c) The distinction of ‘low (economic sphere) and high (national security and defense) 
politics’ affects the prospect of European integration (Bulmer, 2015).  
The theory of Intergovernmentalism sought to interpret the notion of the European 
integration process by adopting a state-centric approach and emphasizing the role of 
nation-states. Also, it perceived integration as a zero-sum game driven by states’ interests 
and actions (Hix, 1999). More specifically, it is introduced a context within which the 
process of decision-making through international organizations is explained. These 
organizations operate as agents for negotiating and sharing ideas among states. Hence, 
the legal footing rests on international treaties and membership is expressed on a 
voluntary basis. (McCormick, 2001, 2009). Intergovernmentalism contends that there is a 
cost-benefit analysis regarding the cooperation of member states in European integration 
(Bickerton et al., 2015). Under these terms, the concept of cooperation gains specific 
features. Notably, cooperation is not associated with ideological issues but rests on the 
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rational behavior of government. In this light, European integration is referred to as an 
institutionalized form of cooperation among states (O’Neil, 1996). The core of this theory 
lies in the principle of state sovereignty. This concept also obtains many understandings 
of the issues of independence and authority (Nugent, 2002; McCormick, 2009). Member 
states, in turn, exert control over the process of European integration without assigning 
their sovereignty. In practice, European cooperation is described as the concentration or 
distribution of sovereignty, rather than a transfer of sovereignty from the state to the 
supranational level (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990: 277). The delegation of sovereignty 
to the supranational institutions is of critical importance. In essence, supranational actors 
are thought to serve the interests of the member states without having an autonomous or 
independent role. In this regard, the main emphasis of this theoretical perspective is put 
on the role of nation-states and decision-making whereas the implementation process is 
almost entirely ignored. By this account, a rather weak interpretative analysis of the 
application of policies is demonstrated. 
 
3.4. The Neofunctional and Intergovernmental criticisms 
 
The primary aim of Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism was to create a context 
within which they could explain the scope and dynamics of European integration and EU 
governance. Both theories originate from the field of International Relations (IR). In a 
broader frame, International Relations deal with two basic notions: war and peace, and 
the connections among states. Based on this assumption, international relations scholars 
expressed their interest in European integration because the main concept was the 
cessation or elimination of any event of war. Thus, through the lens of these theories, the 
EU is not only a theoretical phenomenon but is the starting point for interpreting a range 
of other phenomena (Jachtenfuchs, 2001). Also, the rupture of the traditional perception 
of the state changed the way of understanding the EU. The development of the EU 
indicates a particular figure of polity that is not attached to the fixed pattern of the state 
(Hix, 1994, 2005). In contrast, the EU as a novel system generates relevant and 
compulsory policy. In a sense, these theories are arguably ‘trapped’ in an old-fashioned 
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perception of the nature of the EU raising many doubts and prompting many critiques. 
Therefore, the development of the theoretical progress from other areas of social 
sciences paved the way for more modern theoretical interpretations of EU policy making 
and integration, as will be explained below in this chapter with the use of federalism 
(Haas, 2001, 2004; Rosamond, 2005).   
More specifically, some of the main critiques of Neofuncionalism focus on the theoretical 
and empirical basis, as expressed by an array of scholars (Haas, 1975, 1976; Moravcsik, 
1993, 1998, 2005; Taylor, 1990; Keohane and Nye, 1975; Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; 
and Schmitter, 2005). The first critique is that Neofunctionalism has shown a rather weak 
connection between theory and analysis of actual integration, thus failing to clearly 
diagnose the progress of the European Community. In a sense, neo-functionalism was 
seen as a ‘grand theory’ seeking to explain the scope of integration. This arguably 
resulted in the first major internal rupture. In response, ‘middle-range theories’ were 
created, which attempted to interpret certain aspects of an issue, rather than the entirety, 
by pointing out their outdated character, namely that these theories had become largely 
worn out (Haas, 2001, 2004; Ruggie et al, 2005). The second critique was the 
establishment of a supranational elite and its loyalty regarding the European institutions 
(Risse, 2005). The presence of member states’ officials in the Commission allegedly 
serves and accounts for the interests of each member state. At the same time, it was 
observed that there is an inclination to their country of origin when crucial political issues 
emerge (Hooghe, 2002).  
Third, Haas (1975, 1976) identified that there was a failure of regional integration and 
European cooperation through spillovers. He suggested that the development of the 
European Community could have been examined through the prism of international 
interdependence, stressing, however, that the theory of regional integration that describes 
this entity is surrounded by a supranational cloak. Fourth, this theory focused primarily on 
the increased significance attributed to the concept of the nation-state as the main actor 
and regional cooperation within the context of the EU where states have an influential 
role in negotiations (Moravcsik, 1993). Finally, the last criticism is centered on the strong 
elitist aspect (political and administrative elites), thus neglecting the engagement of 
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citizens in the integration process, which is largely characterized as non-democratic 
(Risse, 2005; Niemann, 2006). 
Taking into account that Neofunctionalism develops an argumentation over spillovers and 
highlights the importance of the relationship and interaction between domestic and 
supranational functions, the analysis is restricted to a rather descriptive and incomplete 
account. To a certain extent, it gives the sense that some issues regarding the workings 
of both levels, national and supranational, and the focus on vested interests can be 
explained but this is not enough to deploy a deep and thorough analysis on policy 
implementation and the main drivers leading to implementation deficit. As a result, the 
consideration of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in this context falls into an outdated and 
short interpretation, thus paving the way for a more contemporary theorization which is 
best expressed through federalism (see Chapter 1).  
On the other hand, given that Intergovernmentalism perceives European integration 
under a state-centric approach, a lack of profound explanations on the aspects of policy 
implementation is noticed. Instead, this theory presents a monolithic account of European 
integration and governance by highlighting the issue of national preference formation. 
This issue is also linked to the international demand for cooperation deriving from the 
national level and inter-state bargaining, which is influenced by the governmental elites 
(Bache et al., 2014). At the core of this theory, the international dimension is 
overshadowed by the power of member states while cooperation is the fruit of hard 
interstate bargaining (Peterson, 2015). Therefore, this theory seems to be very rigid and 
lacks an analytical interpretative framework in terms of task allocation and how policies 
are implemented. In so doing, there is a significant weakness to explain the ‘downloading’ 
of policies, and subsequently the actions of implementers (see Chapter 1).  
Against this backdrop, the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic cannot be adequately addressed 
because Intergovernmentalism is focused on a rather sterile description of cooperation 
and sovereignty. Likewise, it provides incomplete answers on the increasing role and 
influence of supranational actors such as the European Commission in policy making 
and, finally, does not respond to who undertakes the task of policy implementation. The 
lack of in-depth analysis, unavoidably, leads to the search of other theories that examine 
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the distribution of power and, more specifically, the implementation of policies through the 
lens of multi-level governance such as federalism (see Chapter 1).   
An alternative approach examining the environmental policy ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in 
the EU is the theory of federalism, by setting out a comprehensive approach regarding 
EU integration, task allocation, distribution of power, and the relationship between the 
supranational and national level (Kelemen, 2000, 2003; Börzel and Hosli, 2003; Auer, 
2005; Trechsel, 2005; Benson and Jordan, 2008, 2011). In addition, as will later be 
explained in this chapter, federalism has the potential to explore more in depth and 
analytically the influential factors shaping EU environmental policy (objective 3 of this 
thesis), and to deploy a comparative framework, which is essential to investigate the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic at the domestic and supranational level. The distinction of 
competencies essentially reflects the extent of regional dynamics in terms of political and 
economic power between the member states and the EU. Moreover, this approach allows 
an analyst to focus on the ‘downloading’ policy process that is central to debates on 
‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ (see Chapter 1).  
Despite the fact that federalism constituted one of the first theories of European 
integration, it has been overshadowed by the theories of Neofunctionalism (Haas, 1968) 
and Intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998). Renewed interest in 
federalism (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2001; Kelemen, 2004; Majone, 2006) in the 2000s has 
shown a rebirth and a significant trend in analyzing more contemporary developments in 
the EU (Pollack, 2001, 2005; Majone, 2006; Menon and Schain, 2006; Benson and 
Jordan, 2008, 2011). In particular, federalism focuses on the operational and regional 
character of political power between the different levels of governance and aims to 
explicate European integration under a more regulative context. In addition to this, 
federalism conceives European integration as a multi-level state-shaping procedure with 
strong interaction between the domestic and supranational levels (Jordan, 2008).  
Against this backdrop, the critiques on federalism express some broader concerns. The 
idea to a more powerful Europe and at the same time to weaker states reflects federalism 
as a negative element of centralism (Auer 2005). From a critical perspective, this view 
brings to the fore the questionable and multifaceted aspect of federalism regarding the 
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distribution of powers and task allocation in times of crisis. In the wake of the economic 
crisis, this concern is, plausibly, fueled by Euroscepticism and the lack of trust among the 
member states regarding the existing political and economic structure of the EU. 
Therefore, these concerns link mistakenly federalism to a further weakening of the nation-
states by giving up their national sovereignty to a ‘supranational economic union’. 
Acknowledging that for many the role of the nation-state is still strong; more efforts will be 
required to establish trust with regard to the role of the EU as a multi-governance system. 
Along these lines, the EU integration moves forward but at a slower pace. The role of 
‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ not only in EU environmental policy but also in other policy areas 
shows clearly the contrasting views of member states on EU integration. Despite the 
growing literature on federalism, a concrete analytical context and further lucidity are 
needed to estimate its long-range contribution to the understanding of the EU (Benson 
and Jordan, 2008, 2011) as well as more empirical testing (Trechsel, 2005). Beyond these 
critiques, the EU is regarded as quite federal in its structure including a high degree of 
autonomy of its member states, constitutional and institutional framework and constrained 
sovereignty (Auer, 2005).   
In spite of the main concerns and critiques which focus on the utility and practicality of 
federalism, this theoretical approach has some very strong advantages that are analyzed 
in this thesis. First, according to Benson and Jordan (2008), federalism serves the need 
to clarify and interpret specific parts of the nature and current form of the EU. Second, it 
offers a comparative approach between the EU and other multi-level systems such as 
Germany and the USA, highlighting the various forms of federalism (Nicolaidis and 
Howse, 2001; Börzel and Hosli, 2003; Benson and Jordan, 2011). Third, it attempts to 
explain the course and the historical evolution of EU integration (Burgess, 2000). Fourth, 
it perceives differently the vertical distribution of tasks between the various tiers of EU 
governance (Weale et al., 2000; Weale, 2005; Börzel and Hosli, 2003; Benson and 
Jordan, 2011). Fifth, for the purpose of this thesis, federalism better captures the domestic 
trend-setting in policy implementation as it is, more accurately, centered on the driving 
forces affecting the performance and subsequently the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic.  
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3.5. Federalism 
 
3.5.1. Definition 
  
Federalism has triggered many debates among scholars about its core meaning and its 
theoretical aspects. It refers to the issue of unions encompassing the accession of 
peoples, groups, and polities without conceding their identities (Elazar, 1994: xv). Daniel 
Elazar conceives federalism as ‘the combination of self-rule and shared-rule through 
constitutionalized power sharing on a non-centralized basis’ (Elazar, 1993: 190). The 
main idea of federalism is that it institutionalizes specific relations of the constituent parts 
of the decision-making process. It also offers the opportunity to better organize political 
power and authority in a political system, arguing that these relations should be congruent 
with federal elements. Additionally, it interprets the constitutionalized division of powers 
among the equally respective participators at various sectors of governance (Elazar, 
1987: 12). Similarly, King (1982) conceived federalism around a normative and 
philosophical mantle underpinned by federal principles. Burgess and Gagnon (1993) 
interpret federalism as a form of political organization that includes a wide range of 
federations, confederacies, associated statehoods, unions, leagues, condominiums, 
constitutional regionalization and constitutional ‘home rule’.  
Federalism comprises a broader idea, theoretical framework and a set of principles that 
applies to various political forms, such as federation and confederation (Karmis and 
Norman, 2005). Federalism, in simple words, is the coalescence of independent regional 
units into a central unit where the constituent parts keep a part of their autonomy and 
repudiate another part for joining the union. The constituent parts, namely regional units, 
ensure their existence within the federation, in which legal footing is based on treaties or 
a consensual constitution (Abromeit, 2002). Also, the principle of divided sovereignty is 
fundamental in distributing the tasks across the various levels of governance (Abromeit, 
2002). Federalism is characterized as an institutional deal including three basic principles: 
autonomy, superposition, and participation along with the division of authorities and two 
different, independent levels of government (Koslowski, 1999; Auer, 2005).  
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More analytically, the notion of autonomy describes that the constituent parts enjoy a 
large degree of political and economic autonomy by keeping their own institutional and 
legal framework. This implies that the idea of sovereignty is inherent but restricted. 
Following this, the idea of superposition refers to the allocation and use of authority 
between the constituent parts, which are subject to an upper law unit. Finally, the concept 
of participation implies that the cooperation and association of the central government 
with the constituent parts (Auer, 2005). The role of the constituent units is to partake in 
setting, legislating and implementing the federal policies. This enables the constituent 
parts to undertake a number of actions, such as taking initiatives for legislation, 
deliberating on federal regulations, modifying international treaties, resorting to the 
federal court and applying federal laws. On the contrary, the federal unit is responsible 
for overseeing the constituent parts in the implementation process (Kelemen, 2003).  
 
3.6. Federal systems 
                          
3.6.1. Federation – Confederation distinction 
 
Federation was established by the founding fathers of the USA in the Constitution of 1787 
expressing a new system of governance (Ostrom, 1986). They conceived that a new type 
of polity could balance the issues of financial claims for creating a union with political 
requests and retaining the sovereignty of states. Its scope was to set up a central 
government composed of a polity in which the constituent parts, namely the states, 
govern themselves and form a constitutional government followed by the division of 
powers across the levels and burden sharing (Auer, 2005). A federation is a union 
encompassing constituent parts and a central government, which are delegated with 
responsibilities and powers through a constitution elected by the citizens (Watts, 1998, 
2008). Confederations are distinguished from federations as a form of federal system by 
emphasizing the fact that institutions of shared rule rely on constituent governments 
which, in turn, are composed of representatives and act indirectly to the electoral and 
fiscal footing (King, 1993).  
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In federations, there is a direct connection between the government and citizens, and 
unlike in confederations, the direct relation emerges between the shared institutions and 
the state governments (Elazar, 1993). Elazar (1987) and Osaghae (1990) refer to 
federations as non-centralized by explaining that decentralization presupposes hierarchy 
with power stemming from the upper levels. The term non-centralization implies a 
constitutionally structured distribution of power, which better fits in federations. Some of 
the suggested indices measuring aims and autonomy are the allocation of legislative and 
administrative jurisdictions, the distribution of funds, decentralization to non-
governmental agencies, constitutional constraints and the involvement of constituent unit 
governments in the federal decision-making procedures (Abromeit, 2002).  
Federal constitutions provide the context in which the allocation of powers, general 
operations and the role of participants are determined. It is perceived as a form of 
statehood in which the constitution operates as a foundation. Federal constitutions 
institutionally ensure the existence of constituent units (Auer, 2005). In addition to that, 
federal constitutions define and allocate authorities to the federal unit and its constituent 
parts (Abromeit, 2002). Such a constitutional setting presupposes an active participation 
of citizens through elections or referenda in the process of decision-making. Furthermore, 
economic autonomy can be matched with the sovereignty of constituent parts. The 
emergence of conflicts and frictions in the execution of tasks can have a significant impact 
on the lower and upper levels of government. Constitutional adjudication constitutes an 
umpire and is a useful tool for resolving disputes (Auer, 2005).  
The distribution of funding in a federation is very significant because, first, financial 
resources tend to increase or reduce governments’ capabilities for exerting their duties 
(McKay, 2001, 2005) and, second, taxing powers and outlays are very useful tools for 
influencing the economy (Donahue and Pollack, 2001). Watts (1998) proposed that 
shared institutions would cause a democratic deficit in confederations rather than in 
federations because of their direct election by the citizens. Another important element of 
setting up federal systems is the extent of elite accommodation and public engagement. 
The role of democratic procedures affects elite accommodation, particularly when 
emerging issues of legitimizing new political systems to the extent that they can facilitate 
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or impede the bargaining process (Watts, 2008). The notions of cooperation and 
competition among the institutions are inherent in federal systems, along with the 
appropriate balance needed for intergovernmental negotiations. Finally, an equally 
important issue for resolving internal disputes is the influence of political culture in terms 
of tolerance and admittance of specific territorial groups (Auer, 2005).   
 
3.7. European Federalism 
 
A European Federation was the clear aim of federal ambitions and plans laid down in the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Koslowski, 1999). Given that multi-level systems define the 
allocation of powers between the levels, the EU exhibits an array of federal elements 
(Laursen, 2016). First, the EU constitutes a bicameral legislative body with a strong upper 
house (Council of Ministers) and a weaker lower house (European Parliament) that 
operate as a central government, with member states as the subunits. Both levels are 
permeated by formal rules on the basis of a mutual agreement that autonomy of each 
level is secured and is simultaneously confined by the central government (Trechsel, 
2013). In doing so, the form of the existing structure cannot change unilaterally due to the 
formal agreement of both sides (Auer, 2005). Second, the process of federalization of the 
EU argues that the EU is grounded in a voluntary basis of those participating (‘coming 
together’) and not in a relationship of coercion (‘holding together’) (Benz, 2003; Swenden, 
2004). Third, the bulk of authorities dealing with legislative action (policy and decision 
making) are delegated to the EU level where member states undertake an executive 
action (implementation). Despite the differences over implementation issues among 
member states, there is a high degree of collaboration and coordination, which is widely 
known as a ‘top-down’ or ‘downloading’ process (Mendez, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2005; 
Chryssochoou, 2009), and these are both central aspects of the ‘leader-laggard’ debates 
(see Chapter 2). The distribution of tasks laid out by consecutive treaties determines the 
institutional footing of the EU and member states’ functions (Börzel and Hosli, 2003). In 
addition to that, the principle of subsidiarity defines the role of EU policy making, develops 
political links and changes the dynamics of integration (Follesdal, 1998; Jordan, 2000).  
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Fourth, the principle of negotiation governs the EU legislative procedure (Stein and 
Turkewitsch, 2008). Hueglin and Fenna (2006) argued that national governments play a 
vital role in ‘council governance’, stressing the notion of cooperation between national 
governments and supranational actors. Fifth, the creation of the Monetary Union 
constituted a basic instrument for the single market and the first step towards fiscal 
federalism within the EU. The establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) (1998) 
and the adoption of the Euro currency (1999) laid the foundations as one of the biggest 
achievements of the EU. The main principles of European macroeconomic policy include 
monetary and fiscal policy, exchange rates and market structures. The exercise of fiscal 
policy is followed by rules to avoid excessive fiscal deficits or debts and achieve a 
budgetary balance or surplus. These rules concern and apply to all levels under the basic 
idea of keeping sound finances (Alesina et al., 2005). The main objective of the monetary 
policy is to retain price stability and to assist, design and carry out the general economic 
policies of the Community (Begg et al., 2003; Lenza and Reichlin, 2010). All of these 
federal features described above are strongly echoed in the context of EU environmental 
policy, where the institutional setting provides solid foundations and ensures a multi-level 
approach and comparative evaluation. A closer study shows that the political and 
economic dimensions are the basic driving forces leading to a more realistic consideration 
by using comparable indices, such as policy adaptation and fiscal performance (Laursen, 
2016). Simultaneously, this attributes more qualitative features to the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic and ‘top-down’ approach.  
On the other hand, many voices have expressed that Europe is confronted with some 
structural weaknesses in terms of being a federal polity. Schmitter (2000: 45) argued that 
the way to a fully-fledged federalist state is anticipated to be a difficult task due to the 
absence of statehood and nationhood. On the contrary, the diversity of national identities 
and political cultures gives a boost to the main idea of federalism, which seeks to unify 
rather than segregate (Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2007). Tsebelis (2002) identified an 
increase in the number of veto players given the enlargement of the EU. Despite the fact 
that a number of powers have been conceded to the European Parliament under the co-
decision rule, the ‘council governance’ that involves the Council of Ministers is a very 
powerful veto player. Member states are entitled to amend or change the treaties of the 
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EU based on the unanimity rule. Some argue that the unanimity rule is an impediment 
and causes a ‘federal deficit’ (De Witte et al., 2013). Based on the principle that every 
member state is considered equal irrespective of its size, this empowers the subunits to 
have an increasing role regarding the amendment of the treaties (Falkner, 2011). The 
allocation of disproportionate power to the subunits causes imbalances with a stronger 
role for the member states and a weaker role for the central government (Follesdal, 2005). 
Moreover, the lack of actual tax and spending capacity reflects the limited resources of 
the budget (Donahue and Pollack, 2001; Lindner, 2005), and the wider tax variations of 
member states (McKay, 2001, 2005).  
 
3.8. Types of Federalism and the ‘Leader-Laggard’ Dynamic 
 
Having illustrated the basic features of federalism, federal systems, and European 
federalism, in the following section a more detailed analysis of the three main versions of 
federalism is provided, namely cooperative, regulatory and fiscal federalism. 
Furthermore, an explanatory context about their basic functions and utility is given, with 
a view to better understanding of EU environmental policy and the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic. The selection and use of the three different versions of federalism (cooperative, 
regulatory and fiscal) (Moravscik, 2001; Oates, 2002; Church and Dardanelli, 2005; 
Fossati and Panella, 2005; Kelemen, 2007; Begg, 2009) has to do mostly with the current 
needs and federal vision of the EU. More specifically, after a long period of disputes and 
contestations on the nature and the form of the EU, these versions explain more clearly 
and eloquently the various dynamics and trends within the European area. Each version 
is underpinned by a strong theoretical background and a systematic approach thus 
allowing the researcher to focus on specific functions or parts of the EU. Finally, the 
normative context provided by the selected theoretical perspectives gives a detailed 
analysis of the allocation and organization of political power across the two levels of EU 
governance as well as the integration process.  
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3.9. An analytical framework 
 
Following the brief outline presented in Chapter 1 with regard to the analysis of the 
different approaches of federalism used in this thesis, in this part, I shall show more 
analytically how cooperative, regulatory and fiscal federalism develop the issue of 
implementation of EU Environmental policy and the ‘Leader-laggard’ dynamic (see 
Chapter 2).  
 
3.9.1. Cooperative Federalism 
                                                                                            
Cooperative federalism was the predominant notion of American federalism from 1954 
until 1978, reflecting the key policy issues such as market failure, postwar affluence, 
racism, urban poverty, environmentalism and individual rights (Kincaid, 1990). It was 
characterized by the concepts of social equity and political change, along with the state 
and federal penetration into the jurisdictions of each level. According to Weiser (2003), 
some of the advantages of cooperative federalism as a normative approach are the 
following:     
i) it considers long-term state preferences and autonomy 
ii) it facilitates participation and strengthens accountability regarding public policies                                        
iii) it allows experimentation and competition among states                    
iv) it relies on the economy of state governments 
 
The ideological basis of cooperative federalism is grounded in law and economics (Inman 
and Rubinfeld, 1997). The main concept is that these arrangements are held in a 
legislative body (Wittman, 1989) or through subunits of local governments that are 
endorsed by the central government or other units such as courts (Ellickson, 1979). 
Elazar (1964, 1991) conceives cooperative federalism as a political procedure led by 
various actors at different levels who seek to adjust their actions given that cooperation 
due to competition may involve conflicts and common interests. Cooperative federalism 
perceives the main function of the central government as corrective to the inefficiencies 
of lower level agencies, that is, weakness to adequately address particular issues due to, 
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for example, lack of resources and capacity, and to provide better public services through 
inter-jurisdictional bargaining (Zimmerman, 2001). 
This approach is centered on the comprehension of how competencies are distributed 
efficiently between the two tiers, the federal level, and the state level, within the context 
of political systems (Sarnoff, 1997; Burgess, 2006). The basic assumption is that cross-
boundary problems demand difficult solutions and, as a result, collaboration becomes 
necessary. Therefore, beyond a rigorous distinction of competencies ‘separation des 
pouvoirs’, it is useful to understand the operating segregation of responsibilities within the 
various levels ‘distribution des pouvoirs’ (Börzel and Hosli, 2003: 183). This implies 
collaboration among the different levels, notably, on contentious issues such as the 
environment as a market failure (Fischman, 2005: 195). It is observed a concentration of 
legislative competences at the federal level that enables states to implement policies 
(Rodden, 2004). A possible loss of autonomy can be counterbalanced by strong 
democratic authorities in central decision-making.  
O’Neill (1996) describes cooperative federalism as the combination of intergovernmental 
bargaining and the supranational character of policy making. However, there are various 
factors influencing that policy process. First, according to Hueglin and Fenna (2006: 63), 
the EU exhibits a council governance type of federalism where state governments have 
a prominent position. National governments are carriers of domestic interests and seek 
to negotiate them in intergovernmental meetings. Second, EU institutions would 
collaborate with state governments concerning the distribution of competences. 
Supranational and domestic actors would participate jointly in decision-making 
procedures. Particularly, member states have to cooperate with the European Parliament 
thus leading to a federal type of decision-making (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Third, the 
interaction of domestic and EU interest groups would induce a high degree of shared 
competences (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Those interest groups can exert significant 
pressure on state governments and supranational institutions by promoting their issues 
to the EU level.  
According to cooperative federalism, all actors should operate under the formal and 
informal rules of the institutions. Under the logic of cooperative perspective, the 
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distribution of competencies is based on the provisions of EU treaties (Börzel and Hosli, 
2003). The principle of subsidiarity defines the limits of EU tasks and provides the lower 
levels with the opportunity to take action (Donahue and Pollack, 2001: 73; Fischman, 
2005). Initially, task distribution is surrounded by political claims for collaboration which 
originate from cross-border issues (Kelemen, 2004). The outward nature of the problems 
increases political pressure, which would, in turn, suggest that domestic and EU actors 
collaborate more closely leading to 'a politics of competence' (Kelemen, 2004). As are 
result, the emergence of ‘spillovers’ in different areas would urge the deepening of 
cooperation. 
Within the context of environmental policy, these spillovers would comprise a broader 
range of issues such as conservation, pollution and market competition (Stewart, 1992). 
State governments would gather their domestic claims and push for action at the EU level. 
On the other side, the EU has a mediating role seeking to balance the various requests 
and act based on the legal provisions. Cross-border issues would give EU actors the 
chance to widen the scope of environmental policy (Kelemen, 2004). Furthermore, 
distribution of competencies would be based on a legal or constitutional basis, namely 
treaties, which accommodate the claim for intercession. The lack of clear basis in the 
Treaty of Rome (1957) on environmental policy led to the adoption of Article 100 and 
Article 235, which deal with transboundary issues (McCormick, 2001). Finally, 
intergovernmental collaboration would stem from the necessity of distributing tasks with 
other actors either by coercion or by bargaining (Benson and Jordan, 2008).  
In the frame of the 'leader-laggard' dynamic, ‘leader’ states in environmental policy would 
seem to converge with the requirements of the EU and push for the imposition of more 
stringent rules as it translates into fewer adaptation costs in ‘downloading’ policies. The 
collaboration of ‘leader’ states with the EU would provoke regulatory and economic 
benefits accompanied by policy innovations (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997). A good 
example would be the export of technology and the strong competitive advantages for 
their industry derived from selling it to others (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Börzel, 2001, 
2007). On the other hand, ‘laggards’ would not be very willing to cooperate closely with 
the EU because stricter environmental standards entail additional economic costs in the 
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‘downloading’ of these policies (Börzel, 2003). Some of the main reasons are that the 
domestic change would, therefore, bumped into a loose regulatory framework and weak 
administrative structure (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000). Hence, this would trigger an 
implementation gap and exacerbate the institutional capacity of ‘laggards’, resulting in 
various tensions with the EU and other member states. 
 
3.9.2. Regulatory federalism 
 
Regulatory federalism draws its origin from the surge of governmental political action 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The alarming increase of social, financial and environmental 
repercussions has affected the shaping of regulatory policies until today (Oates, 2003). 
According to Kelemen (2000: 133), ‘the main institutional structures of federal-type 
systems formulate the deployment of regulatory policy’. This is based on two findings. 
First, power sharing between the federal and state government levels causes a ‘politics 
of competence’ (Kelemen, 2004: 11). Throughout integration, the allocation of 
competences defines that the federal government takes up the main role in policy making 
and states are responsible for the implementation of policies. Second, the accumulation 
of power at the highest level affects the ‘politics of discretion’ (Kelemen, 2004: 12). The 
dispersion of power across the executive and legislative bodies enables the judiciary (e.g. 
the European Court of Justice) to mediate for the implementation of the various policies.  
A basic feature of the distribution of competences is the alteration of actors’ preferences. 
Kelemen contends that federal and state levels strive to increase their political clout and 
authority. By doing so, the federal government attempts to materialize its choices by 
obtaining wide support, removing possible obstacles and expanding its jurisdictions: a so-
called ‘three for one offer’ (2004: 13). Simultaneously, state governments aim to gain 
popular support and increase their hopes for re-election by strengthening the autonomy. 
According to this theoretical perspective, when power is concentrated, such as in the 
Westminster type of federal system, the limited participation of federal courts would be 
noticed in the regulatory procedure leading to the greater discretion of state governments 
in federal laws.  
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On the other hand, when power is allocated, any tensions related to the legislative and 
executive tiers would urge the involvement of the federal court. The active role of the court 
means that it may coerce and decrease any discretion of the states about the 
implementation of federal regulations taking into account the fragmentation of federal 
government (Kelemen, 2000). In this context, the scope of federal government has 
expanded and is concerned with areas that were under the exclusive authority of nation 
states. This also seems to be reflected by the capacity of delegating tasks in the form of 
financial projects and grant-in-aid programs (Bagnall, 1985). State governments based 
on subsidies may urge state and regional governments to carry out specific operations 
and provide particular public services (Rodden, 2002). These competencies may include 
economic incentives to the states abiding by Congressional or Treaty rules. First, the 
federal government would use grant programs to make state governments more actively 
involved. Second, the participation of state governments in these programs would lead to 
a monitoring of administrative procedures by the federal government (Bagnall, 1985).   
It could be argued that federal regulation rests on homogeneous imposition and federal 
regulators that are subject to various interests with political and economic influence at all 
levels of governance. The essence of the federal regulation is the assignment of setting 
standards to the appropriate level of government (Hedge and Scicchitano, 1994). The 
economic aspect would propose that decentralization of responsibilities regarding public 
services can be ceded in state governments or local agencies including potential costs 
and gains linked to the service provided. That type of decentralization permits an 
adaptation of these services at each level. On the contrary, centralization presupposes 
homogeneity at all levels of services (Oates, 2003).  
Based on this theoretical perspective, environmental issues and regulation are 
intertwined with the historical framework, the political environment and current trends 
(Buzbee, 2005). The regulation concerning environmental issues would stem from the 
interaction of industry, environmentalist movements, low-level governments and federal 
agencies. In Europe, this theory would imply that there is a high degree of interaction 
between the centre and the member states on environmental issues. Most of the 
problems have a regional background and demand broader solutions (Vogel et al., 2012). 
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In this light, environmental policies would first be tested and applied to the member states 
and then would be promoted to the federal level and from there to uniform application in 
all member states. In effect, the European Commission would harness its power to 
compel states to increment, rather than reducing the environmental standards.  
Given the key role of the Single Market, the legislative bodies of the EU, the European 
Commission, and the European Parliament would be very sensitive for its smooth 
operation by increasing environmental standards (Vogel et al., 2012). Based on this 
assumption, the formulation of environmental policy would take into account the economic 
differentiation among the member states (Börzel, 2000; Liefferink et al., 2009). This 
process would be primarily aimed at rich regions that are economically affluent and 
prosperous, and then at those facing economic problems (Holman, 2004). These 
differences among states reflect a set of weaknesses and strengths which would fuel the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic. By harnessing their advanced domestic regulatory framework, 
‘leader’ countries in environmental policy would use different strategies to exercise 
pressure at the EU level in order to achieve better political and economic outcomes 
(Liefferink and Andersen, 1998). The incentive is, therefore, very strong because, on the 
one hand, they have advanced technology, knowledge, and expertise to deal with these 
issues in the frame of the single market, and on the other hand, they seek to impose their 
model and standards in order to avoid additional adaptation costs.  
On the contrary, ‘laggards’ devoid of a relatively steady regulatory framework would adopt 
these costly policies and in return, they would request financial support in the form of side 
payments in order to keep up with the regulatory trends. In many cases, this would have 
knock-on effects within the member states. For example, this would cause policy 'misfit' 
and hamper the implementation process by shifting the blame to others (Börzel, 2001; 
Heritier et al., 2001). The involvement of the European Court of Justice would at this point 
be very important due to its critical intervention and rulings that largely define the actions 
of member states in cases of non-application of EU law and distortions of the single 
market, such as the case of the Danish bottle system (Panke, 2007). In harnessing the 
pressure of ‘leader’ states, the EU would adopt stricter regulations and impose 
harmonization of standards in all of its territory, despite the strong opposition from some 
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‘laggards’ in order to accelerate the pace of the adoption of a common and integrated 
approach. 
 
3.9.3. Fiscal Federalism 
 
The theory of fiscal federalism originates from the sector of public finance which was 
dominant during the 1950s and 1960s and dealt with the vertical structure and functions 
of the public sector (Musgrave, 1959). It anticipates that when the market system fails 
because of different problems facing the provision of public goods, the government, in 
turn, has to implement remedies in order to rectify these failures of which the environment 
is one. As a result of this market failure, state intervention is imperative. More specifically, 
such a failure can be largely seen in the sector of the environment due to environmental 
degradation such as pollution and climate change. These environmental challenges 
would pose significant risks in the operation of the single market making the intervention 
of the European Commission deem necessary. The aim of this theory is to examine the 
interaction and operation of various levels of government with the use of fiscal instruments 
such as intergovernmental grants (Oates, 1999).  
The approach of fiscal federalism puts forward a normative context about the concession 
of competencies to different levels of government associated with the right to implement 
a policy through fiscal instruments, such as the transfer of funding from the central 
authority to the constituent parts (Musgrave, 1959). At the core of this theory, it is argued 
that the central government is liable for macroeconomic consolidation and income 
redistribution to address the needs of the poor (Oates, 1999, 2008). One of the primary 
objectives of the devolved levels of government is the provision of goods and services 
consumed in their constituencies. Adjusting the type of goods and services to the specific 
preferences and local conditions of the constituencies would result in increasing 
economic prosperity. In order to optimize social well-being, fiscal federalism adopts the 
premise that local standards diversify proportionally (Ahmad and Brosio, 2006).  
The ‘decentralization theorem’ considers the response to the local provision of public 
services to be equable to the level of public expenditure (Majocchi, 2008). Fiscal 
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decentralization takes place under a specific context of legal provisions where lower 
levels of government take over competencies deriving from the Constitution or statutes in 
order to proceed with the increase of taxes and expenditure operations (Oates, 2005, 
2008). Some indicative examples of fiscal decentralization are Germany, Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Canada, the USA, and Switzerland. Administrative decentralization occurs 
when a large portion of taxes increase at the central level. However, various funding 
programs are allocated to decentralized bodies, which are responsible for the 
implementation of expenditure functions, while adopting the rules of the central 
government and acting as its representative (Obinger and Castles, 2005; Obinger et al., 
2005; Sellers and Lindstrom, 2007). 
There are two different versions of fiscal federalism. The first generation of fiscal 
federalism (FGFF) is deemed, to a large extent, as regulative considering that public 
decision-makers are seeking to augment social well-being (Musgrave, 1959; Rubinfeld, 
1987). The second generation of fiscal federalism (SGFF) builds upon the first generation 
and contends that sub-national officials act on the basis of the objectives (fiscal and 
political incentives) of institutions which frequently deviate from optimizing social 
prosperity (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Salmon, 1986; Qian and Weingast, 1997; 
Garzarelli, 2004; Oates, 2005). According to Wildasin (2008), fiscal federalism has the 
characteristics of tax and spending adjustments and deals with the segregation of policy 
and fiscal interaction of different levels of government. Musgrave (1971) and Begg (2009) 
interpret fiscal federalism from a different angle. The main notions of stabilization, 
distribution, and allocation seem to be providing a broader context of the EU budget. More 
specifically, stabilization would respond to the higher levels of government and multi-level 
systems. Correspondingly, the distribution would be linked to the central government or 
in the case of the EU, the European Commission, would be responsible for eliminating 
tax competition among jurisdictions.  
Finally, allocation of funding is related to public finance with a clear hierarchy from the 
federal government to the federal units. The main scope is to increase domestic 
standards and provide equal provision of services through governmental transfers or 
subsidies (e.g. Structural Funds Program by the EU) by taking into account local 
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preferences. Fiscal federalism also investigates the functions of various political and fiscal 
bodies to be fueled by incomplete information and control due to lack of proximity and 
knowledge about the local needs and their engagement (Boadway et al., 1994; Weingast, 
2006). Particular knowledge of the constituencies’ and residents' needs makes local 
governments respond better than the central government.  
There are two types of grants that are central to the fiscal federalist perspective: 
conditional and unconditional. The transfer of this funding can be vertical (from the centre 
to the lower levels), horizontal (from the rich regions to the poor), or a blend of both (Begg, 
2004; Enderlein, 2010). Hence there are some possible ways of using grants through the 
internalization of spillovers, fiscal consolidation and a better tax system (Rodden, 2002). 
Conditional grants stress the benefits that originate from local services for people dwelling 
in different areas. Contrary to this, unconditional grants are particularly used for fiscal 
consolidation. These transfers take into consideration the fiscal needs and efficiency of 
the lower levels of government, such as states, regions, and municipalities (Oates, 1999). 
The aim of fiscal consolidation is to establish fairness and eliminate those externalities 
that can forestall the distribution of resources and to offer stability as a counterweight to 
potential imbalances. Finally, it can produce a fair, advanced and productive tax system 
based on the economic output of each constituency (Weingast, 2009).  
With regard to environmental policy, if the theory presented above holds true, it is 
expected that the internalization of inter-jurisdictional externalities and harmonization of 
environmental standards would demand central intervention in the EU for the protection 
of the single market (Jordan, 2005). The reasoning of harmonization is directly connected 
to product standards and free trade without barriers between the member states. 
Acknowledging that most of the environmental problems (environmental pollution) in the 
EU have a regional or local origin with a high-risk of 'spillovers' and cross-border impacts, 
the intervention of the EU would be unavoidable (Hildebrand, 1992). In this regard, the 
EU would intervene to help the member states to internalize the externalities, namely the 
cost of adopting environmental measures to prevent distortions in the single market. This 
would take the form of financial assistance such as grants and subsidies.  
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Furthermore, the transfer of funding and subsidies to less developed and new member 
states would rest on the logic of convergence, that is, the bridging of the financial gap 
with a view to raising environmental standards and optimizing the level of wellbeing and 
environmental quality. One of the main objectives of environmental subsidies would be 
the improvement of the provision of environmental services, such as those provided in 
more advanced member states. This, in practice, implies more competition and economic 
growth. From the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic, ‘laggards’ would benefit because the transfer 
of funding would solve many of their internal problems as they lack the capacity and the 
financial resources to afford the costs. ‘Leader’ states would provide this financial 
assistance to poorer states but this may put their economies at a competitive 
disadvantage due to the lack of those funds that could otherwise be invested 
domestically.    
On the other hand, the economic discrepancies within the EU, which have seemingly 
widened with the advent of the economic crisis (2007), would be expected to lead to fierce 
economic competition among member states and an increased flow of capital and people 
from the South to richer and more developed North (Hallerberg, 2011). At the same time, 
this would create detrimental effects not only to the economy of the poorer southern states 
suffering from recession and austerity but also to the more affluent states of the North 
with the capital flight, as they would contribute through intergovernmental transfers 
(funding) to poorer states to support their economy (Börzel, 2000, 2002; La Spina and 
Sciortino, 1993; Pridham, 1996).  
Taking into consideration that the financial gap between ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ tends to 
grow, according to the fiscal federalist perspective, the EU would seek to achieve fiscal 
consolidation and allocation of funds, especially to Southern States, as can currently be 
seen with the Cohesion Funds26. Their basic objective is to decrease regional inequalities 
                                                          
26 The aim of coordinated funds (European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund 
(ESF), Cohesion Fund (CF), European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), European 
Maritime & Fisheries Fund (EMFF) is to establish a clear link with the Europe 2020 strategy for generating 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU, improve coordination, ensure consistent implementation 
and make access to the ESI Funds as straightforward as possible for those who may benefit from them. 
Structural funds have also some environmental goals linked to environmental protection and resource 
efficiency, sustainable management of natural resources, climate adaptation, risk prevention and 
management, and transport, (developing rail transport, supporting inter-modality and strengthening public 
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in terms of income, wealth, and opportunities between the richer and poorer regions of 
Europe. Under this theory, the allocation of funds would support the poorer member 
states to better implement policies and tackle environmental issues. Given that ‘leaders’ 
wish to harness their competitive economic advantages to promote stricter environmental 
standards to the EU, 'laggards' due to their structural and administrative inefficiencies 
may misallocate these resources. In this light, they may prioritize economic policies and 
use these funds to correct budget deficits and achieve fiscal consolidation at the expense 
of the implementation of EU environmental policy. 
 
Table 3.10.: A summary of the dominant federalist theory perspectives of 
this thesis  
 
The table below summarizes and exhibits a brief outline with the basic ideas and notions 
explaining the main functions of the three different perspectives of the theory of 
federalism. 
 Cooperative Regulatory Fiscal 
Main Argument Spillovers Social, financial 
and 
environmental 
implications  
State intervention 
to rectify market 
failures 
Driver Differences in 
regulatory 
standards in 
constitute units 
Harmonization Fiscal equalization 
between states 
                                                          
transport (European Commission, 2015). Date of access: 23/08/2016, For more information, please see 
the report of the European Commission “European Structural and Investment Funds 2014-2020: official 
texts and commentaries, November 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides 
/blue_book/blueguide_en.pdf  
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Relationship 
between the 
tiers 
Two-way 
interaction 
Competitive with 
the European 
Court of Justice 
as mediator 
Decentralization 
Competencies Distribution of 
tasks 
(Subsidiarity) 
 
‘Politics of 
competence’ 
‘Politics of 
discretion’ 
Macroeconomic 
consolidation, 
revenue allocation  
Leader/Laggard 
Relationship 
Inter-jurisdictional 
competition 
 
Divergence of 
domestic 
standards 
(Implementation 
deficit) 
 
Regional 
imbalances (rich 
and poor) 
impacting 
implementation 
capacity 
 
Environmental 
Politics 
Stricter 
environmental 
standards 
Regulatory 
expansion 
Minimizing costs of 
environmental 
measures 
 
The use of the three different versions of federalism aims to provide an in-depth analysis 
and understanding of the ongoing EU federalization process. Each category describes a 
series of basic features which contribute to a better understanding of the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic. Finally, Table 3.10. illustrates and de-codifies the key points of the three federal 
approaches taken in this thesis. 
To begin with, cooperative federalism creates expectations that the occurrence of trans-
boundary environmental issue "spillovers" in a wider area make the notion of cooperation 
indispensable. The inter-jurisdictional character of environmental issues generates 
increased pressure for political action between the national and supranational level and 
the domestic actors. This, therefore, leads to the issue of how and in which way task 
allocation is carried out. The imperative of sharing tasks is essentially the principle of 
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subsidiarity, which, under the founding treaties, defines the level of government 
undertaking responsibilities with regard to the efficient implementation of specific actions 
and policies. More explicitly, the EU level takes on the role of coordination by internalizing 
the externalities that might cause disputes among member states and assign the task of 
implementation to the lower level, that of member states. The allocation of competences 
aims to better address environmental issues in terms of efficiency and functionality. The 
two-way interaction between the EU and member states has a significant impact on their 
approach and the quality of policies adopted. At the level of member states, the existence 
of differences in environmental standards may give rise to conformity issues which, in 
turn, may result in the adoption of a stricter regulatory framework. This is more evident 
when the focus is on competition among the various jurisdictions and the implications that 
this may have on the single market. Due to the existence of diverse standards, states with 
lower standards may gain a competitive advantage at the expense of those with higher 
thus threatening the smooth functioning of the single market.  
According to the logic of cooperative federalism, ‘leader’ states would not be very willing 
to lower their standards due to their strong domestic economic pressures, advanced 
regulatory framework, industrial and technological benefits and production of novelties. 
However, they would be seeking to establish a level the playing field by promoting their 
standards to the EU level which means fewer adaptation costs in the ‘downloading’ of 
these policies as they actually implement their own standards. By doing this, it is created 
an increased demand for better collaboration and coordination with the supranational 
bodies such as the European Commission. At the EU level, the European Commission 
may respond to pressure from member states but does not set the agenda. Accordingly, 
the EU is more oriented to correcting the inefficiencies of the national governments by 
imposing stricter EU environmental policies for the sake of the common market. On the 
other hand, ‘laggards’, despite their opposition, ultimately retreat and accept the new 
regulatory framework and stricter environmental standards. However, this is not to say 
that they would comply with it but they may see it as a way of imposing power by the most 
powerful members. Consequently, the rather weak political interest and willingness 
coupled with structural and administrative problems may weaken the policy 
implementation and result inevitably into an implementation deficit.  
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Subsequently, regulatory federalism is concerned mainly with the ‘top-down’ model 
explaining how the EU strives to achieve uniformity of standards and therefore 
harmonization of environmental policy. Drawing on that, the main rationale lies in the 
reduction of social, economic and environmental repercussions that originate from the 
diversity of regulatory standards of the member states. The divergence of standards 
essentially necessitates the 'politics of competence' and ‘politics of discretion’, that is task 
allocation, with specific actions taken by the EU and the member states under the 
principle of subsidiarity. In this light, the Commission or member states initiate the 
discussion on higher standards. The expectation would, therefore, be that the EU, as a 
regulatory state, will take on the responsibility for setting standards and favoring 
regulatory expansion. Such regulatory expansion amplifies the environmental policies 
and enriches their quality. The legal enforcement is expressed through the European 
Court of Justice which operates as an umpire for the resolution of any disputes. That 
being said, member states agree to preserve the integrity of the single market by 
accepting the cost of implementation. Therefore, the adoption of new policies and their 
implementation would mean additional adaptation costs. Consequently, the logic of 
regulatory federalism from a ‘leader-laggard’ perspective would suggest that because of 
their higher economic, political and technological capacity, ‘leaders’ are more likely to 
comply with the new policies. In contrast, ‘laggards’ would be expected to oppose the 
adoption of new measures due to high domestic pressures from vested interests, weak 
policy structures and higher adaptation costs.   
Through the lens of fiscal federalism, taking into account that inequalities between the 
member states constitute a major obstacle and a constant threat to the functioning of the 
single market, the EU steps in by internalizing the externalities and pushing for 
harmonization of standards. For the sake of the protection of the single market, it is 
imposed EU central control, of which the primary aim is to detect the inefficiencies and 
provide remedies in case of distortion of competition and protectionism by member states. 
The decentralized system between the two levels enables the EU, through the European 
Central Bank, to undertake macroeconomic consolidation and, for the member states the 
revenue allocation. In so doing, the distinction of competencies serves mostly to facilitate 
the more efficient supervision and to better address the economic specificities of each 
84 
 
member state. However, the existence of inter-jurisdictional competition would create 
regional imbalances between the rich and poor states, resulting in significant economic 
discrepancies and implementation failures. As a corollary, this would lead to the transfer 
of financial resources in the form of subsidies or side-payments from either the EU or the 
richer states to the poorer ones as counterweight towards fiscal equalization.  
In this vein, the theory would suggest that the means of achieving fiscal equalization are 
dependent on the degree of economic development, where ‘leaders’ having the financial 
capacity are able to more efficiently address environmental problems, unlike ‘laggards’ 
facing economic hardship are therefore unable to keep up with the ‘leaders’ because of 
lack of economic resources. Hence, priority is given to economic growth by putting the 
environment on the back burner. In terms of implementing the environmental policy, this 
translates into minimizing costs of environmental measures because their adoption is 
accompanied by a significant economic burden. In view of these, the goal is to provide 
funding to member states in order to more effectively respond to environmental problems 
and rectify their chronic problems and inefficiencies. However, further complexities may 
arise, such as inaction or deliberate avoidance for the implementation of environmental 
policies linked to funding allocation. This would mean that laggards in the vortex of large 
economic issues such as high public debt or budget deficits may misallocate these funds 
to redress potential losses in other sectors. As a consequence, this would create further 
gaps in the effective implementation of environmental policy with such a misallocation of 
funding beyond the initially set objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the establishment of the EU, several theories sought to explain the complex and 
multifaceted picture of the EU. In an effort to better understand the nature of the EU, 
traditional theorization through Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism laid the 
foundations for a thorough discussion. However, these theories failed to respond to the 
changing dynamics of the European integration and give strong interpretations of the 
implementation of EU environmental policy. While these theories have long been argued 
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by some scholars to be outdated, they still influence academic debate on the EU. Some 
scholars, have suggested that the development of more contemporary theorizations to 
provide a better understanding of the multi-level governance system are needed, such as 
federalism. Although federalism as a theoretical approach is not new, its employment in 
this chapter and thesis as the main theoretical framework helps examine in-depth the 
implementation of EU environmental policy and the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic during the 
economic crisis. Taking into account that the process of federalization permeates various 
parts of the EU, a stronger vision is sufficiently strengthened through the lens of 
cooperative, regulatory and fiscal federalism. The normative approach and theoretical 
explanations of these three strands of federal theory illuminate the factors shaping EU 
environmental policy implementation. Furthermore, the contemporary vision of EU politics 
adds value to the theory of federalism for two reasons. First, it captures European 
integration through the current trends and dynamics at the national and supranational 
level, and, second, it perceives and interprets more the variations and pressures amongst 
actors in the implementation process. Indisputably, within federalism, the ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic obtains a solid background and a more interpretative context upon which a 
systematic and methodical analysis is deployed. Finally, having set out the theoretical 
framework here, in the next chapter, I will analyze the methodological steps followed for 
the data collection of this study. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Having developed the theoretical background of this thesis in the previous two chapters, 
this chapter will operate as the intermediate link between the theory and empirical 
research. More specifically, I shall present in detail all the methodological approaches 
employed for this research. Initially, the chapter begins with the provision of the general 
methodological and philosophical framework (epistemology) as the basis for this study. 
Then it proceeds with the analysis of interviews in general, the definition of the elite and 
then elite interviewing as a primary data source followed by the use of a semi-structured 
questionnaire and open-ended discussion. Thereafter, the importance and value of the 
documentary analysis as a secondary data source is analyzed. Subsequently, the role of 
descriptive statistics (in the form of environmental infringements) as complementary to 
elite interviewing is also developed. With the completion of the analysis of the primary 
and secondary data sources, the issue of data validity is discussed in relation to the 
reliability and accuracy of the findings, focusing on the method of triangulation and other 
peer approaches. Finally, ethical considerations address the issues of anonymity, data 
protection and the purposes of this research.  
 
4.1. General Methodological Framework 
 
To begin with, research is a stepwise procedure focused on the collection and analysis 
of information from multiple sources aiming to increase knowledge and understanding of 
a particular topic or contribute significantly to existing knowledge. (Newman and Benz, 
1998; Kumar and Phrommathed, 2005; Taylor et al., 2015; Weber, 2015). According to 
John Creswell (2013: 16), “research is a process in which you engage in a small set of 
logical steps”. Alternatively, it may be argued that research fills the void in existing 
knowledge; approves, disapproves and evaluates the results of prior studies; suggests 
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improvements; generates new ideas and ways of practice; and informs policy debates 
(Patton, 1990; Creswell, 2013). In doing so, research offers the opportunity to the 
researcher to constantly build the wall of knowledge brick by brick and present strong and 
credible results (Bickman and Rog, 2008; Seidman, 2013). This research is concerned 
with the 'leader-laggard dynamic' and the implementation of EU environmental policy 
during the economic crisis in the member states. Therefore, one of the most critical steps 
in the run-up to conducting research is data collection. However, before analyzing the 
distinction between primary and secondary data, it would be useful to unfold the main 
philosophical assumptions of this research. 
 
4.1.1. The Philosophical Framework of the Research  
To better understand, the overarching objective of this section is to introduce to the reader 
the philosophical underpinnings surrounding this study on how knowledge is obtained 
and interpreted. For some scholars, such as Mark Avis, for qualitative researchers the 
use of specific methods or traditions in research is customary (2003: 995). On the whole, 
the subjects studied by the social and political scientists are principally formed by the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. However, it is crucial to consider whether 
these approaches are essential to do qualitative/quantitative research or are useful in 
adopting and explaining research methods. To a large extent, these assumptions give an 
expressive tone irrespective of whether they are recognized. In doing so, additional 
considerations must be considered in relation to the stance and approach taken regarding 
the theory and the processes followed. Burnham et al. (2004) contend that the 
assumptions linked to the type of knowledge (epistemology) and social reality (ontology) 
may be disconnected from the discourse of research methodology. Therefore, the 
analysis of the society needs to expand into more complicated issues such as the 
interpretation and not only the nature of social reality prior to tackling a problem. Before I 
proceed to the studied topic and choose the appropriate methodology is significant to 
understand the argumentation and background of social sciences’ philosophical 
framework in order to provide strong links with the ontological/epistemological 
considerations to the research methodology. Although at first glance, ontology and 
epistemology demonstrate a high degree of difficulty, they cannot be excluded since they 
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set the foundations for this research (Grix, 2002). As David Marsh and Paul Furlong 
clearly state “they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees fit” 
(2002:17). According to this view, for a researcher is reasonable to consider the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions when it comes to deploying and defending 
his piece of work. Moreover, this would imply that the acceptance of different or alternative 
positions may lead to better understanding and reflection on the scope of these theories.  
In a more detailed analysis, a first step is a distinction between ontological and 
epistemological perspectives and the questions derived from them (Grayling, 2003; 
Yilmaz, 2013). Initially, ontology places itself in the realm of existence. In other words, it 
is a theory of ‘being’. In this sense, ontological questions are concerned with the very 
nature of being (Bateson, 1972). While this approach may generate some intellectual 
confusion over existential issues, one of the most crucial questions is whether or not the 
real world exists and operates irrespectively of our knowledge of it. Considering that the 
ontological context has at its core the view on how a researcher perceives the nature of 
the world, the epistemological framework put emphasis on the idea of knowledge 
(Krippendorf 1984:23; McNamee 1988; Greene 1994). In particular, the main 
epistemological questions focus on how and what we can know about the world. 
Arguably, the researcher has a keen interest to explore, identify and make links of real or 
objective relations between social phenomena and to study how these can be 
accomplished. From a critical perspective, this approach essentially drives us back to the 
ontological context where if one questions that there is no real world, it means that the 
observer cannot be objective due to the fact that s/he is part of the social world influenced 
by the social constructions of reality (Marsh and Furlong, 2002:19). Undoubtedly, this 
position reveals two interesting points, how actors interpret the world and how their 
explanation is construed by an observer. Therefore, the formation of real relationships 
between social phenomena obtains particular weight because it elucidates whether the 
direct observation is needed or the existence of some relationships is not directly 
noticeable. Although there is apparently a distinct relationship between one’s 
epistemological and ontological views, one’s epistemological stance may be affected by 
one’s ontological position. Following this explanatory context some answers are due on 
the importance to address these questions. Research is directly linked to philosophical 
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explanations, as seen above, due to the fact that they affect and refine the formulation of 
the research questions, the organizing plan of the study and the conclusions (Avis, 2003). 
Interestingly, the interpretations and explanations given on the issue of knowledge of the 
world are associated with the techniques and approaches employed by the researcher. 
Consequently, from a philosophical point of view, the value and success of each research 
method and theory are tied with the epistemological approaches denoting a lack of self-
validation. However, this is better understood by the analysis and utility of the paradigms 
of social research which provide the context within which the ontological and 
epistemological foundations take shape. 
      
4.1.2. Paradigms of Social Research  
 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1988), a paradigm can be displayed as a collection of 
primary beliefs (or metaphysics) which is concerned with fundamental facts or principles. 
It reflects a particular conception of the world that determines, for the occupant, the 
inherent and essential features of the world, the position of the individual within it and the 
kind of relations to that world with its components. The beliefs are considered essential 
as they have to be merely taken on the basis of faith. Instead, it is a duty to establish the 
ultimate truth. Three key epistemologies are classified, such as positivism, realism, and 
interpretivism. Based on this categorization two basic camps are very distinct and 
contrasting, that is, positivism and realism. A more descriptive account follows below on 
the epistemological and ontological positions. 
To begin with, positivism draws its origins from the field of natural sciences (Bryant, 1985; 
Ambert et al., 1995; Burnham et al., 2004). For its advocates, natural and social sciences 
are generally related. It could be said that positivism has affected social sciences but its 
influence is declining. There is also the belief that tactical relationships can be formed 
between social phenomena. This may occur while examining the theory and creating 
hypotheses that can be tested through observation (Marsh and Furlong, 2002:22). The 
long-established tradition of positivism asserts that the world is real and not socially 
constructed. In this regard, a reliable way to test the validity of the theory is by direct 
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observation. Furthermore, positivism rests on a foundational ontology which means that 
the social world exists irrespective of our knowledge of it (Burnham et al., 2004). In such 
a view, the main scope is to compose causal statements between social phenomena in 
an objective and value-free way by using interpretative models (Marsh and Smith, 2001: 
529; Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 20). Additionally, it is believed that the knowledge of the 
world can be borne out by the senses. In simple words, this means that knowledge is built 
by an inductive process of gathering facts in order to set the basis for general laws. In a 
similar way, positivists contend that it is epistemologically feasible to distinguish empirical 
from normative questions in relation to what is and what should be (Marsh and Furlong 
2002:23). The basic reasoning behind this is that the principal aim of the social sciences 
was to continue empirical questions in contrast to philosophy, metaphysics, and religion 
whose aim was the formulation of normative questions. As a result, this differentiation 
leads to a deductive procedure where the interpretation and evaluation of laws are 
allowed. 
On the other hand, interpretivism disagrees with the core idea of positivism and contends 
that the intricate nature of social interactions cannot be sufficiently explored through the 
lens of natural science and positivism. The advocates of interpretivism argue that the 
world is surrounded by social constructions. A firm belief is that social systems can be 
interpreted in a way that captures this discreteness (Burnham et al., 2004). Against this 
backdrop, it is eloquently expressed that interpretivism constitutes the counterweight of 
positivism which presents an anti-foundationalism ontological position. In essence, the 
main challenge arising through interpretivism is that social phenomena and categories 
are not prefixed. In contrast, social interaction is the key point for their generation which 
makes them be in a condition of a lasting review. Hence, based on the ontological 
perspective, the world cannot exist irrespective of our knowledge of it. More explicitly, this 
means that the importance of interpretation, explanation and understanding of social 
phenomena is very high while influencing the outcomes. Accordingly, the meanings and 
interpretations can be fleshed out and understood by the use of discourse and tradition 
(Marsh and Furlong 2002:26). In this sense, the center of attention is placed on detecting 
and finding these discourses and traditions to set up the context and extract those 
interpretations given to social phenomena. Simultaneously, for the interpretive approach, 
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there is no objective truth or analysis due to the fact that social scientists and researchers 
operate within the framework of discourses and traditions. In doing so, there is the sense 
that knowledge is laden with a theoretical and discursive mantle and paves the way for 
the double hermeneutics; the condition by which the interpretations of people find 
expression in the social world; and the constructed interpretations provided in the 
research by social scientists (Stoker and Marsh, 2002). 
Analyzing the above positions, I believe that social world can exist irrespective of our 
knowledge of it (Burnham et al., 2004). There is also the opportunity to observe causal 
relationships. Nevertheless, I think that social phenomena and causal relations cannot be 
subjected to direct observation. I do not espouse the view of positivists that social science 
can be value-free. Instead, I believe that the normative and empirical type of questions 
posed is crucial in social research. Thus, I am inclined towards the epistemological 
approach of critical realism where there is a combination of an interpretive context on 
social phenomena and outcomes as well as a good basis derived by positivism on social 
structure and action under causal explanations (Hay, 2002). Through the lens of critical 
realism, I assume that there are profound structural relationships between social 
phenomena as those described in the context of institutions and organizations which are 
crucial for the interpretation of behavioral stance but cannot be directly observed. More 
critically, I consider that these structures cannot fully define the agents and outcomes. 
However, they are depicted as a factor of restriction and facilitation on the position and 
behavior of individuals. Moreover, the perception and knowledge of the world we have 
may be theory-laden, which implies that an erroneous or inaccurate image may be drawn 
of social phenomena (Burnham et al., 2004). Significantly, I am not fully receptive of how 
the facts and actors are presented but I recognize that social phenomena occur 
irrespective of our explanation of them (Benton and Craib, 2010: 120). Consequently, the 
consideration of the external reality and the illustration of the current reality are necessary 
for the explanation of these relationships within social interactions. 
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4.1.3. Methodological and Theoretical Implications of my Research 
   
 
4.1.3.1. Critical Realism and the Use of Theory  
 
In accordance with the above-mentioned, the third and fourth objective of this research 
deal with the use of federal theory perspectives to explore the influential factors shaping 
the ‘Leader-Laggard’ dynamic in EU Environmental policy and to provide a more 
contemporary theorization of the EU (see Chapter 1 and 3). With the analysis of critical 
realism, a need to address the epistemological issue of investigating invisible or hidden 
key factors and relationships emerges. Adopting the critical realist perspective, I am of 
the opinion that the theoretical framework operates as a means to single out those 
situations and phenomena that can be directly observed or not. Additionally, the effect of 
critical realism in my research is grounded in the idea that researchers cannot be 
excluded or be independent of the social world as they are constituent parts and various 
social constructions with regard to their surroundings are developed (Burnham et al., 
2004). Based on the above-mentioned, I used a diverse theoretical context applied to the 
empirical section of this thesis. With the deployment of the three variants of federalism 
(cooperative, regulatory and fiscal) I sought to explore, analyze, and interpret the task 
allocation, distribution of power, the relationship of the EU with the member states as well 
as the endogenous and exogenous factors affecting the implementation of EU 
Environmental policy in the member states during the economic crisis. By this token, a 
more inclusive and deep understanding of the current status of the EU and the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic is provided by federalism. First, the adoption of the federalist framework 
is an interesting tool to theorize and explain the EU as a multi-level system of governance. 
Second, it provides a theoretical platform upon which the implementation of EU 
environmental policy and the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic during the economic crisis can be 
better analyzed and interpreted. 
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4.1.3.2. Critical Realism and Methodological Approaches 
  
The significance of the critical realist approach to my research is associated with the 
specific type of methodology and data collection as will be analyzed below. From a critical 
realist perspective, the provision of a clear interpretative framework on an empirical basis 
will demonstrate the causality of social interactions in those cases that cannot be 
observed (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). All this is to suggest that the use of elite interviews, 
documentary analysis and descriptive statistics are necessary for the conduction of this 
research in the study of the ‘leader-laggard dynamic’ (see Chapter 5 and 6). All the 
research data produced were critically analyzed, assessed and cross checked with the 
method of triangulation (see Data validity and triangulation below in this chapter). This 
process enables me to more accurately explain and analyze the 'leader-laggard' dynamic 
and the implementation of EU environmental policy during the economic crisis. First, by 
the use of elite interviews, I seek to investigate the policy outputs and analyze how EU 
environmental policy is implemented. Second, by documentary analysis, I pursue to 
explore both policy outputs and outcomes. More specifically, based on secondary data, I 
investigate how other studies/reports/documents have explained the relation of policy 
outputs and outcomes in order to compare them with my findings regarding the actual 
performance of member states and the two case studies. Third, by descriptive statistics, 
I analyze mainly the policy outcomes as emerge from the number of environmental 
infringements. However, in Chapter 5, an analysis of the policy outputs is provided 
respectively (see Figure 5.1.1. Categorization of Implementation deficit). The above 
discussion shows that all the methods employed for the existing research add particular 
value to the investigation of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic and the implementation of EU 
environmental policy during the economic crisis by the distinction of policy outputs and 
outcomes (see Chapter 5 and 6).  
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4.1.3.3. Primary vs Secondary Data  
 
Following the analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of this research, data collection 
is a very arduous and laborious process which includes different strategies for social 
scientists (Neuman, 2002; Berg et al., 2004). The distinction between primary and 
secondary sources is necessary at this stage (Hox and Boeije, 2005). Primary data is 
new information or original data collected for a particular research question or purpose 
and reported by the researcher or the owner of the idea (Keppel, 1991). Essentially, new 
knowledge is generated and added on the existing knowledge base (Mouton and Marais, 
1988). A good example is the production of knowledge from experiments and social 
surveys. In this study, the use of elite interviewing is considered as a primary source of 
data. Secondary data essentially sum up the primary data. Some examples of secondary 
data are documents, encyclopedias, handbooks, textbooks, statistical indexes, reviews 
and syntheses, and journals (see the secondary data of this research in the appendix). In 
other words, it is material that is initially collected by a researcher (or public body) that 
can be reused or reproduced for other research purposes (Hakim, 1982). That being said, 
secondary data is the result of the processing and refinement of the original idea of the 
creator or researcher (Scott, 2014). With regard to this study, documentary analysis and 
descriptive statistics are used as secondary data for the study of the 'leader-laggard' 
dynamic and implementation of EU environmental policy. 
From the evaluation of both primary and secondary data, it can be concluded that primary 
sources give a first-hand experience, introduce and develop the plan of research and give 
more details about the original idea of the researcher compared to secondary data 
(Creswell, 2013). Subsequently, secondary data provides a wide range of opportunities 
by enriching existing knowledge based on the development of new interpretations and 
explanations stemming from a combination of sources such as documents, publications, 
reports and statistical data. The significant contribution of secondary data is highly 
corroborated by this study as it draws upon many reports and documents from the 
European Commission (see the secondary data of this research in the appendix). A more 
detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the methods used will be given 
below in this chapter. 
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4.2. Interviews in general 
 
While the search for political scientists to interpret political phenomena is an overarching 
objective, the technique of interviews is a powerful tool offering a first-hand testimony 
largely seen in this study. The contribution of this type of research in the realm of political 
science, as expressed by numerous scholars (Lilleker, 2003; Burnham et al., 2004; 
Bryman, 2015), has added significant value, depth and breadth to qualitative research 
and in the examination of the ‘Leader-Laggard’ dynamic. According to Aberbach and 
Rockman (2002), interviews are very significant in explaining the nexus of perceptions, 
intentions, and actions of actors. In this study, the interactions and relations between the 
national and supranational level as well as the actors and the member states tasked with 
the implementation of EU environmental policy are clearly seen. Moreover, interviews for 
Lilleker (2003) shed light on matters that are less developed or where there is a gap in 
understanding. For all scholars, interviews arguably generate a huge amount of primary 
data and information that cannot be met easily in documents or books thus enriching 
research. However, interviews are accompanied by some restrictions that cannot be 
proclaimed as the only methodological approach. Data collection under these terms 
should be grounded in a multifaceted basis, where a greater sample of interviews will be 
required in order to provide validity. In this regard, the sample of interviews is composed 
of 26 participants from the whole environmental spectrum as will be analyzed below. By 
any account, as Lilleker (2003: 208) aptly argues, ‘interviews can provide the means for 
expanding upon data and will add greater depth to a scientific analysis of an event and 
phenomenon’. However, before analyzing the elite interviews it is necessary to determine 
what an elite is. 
 
4.2.1. What is an elite? 
 
A strong interest has been sparked amongst scholars in defining and explaining the role 
of elites in society and the business sector (Ostrander, 1993; Odendahl and Shaw, 2002; 
Littig, 2009; Morris, 2009; Rice, 2010; Mikecz, 2012). As Harvey (2011) contends, the 
study of the elite can be attributed to the development of ethnographic studies in the form 
96 
 
of focus groups, interviews, case studies and participant observation, as well as a growing 
trend amongst scholars to better perceive the attitude of elite members in a broad range 
of activities. Although there have been many efforts to spell out and stress the research 
gap in the social sciences, the study of the elite presents great opportunities for more 
inclusive research (Littig, 2009). A significant part of the literature on elite interviews is 
concerned with the identity of the elite, selection and access, and possible risks in the 
conduct of interviews (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002; Dexter, 2006; Goldman and Swayze, 
2012). Another part of the existing literature is focused on the selection of interviewees 
and their classification based on their profession and expertise (Ostrander, 1993; 
Cochrane, 1998; Tansey, 2007).  
The abundance of definitions in the literature enhances the understanding and 
approaches to the research of the elite (Richards, 1996; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; 
Beamer, 2002; Goldstein, 2002; Kezar, 2003; Harvey, 2011). Therefore, one could infer 
that the variety of definitions rests on the diversity of participants. Although open to some 
debate, there is the belief that titled positions exude a sense of elitism in terms of specialty 
and knowledge. However, as Harvey (2010) points out, sometimes the distinction of 
professional titles may give a false account of the role of these people bear. More 
specifically, using the definition of Lilleker (2003: 207), it can be argued that, “elites can 
be loosely defined as those with close proximity to power or policymaking; the category 
would include all elected representatives, executive officers of organizations and senior 
state employees.” Beyond these, the problem arising from this definition is the exclusion 
of those working in NGOs and businesses. In a more detailed analysis, Zuckerman 
(1972), introduced the more complex concept of ‘ultra-elites’. This term is more inclusive 
and refers to the classification of eminent and dominant people who enjoy important 
power in a group. According to Woods (1998), the characterization of the elite is based 
on the ability to manage a range of resources as a result of the strong influence and high-
level professional and social relationships. Having analyzed how the literature defines the 
elite above, my personal contribution to the understanding of this concept is centered on 
those who are specialized in a particular field and have high interpersonal connections 
that stem from their key position in their work environment. 
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4.2.2. Elite Interviews 
 
A first clear guidance on how to gauge elite opinion is given by the seminal work of Dexter 
(2006), who argues that elite interviews aim to tap the views of those who are engaged 
in a direct way with political procedures. Expanding on this reasoning, Beamer (2002) 
argues that these people can act decisively in policy making, while the contact with them 
enlightens many aspects of particular political matters. In the same vein, Tansey (2007) 
argues that elite interviews reveal hidden aspects of political procedures that are not 
explicit in documents. For Burnham et al., (2004: 205) there is a strong nuance of power 
preponderance, “Unlike, electoral studies where the balance of knowledge and expertise 
is usually in favor of the interviewer, elite interviewing is characterized by a situation in 
which the balance is usually in favor of the respondent”. In accordance with the above, 
the use of elite interviews in this study highlights the role and significant contribution of 
the participants through their specific knowledge. This implies that the information given 
through the interview questionnaire revealed and clarified many of the organizational and 
administrative problems of implementation process in the member states. 
Therefore, the main questions included in the questionnaire (see the interview questions 
in the appendix) derive from a careful consideration and analysis of the theoretical context 
along with the gaps from the literature (see Chapter 3). After a methodical and systematic 
review of the federal theory, the design of the questionnaire is based on four pillars. First, 
it starts with the broader context of EU Environmental policy with regard to its 
effectiveness, implementation, driving forces and the interaction of the EU with the 
member states. By doing that, the main scope is to introduce and cast light on the various 
changes in the procedures of legislation, monitoring, and implementation of EU 
environmental policy over time and during the economic crisis. This part is directly linked 
to the history of EU Environmental policy (questions 1-2, 4-5), the issue of ‘Leader – 
laggard dynamic in Chapter 2 (questions 5-6) and the different versions of federalism in 
Chapter 3 (see questions 3, 5-7 in part 3 of the questionnaire). In a subtle analysis, 
question number 3 focuses on fiscal federalism, questions 5-7 on cooperative and 
regulatory federalism respectively. Then, it goes on to explore the actual implementation 
practices, problems and difficulties at national and supranational level, namely in a multi-
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level governance system. In section 4 of the questionnaire, all the questions are 
connected to the federal perspectives. In section 5 of the questionnaire, the general 
meaning of the questions aims to capture the impact of the economic crisis and austerity 
measures along with the ensuing dilemmas regarding the short and long-term ambitions 
of the member states. There is also the need to examine whether or not a divergence of 
environmental standards and possible costs exist and how these affect the 
implementation performance. More analytically, question 2 refers to cooperative 
federalism and questions 2-7 refer to both regulatory and fiscal federalism. Last but not 
least, in section 6 of the questionnaire, the main goal is to highlight the domestic 
environmental framework. These two questions are associated to a large extent with the 
cooperative and regulatory federalism. In effect, the above analysis means that the study 
meets the basic requirements (e.g. how it addresses the main research question through 
the formulation of sub-themes and sub-questions based on federalism). Hence, more 
accurate responses and strong conclusions are generated (see also the interview 
questionnaire in the appendix). In this vein, the coherence and compatibility of the data 
collection methods to the research problem are ensured (Rose and Sullivan, 1993; 
Singleton et al., 1993). 
 
4.2.3. Techniques of Interviews 
 
In view of a complete and tested research approach, interviews satisfactorily embody a 
pivotal role in data collection. However, what leads to successful data collection is 
distinguished by three different interview techniques: the structured, the unstructured and 
the semi-structured, where each of them has its own distinctive characteristics (Leech, 
2002; Burnham et al., 2004; Seidman, 2013). Structured interviewing is based on an 
analytical and fixed series of questions followed by a rigorous context in terms of 
categorization and planning (Brinkmann, 2014). This technique is destined mainly for 
quantitative data collection, providing the opportunity for direct comparisons with the data 
collected in interviews. In the absence of a clearly structured and pre-fixed plan, the 
unstructured method draws its legitimacy from the interpretations of the interviewees. This 
approach lies in the understanding of the respondents, whose experience and ideas 
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considerably affect the development of the interview (Seidman, 2013). Finally, semi-
structured interviewing would be characterized as a hybrid form of the two previous 
methods and one which harnesses the advantages and reduces the shortcomings of both 
(Roulston and Lewis, 2003). This technique has been employed in this research in order 
to better capture and analyze the responses of the participants. What makes it different 
from the other techniques is the high degree of flexibility, detailed analysis, and 
comparability. The conversational ‘freestyle’ gives leeway to the interviewees to develop 
their own views and respond more freely while creating a kind of familiarity and a more 
personal relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee (Wengraf, 2001; 
Harvey, 2011). Undeniably, due to the rapport established and the flexible structure of the 
interview, the information produced can be more revealing, including aspects that cannot 
be met so manifestly in other techniques, such as the richness of details surrounded by 
a strongly personal tone (Dexter, 2006). Finally, the diversity and convergence of views 
among the participants allow for comparability and more reliable conclusions. Factors 
such as the same group, position, agency, organization, competencies and duties enable 
the researcher to make comparisons, test the data and verify them based on what has 
been said (Arksey and Knight, 1999).  
 
4.2.4. Open-ended Discussion 
 
With a view to achieving the main research objectives, I adopted the method of open-
ended questions structured around themes related to the research (see the interview 
questions in the appendix) because it offered me the opportunity of far-reaching 
conversations with the interviewees (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Seidman, 2013). 
Considering the functionality of this method, the primary goal was focused on the 
interpretation and analysis of their responses in the frame of implementation process and 
causal factors. More specifically, open-ended questions in the context of semi-structured 
interviews provided leeway to the respondents to express themselves more freely 
(Rapley, 2001). Admittedly, that made me more mindful due to the nature and quality of 
discussions which presuppose a more independent manner (Hoffmann, 2007). In 
practice, the comparative advantage of the semi-structured method of questioning used 
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in this study was the natural flow and freestyle of discussion that generated high-quality 
and insightful responses (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). For example, the flow of the 
discussion revealed many hidden aspects (policy outputs) of the implementation process, 
and their persistence or avoidance stressed unavoidably specific aspects. Arguably, the 
stance of the informant was key for eliciting valuable data (Ritchie et al., 2013).  
The main reflection on which method should be selected aligns with the description of 
Aberbach and Rockman (2002) that the selection of open-ended questions reveals three 
main characteristics which have been widely tested in this study. First, the extent of 
preceding research on the matter of interest (Patton, 1990, 2005). The lack of prior 
research on the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic and the implementation of EU environmental 
policy during the economic crisis in member states and the more generic characteristics 
of that in other studies led me to the use of open-ended questions. Although closed-ended 
questions could to a certain extent serve the aims of the current research, the strict order 
and schedule would deprive of the flexibility, spontaneity, and normality of the responses 
(Fontana and Frey, 1994). Second, in an attempt to achieve greater data validity, the 
targeting of the elite attributed great value, high quality, and prestige to my research 
(Sapsford and Jupp, 2006). However, some of the obstacles arising impinged on the 
increased difficulty in coding and analyzing the data. As a researcher, I was confronted 
with large amounts of data and technical terms, which made the processing and analysis 
a very complicated process. Third, a crucial aspect concerning the respondents’ 
receptiveness is that the status of the interviewees requires particular treatment (Bryman, 
2015). Given that I was largely dependent on the responses of the interviewee, in four 
cases noticed an uneven balance in favour of the latter by sending the interview questions 
half an hour before the interview.  
Acknowledging that high profile people may avoid limiting themselves in sterile questions, 
it is appropriate not to insist on closed-ended questions for reasons of convenience and 
practicality (see also the interview questionnaire in the appendix). To some extent, that 
would cause significant problems in the conduct of interviews by confining the explanation 
to a superficial level and juxtaposing it in a mechanistic way (Berg, 2004). Meanwhile, it 
should not be overlooked that the positive side of using open-ended questions can be 
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overshadowed by some drawbacks. Initially, the conduct of interviews is associated with 
considerable costs in terms of time sufficiency for the establishment of interviews, coding 
and the analysis of data (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Additionally, costs in terms of money 
are very important because they include traveling and the purchase of specific gear, like 
a tape recorder for this research, and sometimes these costs may exceed the fixed budget 
allocated. Finally, significant delays can emerge due to time constraints to find 
participants. 
 
4.2.5. Selection and gaining access of interviewees 
 
A large part of the literature is occupied with the selection and approach of the elite 
(Ostrander, 1993; Leech, 2002; Delaney, 2007). A common perception is that the elite is 
generally self-selecting and allows access to the ones they desire. In this light, the sample 
size becomes smaller by the fact that the access to them is difficult and limited (Richards, 
1996; Goldstein, 2002; Tansey, 2007; Bickman and Rog, 2008). Undoubtedly, the 
assumption that ‘gaining access to elites is more difficult than approaching other people’ 
proved in my case to be largely true, especially in the initial stages (Seidman, 2013). 
While experiences may vary among the respondents, this reflects a set of different 
personal strategies followed. As Delaney (2007) suggests, one of the most crucial points 
for a researcher is to introduce his work to those who he wants to interview. Bearing in 
mind that the first impression is key for gaining rapport and ultimately acceptance, I wrote 
a comprehensive introductory email in which I briefly explained all the necessary details 
of my research topic by using simple terminology and reducing academic jargon (Dexter, 
2006). Stressing the importance of elite interviews, my main target was to provide a good 
understanding of my research project, to make clear that the participation of each 
interviewee is unique and valuable for the progress of my research, and to simultaneously 
mitigate their concerns about anonymity and data protection (see the Ethical 
Considerations below in this chapter). In this regard, the sending of a research summary 
and the attachment of the consent form (see the consent form in the appendix) aimed to 
clarify any queries that may arise and help create a climate of mutual trust. The flexibility 
of dates provided for the arrangement of interviews was grounded in the reasoning that 
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elite members have busy schedules and severe time constraints (Morris, 2009). Finally, I 
offered also the opportunity to conduct the interview in different ways (in person, via 
telephone or skype) as in some cases distance played a key role. Attempting to include 
as many interviewees as possible the selection process did not encounter significant 
problems. 
The principal aim when identifying participants was to find people from the higher 
echelons of the state and EU agencies, universities, international organizations, NGOs, 
and businesses relevant to the environmental sector (see the list of participants below in 
this chapter). The reason why I chose the above participants is that they represent the 
main mechanisms of refining the bulk of environmental decisions and are charged with 
the monitoring and/or implementation of EU environmental policy. Additionally, the 
selection of these people was mainly based on criteria such as their job position, 
responsibilities, active involvement, knowledge, experience and expertise. The interviews 
were very representative as I sought to secure diversity and depth, that is, a variety of 
groups and participants from the broader environmental spectrum and not to focus on 
one sector as this would create lots of problems regarding reliability, validity, and 
representativeness of the sample (see the list of participants below in this chapter). At the 
same time, this process also helped me avoid imbalances or overloading towards a 
specific direction. In accordance with Seldon and Pappworth (1983), there is always the 
risk that that method will only include respondents with similar characteristics. Although 
there is always the peril that the participants may deliberately stress continuously the 
strengths or downgrade their flaws and weaknesses of their work or agencies, the 
diversity of views constituted a very important tool as all the different views are hosted 
thus limiting significantly the risk of unilateralism as well as the rather excessive exposure 
of a particular viewpoint (see also Data Validity below in this chapter). Acknowledging 
that some respondents might have an interest in playing up the success of their work, I 
gave leeway and space to them to express freely. This enabled me to know more in detail 
the successes or failures of their agencies and distinguish any exaggerations or 
limitations. While this, at first glance, would be a risky gesture, I was very careful and 
critical in the end with the coding, analysis, and cross-checking of data through 
triangulation (see the method of triangulation below in this chapter). Having the time 
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advantage, I sought to identify potential overlaps or cases of defending sectoral interests 
by comparing their responses with people from the same or other departments, looking 
also at the existing literature, reports, documents and analyzing what they said during the 
interview.  
Initially, all the participants were contacted by email. The stage of approaching in the early 
stages was characterized by particularly warm interest but a scant or little response. As 
a consequence, the initial excitement started to retreat and gave way to obvious concern 
and reflection after the low response rate. After a few positive responses in the first month 
and the arrangement of the first interviews, I felt a deep relief and pleasure that my project 
was finally taking shape. Therefore, I fully agree with Cochrane’s (1998: 2124) vivid 
description that “without gaining access, there can be no research, therefore the first 
acceptance already feels like success—a small victory”. Seizing this opportunity, 
subsequently, I adopted the snowballing method or chain-referral sampling (Biernacki and 
Waldorf, 1981; Berg, 1988; Tansey, 2007; Noy, 2008; Punch, 2013). With the adoption of 
that method, I was given the opportunity to expand my list of participants by harnessing 
the suggested referrals from the initial interviewees and building up my network. 
Considering the pitfalls that often arise, according to Harvey (2010) there are two areas 
in which a researcher should be very careful when searching for and approaching elite 
actors. First, flexibility is required in the planning of questions and meetings. As for the 
first part, I believe the flexibility included in the semi-structured interview and open-ended 
questions is evidence of my flexible strategy, as well as the arrangement of possible dates 
and meetings upon request. Second, the issue of transparency has particular weight in 
the context of ethics and gaining trust (Dexter, 2006). As mentioned earlier, I counteracted 
this risk by sending a brief research summary and the ethics form to interviewees.  
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Table 4.1.: List of Participants 
 
Affiliation Number of Interviews Taped or Notes Method 
Greece 
Senior Officer of 
Local Environment 
Agency (1) (2) 
2 Taped In person 
Officer of Local 
Environment Agency 
(3) (4) 
2 Taped In person 
Special Advisors at 
the Environment 
Ministry (5) (6) 
2 Taped 
Only Notes 
In person 
Senior Official at the 
Environment 
Ministry (7) 
1 Only Notes In person 
Officer in Private 
Environmental 
Business (8) 
1 Only Notes In person 
Senior Official of 
WWF Hellas (9) 
1 Taped Skype 
Senior Official of 
Greenpeace Hellas 
(10) 
1 Taped Skype 
UK 
Labour MP, Former 
Minister (11) 
1 Taped Phone 
Senior officials from 
non-profit 
environmental 
2 Taped Skype 
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Institute (IEEP) (12) 
(13) 
Environmentalist 
(14) 
1 Only Notes Skype 
Associate Fellow at 
the Center of 
European Reform 
(15) 
1 Taped In person 
Officer at Natural 
England (16) 
1 Taped Phone 
Environmental 
Regulator of the 
Environment Agency 
(England) (17) 
1 Taped Phone 
Associate Professor 
of Ecosystem 
Services (18) 
1 Taped Phone 
Senior Official on 
UK and EU 
Programs division 
WWF UK (19) 
1 Taped In person 
EU 
Senior official in DG 
Environment of the 
European 
Commission (20) 
1 Taped Phone 
Research Scientist 
of the EC in the 
Research Joint 
Centers of the 
1 Taped Skype 
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European 
Commission (21) 
Program Manager in 
the Joint Research 
Center of the 
European 
Commission (22) 
1 Taped Skype 
Senior Official of the 
European 
Environment Agency 
(23) 
1 Taped Skype 
Program Manager in 
the EU Specialized 
Agency (24) 
1 Taped Skype 
Senior official of an 
environmental think-
tank (EPE) (25) 
1 Taped Skype 
European 
Conservation Officer 
(26) 
1 Taped Skype 
Attempts for contact 
DEFRA UK -  Due to busy 
schedules and time 
constraints they 
could not 
participate 
-  
Business Europe -  Although they 
expressed initial 
interest, finally they 
did not take part in 
-  
 
107 
 
4.2.6. Field Work 
 
The fieldwork was conducted from September 2014 to March 2015 and was separated 
into three different sections in order of priority, starting with Greece, then the UK, and 
finally the EU. To begin with, the number of Greek participants amounted to ten. My 
fieldwork schedule in Greece included traveling in Athens, where I met with four 
respondents, in Kozani, with another four, and the remaining two interviews were carried 
out via skype. My interview experience in Greece was satisfactory overall but in some 
cases I was faced with reluctance due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed, as 
mentioned by the interviewees. The total number of interviews conducted in the UK was 
nine. Of these, four took place via skype, three via phone, and the remaining two in person 
in London and Woking. In comparison to Greece, in the UK I did not encounter any 
reluctance by the interviewees or problems throughout the interviews since all of them 
were very experienced accepting my request with enthusiasm. On the other hand, the 
interviews for the EU context - seven in total - were conducted entirely with the assistance 
of technology - one via phone and six via skype - mostly due to the long distance and 
strict budget constraints. Although some scholars (Burnham et al., 2004; Mikescz, 2012) 
argue that cultural differences may play a significant role, in my case, I did not have any 
problems as I was very familiar with the Greek and British culture. In total, the sample of 
interviews includes significant diversity but this does not mean that more interviews would 
not be needed. Additional interviews would possibly give different insights and more 
clarity, although I did reach a saturation point in terms of the same themes coming up.   
 
4.2.7. Preparation and Conduct of Interview 
 
Taking into account Zuckerman’s (1972) remark that, intentionally or unintentionally, elite 
respondents might challenge researchers on the nature and relativity of the matter 
discussed, in the preparation stage of each interview, I tried to be well-prepared and 
informed about current developments, as required by the different fieldwork phases. This, 
arguably, included the literature review and specific reading on the area to which the 
interviewee was related. In this way, the main aim was to make them feel that they were 
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speaking to a fellow insider and then to gain their trust as a researcher for a fruitful 
conversation (Dexter, 2006). Considering that familiarity with the subject is for many 
scholars (Burnham et al., 2004; Stevens, 2007; Blakeley, 2013) a key to a good interview, 
I sought to avert any thoughts of wasting interviewee’s time and posing unnecessary 
questions. Apart from that, I had to regularly check material equipment, such as stationery 
for taking notes and if the tape recorder is working properly, since any problems occurring 
during the interview may lead to the loss of valuable data.  
Following the introductory email when approaching respondents, a summary of my 
research was given to the interviewees before the start of the interview in order to have 
a full picture of the topic discussed. In an attempt to collect real and not pre-constructed 
answers that have a strong nuance of spontaneity (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983), as a 
rule, I did not send the questions beforehand, with the exception of four cases when I was 
asked by the respondents to provide them as a prerequisite for their participation. At the 
beginning of the interview, having made sure that the interviewee had understood the 
objective of the research, I then analyzed the procedural character of the interview, 
followed by some questions on their availability, recording, taking notes etc. (May, 2011). 
At the end of each interview, the respondent was asked whether s/he wishes to receive 
a transcript of the interview for his/her record, to check the originality and validity of his/her 
responses, to add anything that had not been mentioned over the course of the interview 
and make clarifications where needed (McCracken, 1988). It is worth mentioning that in 
one case, a participant from the UK, provided me with an extra reading material in the 
form of reports. In concluding, a thank you letter was sent to all the interviewees for their 
time, contribution and cooperation. As Mikecz (2012: 491) argues, “this gesture not only 
served as a reminder in case the interviewee offered additional help, such as reports or 
additional contacts during the interview, but also kept the door open for follow-up 
interviews”. In this regard, I fully agree with Welch et al. (2002) that collaboration after the 
completion of the interview is useful because the sending of interview transcripts to the 
respondent may require clarification and further comments. In spite of the formal rules, 
the emotional character of this procedure was reflected in the emails received, in which 
some of them expressed their pleasure in participating in my research.  
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The average length of each interview was about an hour and less than half of them 
exceeded that limit. While interruptions can be seen as part of the interview process 
(Stedward, 1997), in three interviews held in respondents’ office problems of continuity 
occurred due to the influence of external factors, such as the phone ringing and urgent 
departmental meetings that delayed the process. Following the advice of Rubin and Rubin 
(1995: 7) that “Qualitative interviewing requires listening carefully enough to hear the 
meanings, interpretations, and understandings that give shape to the worlds of the 
interviews”, the open and free style discussion led me to new topics. Acknowledging that 
keeping a balance between me as a researcher and the respondent is a difficult task 
during the talk, I tried to remain neutral (Harrison et al., 2001). While the issue of 
controlling the interview has been researched by many scholars (Ostrander 1993), there 
were only two cases where I found myself being asked by the respondent about the 
structure of my questions, in which they dictated the way at some point, such as “it is 
vague, can you narrow it down please”.  
 
4.2.8. Telephone and Skype Interviews 
 
Conducting most of the interviews via telephone and skype helped me understand at first 
hand the main differences to face-to-face interviews (Irvine, 2011; Hanna, 2012; 
Weinmann et al., 2012; Deakin and Wakefield, 2014). While most of the literature is 
focused on the traditional ways of conducting interviews and, to a lesser extent, on 
telephone interviews, there has not been so much reference on skype interviews (Sturges 
and Hanrahan, 2004; Stephens, 2007; Holt, 2010; Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 2012). Sharing 
the same view as Stephens (2007: 203) that telephone interviewing is “both a productive 
and valid research option”, I noticed that through telephone and skype interviews I had 
better and direct control of the conversation compared to face-to-face interviews, mostly 
as a result of non-visual contact. However, the assumption that telephone interviews can 
be poorer in detail than face-to-face interviews was also true in my case (Sturges and 
Hanrahan, 2004). That would be explained in the context that telephone interviews are 
shorter in duration. Faced with the risk of missing interviews and acknowledging the 
geographical distance of participants, the flexibility in interviewing by telephone or skype 
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gave me the opportunity to organize them at a significantly lower cost due to budget 
constraints (Shuy, 2002; Harvey, 2011). 
 
 
4.2.9. Recording the Interviews or Taking Notes 
 
The contrasting views on recording interviews or taking notes that stem from the literature 
reflect significantly the different preferences amongst scholars (Peabody, 1990; Byron, 
1993; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Harvey, 2011). My decision to carefully use tape-
recording was dependent on factors such as easing the way of conversation and curtailing 
any possible loss of information. For this process, it was very important to secure the 
consent of the respondent (Blakeley, 2013). In my case, 4 out of 26 interviewees did not 
give their permission to be recorded. Although the appearance of a tape recorder may 
cause nervousness and anxiety in the way the interviewees respond, from their answers 
it does not seem to have significantly affected (Zuckerman, 1972; Hart, 1989).  
One of the main advantages of recording is the provision of a verbatim transcript of the 
interview and the actual interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee 
(Richards, 1996). Recording the interview gave me the opportunity to focus not only on 
the details, uniqueness, and responses of the interviewee but also on my sentiments, 
comprehension and stance that influenced the explanation and interpretation of data 
(Mikecz, 2012). In so doing, I attempted to minimize information loss and misinterpretation 
and to accurately quote what the respondent said (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983). At the 
same time, it allowed me to draw my attention to body language, such as eye contact to 
increase rapport. As Mikecz (2012: 488) aptly articulates, “sometimes, the intonation of 
the interviewee’s voice, his posture, and facial expression would express more than his 
words”. Another advantage is that transcribing the interview gave me the opportunity to 
reflect on the content as well as the way the respondent expressed himself during the 
interview, including facial characteristics, feelings, and interruptions. Meanwhile, during 
the interviews, I took notes to stress the most important things and to make sure that in 
the case of technical problems with the tape recorder a full account of the meeting and 
interview would be kept. Taking notes is not just capturing everything said but an elegant 
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way to control the interview. More specifically, there is a sense that the more notes the 
interviewer takes, the better impression is shaped by the interviewee due to the high 
importance of data produced. There is also the belief that the lack of notes may be seen 
by the interviewee as low interest (Ostander, 1995). In my case, along with the note-
taking, a detailed account of the procedural characteristics of the interview was kept, such 
as date, time, venue and a brief progress report, for reflection and further improvements. 
 
4.2.10. Interview Analysis 
 
Analyzing the interview data is a demanding and challenging process for each researcher. 
To begin with, all the interviews taped were transcribed by myself, either shortly after or 
within one day of the end of each interview along with the notes taken. In those cases, 
where permission for recording was not given, only the use of notes was appropriate. In 
this regard, the interview notes were fleshed out with details, either at a neighbouring café 
or at home, while my memory was fresh and could more easily recall particular parts of 
the interview (Blakeley, 2013). Another reason for the quick transcription of interviews 
was to record as clearly as could be the emotional and psychological factors as well as 
the environment of the interview, such as the surroundings, the sentiments, and 
expressions. Inter alia, this part was of great interest because I could provide my own 
perspective and opinion on the outcome, such as annotations and clarifications. As 
Harrison et al., observe (2001: 102), ‘the transcription process for me proved crucial in 
that it allowed me to become “familiar” with my data by milling over them time and again’.  
Following the transcription process, I started coding the data to single out topics. As 
Burnham et al., (2004: 103) argue, ‘the data from open-ended questions is much more 
difficult and time-consuming to code and the coders need clear instructions to avoid 
miscoding’. Having already constructed a semi-structured questionnaire (see the 
interview questions in the appendix), there was, to some extent, a kind of atypical order 
but it was not enough to provide me with clear categorization. Therefore, I segregated 
each interview into themes and placed a keyword on them from which I could identify the 
descent and the connection with the question. Subsequently, after having completed this 
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process with all the interviews, I created sub-groups, entitled, for example, according to 
the main drivers, the impact of the economic crisis, tradeoffs, and economic status, in 
order to gather and place all the responses that addressed that issue with the name of 
each interviewee. With the completion of this stage, I had a clear mapping out of my data 
that allowed me to continue with the interpretation and explanation of data. At all times of 
the writing process, I constantly re-visited the interview transcripts so as to check that I 
included everything. 
 
4.2.11. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elite Interviewing 
 
Having extensively discussed what elite interviewing is and its procedural steps, the pros 
and cons will be analyzed below. Four main advantages were observed in my research 
by the use of elite interviewing. First, elite actors can provide valuable information about 
particular topics (Tansey, 2007). For the purposes of this research, the interviews with 
the elite actors enhanced my knowledge about the capacity of the public administration 
to implement policies, the role of the NGO community and the economic costs for 
countries that have financial problems. According to some scholars (Seldon and 
Pappworth, 1983; Davies, 2001), a second advantage is that elite interviewing can assist 
in disclosing aspects and details of policy processes, as well as explaining factors, 
actions, and outcomes that influence decision making. Arguably, their contribution to my 
research was very important in terms of analyzing the endogenous and exogenous 
drivers and the various problems such as the fragmentation of policy structures and 
misallocation of competences in Greece leading to implementation failures during the 
economic crisis. Third, for much of the literature (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983; Seldon, 
1988; Richards, 1996) elite participants can give a more personal character to the 
information provided. In many cases, I felt that the responses of the interviewees were 
reflecting a deep and strong personal tone deriving from their work experience and active 
involvement in the implementation process (see Chapter 6). Fourth, for some scholars 
such as Richards, (1996) and George and Benett, (2005) elite interviewees can also offer 
exceptional opportunities in seeking organizational connections. As mentioned earlier in 
113 
 
this chapter, some of them introduced me to people (snowballing method) who 
contributed significantly to my research thus increasing my list of participants.   
At the other end of this pendulum, some of the main disadvantages or problems met in 
this research, according to the literature (Manheim and Rich, 1981; Seldon and 
Pappworth, 1983: 20-21; Richards, 1996; Drost, 2011) were the provision of unreliable 
information by a respondent because of his weak memory, the weak understanding of the 
questions, the frequent change of mind during the interview, and the purposeful 
misrepresentation of information aimed at securing interests. More specifically, two 
participants from Greece, surprisingly, did not understand very well some of the questions 
thus touching upon other trivial or irrelevant issues, such as policy making and one of 
them due to frequent changes of his mind gave a more blurred picture of the 
implementation process that led me to ask for more clarifications. I also felt that the same 
respondent was trying in his responses to secure the interests of his department due to 
poor performance. At this point, it is no exaggeration to say that some of the interviewees 
appeared reticent in their responses, especially in Greece due to reasons of sensitivity as 
stated during the interview. Although the issue of reliability constitutes the essence of the 
research (see the method of triangulation below), the above disadvantages were not 
necessarily a problem in data validation as I cross checked them with some other people 
from the same department, documents and reports (see the method of triangulation below 
in this chapter). Acknowledging these problems, I systematically aimed to secure 
objectivity and transparency at all stages as there is always the risk of the temerity and 
formulation of the questions, the bias in interpretation, and questions that lead to 
predetermined answers (see the method of triangulation below). Simultaneously, while a 
part of the literature refers to the interviewer and his constraints that arise from the degree 
of obedience and respect against the interviewee, I sought to be very careful in terms of 
not showing excessive deference or dependence but to remain neutral as my research 
position required (Richards, 1996). Significant barriers can also emerge from the power 
relationship between the interviewee and the interviewer. The power balance may incline 
to the side of interviewee due to concerns of denial or the premature end of the interview. 
Gaining access to an elite member of society may ensnare the interviewer to adopt the 
agenda of the respondent (Hertz and Imber, 1995; Cochrane, 1998; Phillips, 1998). 
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Taking into account that credibility and transparency are primary goals of my research as 
analyzed above I pursued to remain neutral despite the fact that in four cases I sent the 
questions half an hour before the interview in order to secure their participation. Apart 
from these reasons, this would be high-risk and detrimental for my research due to self-
manipulation. However, at any stage of the interview process, I did not adopt the agenda 
of the interviewees for reasons of objectivity and reliability. As my confidence and 
assertiveness grew over time, it helped me to overcome these barriers.  
 
4.3. Documentary Analysis 
 
4.3.1. What is documentary analysis? 
 
Documentary analysis is the methodological process in which an evaluation and 
assessment of documents and reports take place, including of electronic and printed 
sources (Bowen, 2009). According to Tim May (2011: 191-192), “documents, read as 
sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and structure the decisions 
which people make on a daily and longer-term basis; they also constitute particular 
readings of social events. They tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the periods 
to which they refer and describe places and social relationships at a time when we may 
not have been born, or were simply not present”. A document is an easy source of data 
that symbolizes on paper the conception, embodiment, and blossoming of a set of ideas 
and deep thinking. Hence, they are divided into two categories, public and private 
documents. The category of public documents includes minutes of meetings, formal 
notices, newspapers, public records, and archives. Subsequently, private documents 
represent diaries and journals, personal notes, letters, biographies (Creswell, 2013: 245). 
It may be argued that such documents have an informative and inductive role by creating 
a picture of a condition or an individual (Briggs and Coleman, 2007; Scott, 2014; 
Silverman, 2016). The examination of documents offers valuable data because it allows 
the researcher to read the discourse between the lines, interpret the messages and draw 
conclusions from the content (Fairclough, 2003; Patton, 2005). Likewise, documentary 
analysis is subject to consideration and interpretation by the researcher with a view to 
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providing explanations, a good understanding and obtaining empirical knowledge 
(Merriam, 1988; Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Ritchie et al., 2013). One of the main ways by 
which documents were used in this research was for the production of graphs and tables 
in empirical chapters 5 and 6 about the implementation patterns and failures in member 
states. The data were collected mainly from the official European Commission reports 
and documents such as the Annual Reports (24th – 33rd) on Monitoring the Application 
of EU law and descriptive statistics as will be seen below with the use of environmental 
infringements from the official website of the Directorate-General Environment of the 
European Commission from 2006 until 201427 (see the secondary data in the appendix).  
Taking into account the fact that documents can variously be used for the aims of the 
research, it is worth mentioning initially some of their advantages. More explicitly, 
according to some scholars (McCulloch, 2004; Briggs and Coleman, 2007; Fitzgerald, 
2007; Bowen, 2009: 30-31), documents can provide significant information and data, such 
as names, dates, facts, and references, as well as a text providing framework about the 
main role and functions of actors and institutions. In accordance to that, the study of 
documents and reports on the implementation process provided me an explanatory 
context and an in-depth analysis of the ‘top-down’ approach, the interaction, task 
allocation and distribution of power between the EU and member states contributing 
decisively to a better understanding. A significant comparative advantage of this method 
is the focus on data selection than data collection, whereby it can be more efficient, thus 
requiring less time in relation to other research approaches (Sapsford and Jupp, 2006; 
Bailey, 2008). The use of various sources, such as the internet, library catalogues, 
textbooks, newspapers, reports and academic journals, were particularly preferred for my 
research due to reasons of easy accessibility, availability and saving time. For some 
scholars such as Patton (2005) the cost seems to be lower in comparison to other 
research approaches. Acknowledging that the generation and collection of new data are 
frequently accompanied by higher costs such as the elite interviews above, the analysis 
of documents and reports helped me base my research on already existing work and be 
more effective in terms of time management by focusing on those aspects that were 
                                                          
27 DG Environment/European Commission, Date of access: 15/02/2015, http://ec.europa.eu/environment 
/legal/law/statistics.htm. 
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under-explored such as the role of the UK as a purported ‘leader’ and Greece as a 
traditional ‘laggard’, the organizational structure of public administration and the impact 
of the economic crisis. Moreover, documents seem to be unchanged by any 
obtrusiveness, having a more static character (Scott, 2014). Because of this stability, the 
subject studied can be reiterated without so much interference by the researchers 
(Strauss, 1987). Arguably, the use of secondary data as mentioned above helped me see 
what others have written and then to fill in data that were either missing or not fully 
covered in elite interviews (see Data Validity below in this chapter). Consequently, I fully 
agree with Yin (1994) and Bowen (2009) that secondary data can be used as an indicator 
for identifying changes and possible improvements.  
Despite the positive aspects of documentary analysis, this is not to say that there are no 
disadvantages. Indeed, a number of problems which may limit the effectiveness of the 
approach have been observed. First, documents may have gaps in analyzing facts and 
events resulting in incomplete and inaccurate descriptions. It is, thus, common to provide 
poor analysis on a specific issue (Ritchie et al., 2013). During my data collection and while 
I was studying reports, documents, textbooks etc., I was confronted with the issue of how 
recent the publications for my research are. In some cases, I felt that the comparison 
between the older and newer versions of documents included significant changes in terms 
of details and analysis. This fact, inevitably, increased my attention to look for the latest 
versions in order to keep up with the current developments on EU implementation 
patterns. Therefore, I believe that the analysis of documents can in many respects be a 
valuable means to support research findings or prove their validity or substantiate the 
existing evidence stemming from other sources (see Data Validity below in this chapter). 
Similarly, this may also be due to the fact that documents serve a broader context of 
functions without being strictly confined to a sole issue. Second, a common obstacle 
amongst researchers is the low retrievability and, in some cases, accessibility can be 
intentionally hampered (Bowen, 2009; Creswell, 2013). While researchers very often 
have difficulties in locating and obtaining the material required for their study, these 
documents may be sometimes not accessible to the public due to restrictions such as the 
exclusive permission of the author. In my case, due to limited access and older versions 
of this journal in the library of the University of Exeter I visited the British Library in London 
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to find the latest versions of the academic journal (ENDs Report) which means more costs 
and traveling for my research. Beyond that, I did not have any other accessibility problems 
in terms of finding secondary data in other archives, including traveling and costs as I 
used extensively the sources of the library of the University of Exeter. Third, partial, 
preferential and limited selection of documents can raise issues of biased selectivity, 
implying specific incentives and purposes (Fitzgerald, 2007). As a researcher, I pursued 
to include a wide range of secondary sources of data in order to avoid biased selectivity 
and raise impartiality and objectivity in my critiques. Otherwise, this would imply a 
deliberate action to distort and pre-define final outcomes.  
 
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics is a resourceful tool in the political scientist’s toolkit, either as a 
preliminary part of a more sophisticated analysis or a stand-alone research (Burnham et 
al., 2004: 141). Descriptive statistics is a branch of statistics and a form of analysis for 
summarizing, describing and presenting data in a meaningful way with the use of 
tabulation, graphical representation and statistical parameters (Burnham et al., 2004). For 
the purpose of this thesis, descriptive statistics are complementary to the elite interviews 
and documentary analysis. More specifically, I made use of tabulation and graphical 
representation of the environmental infringements in empirical chapters 5 and 6. As 
mentioned above, these were compiled from the official European Commission data sets 
such as the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of EU law and the statistical 
analyses of DG Environment28. The use of environmental infringements is a key indicator 
as it clearly shows the problem in delivering specific policy goals and resulting in 
implementation failures (see Chapter 5 and 6). In this regard, the role of environmental 
infringements (policy outcomes) operates as a tool that measures the deviation from the 
existing institutional framework with some implications for humans and environment from 
the bad or non- application of EU environmental law. Additionally, environmental 
infringements, apart from illustrating the policy outcomes (see Chapter 5 and 6), 
                                                          
28 DG Environment/European Commission, Date of access: 15/02/2015, http://ec.europa.eu/environment 
/legal/law/statistics.htm. 
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essentially direct us, as researchers, to explore and analyze also the policy outputs (as 
explained by the elite interviews above). In so doing, a more comprehensive picture of 
the policy implementation is provided. 
Some of the main advantages and disadvantages of this approach met in this thesis are 
analytically developed below. The main advantages of this method unfold as follows. 
First, descriptive statistics summarize large amounts of data and assist in the 
arrangement and visualization of data (Burnham et al., 2004). The graphical and 
numerical depiction (see Chapter 5 and 6) of the total number of environmental 
infringements (policy outcomes) and their breakdown country by country and at EU level 
on a yearly basis provides a concrete record that makes easier to the reader to 
understand, remember, capture and analyze the main tendencies and fluctuations 
throughout the economic crisis. Second, they give voice to data and are amenable to 
various interpretations and discussions (Stevens, 2012). The analysis of the 
environmental infringements gave me the opportunity to explain in-depth the country per 
country policy outcomes as well as their dynamics by making comparisons across the EU 
countries and my two case studies, (Greece and the UK) (see Chapter 5 and 6). Third, 
the variation of the number of the environmental infringements during the economic crisis 
formed the basis of a rigorous and advanced analysis and therefore the examination of 
the policy outputs and outcomes along with the endogenous and exogenous driving 
forces that lead to implementation failure in member states in Chapter 5. Fourth, they 
offer economy of time and cost, reliability, and precision (Sirkin, 2005). In comparison to 
elite interviews, the data collection with the use of descriptive statistics proved to be 
quicker with significantly fewer costs. Additionally, they offered high credibility and 
accuracy into my research as they were already subject to rigorous scrutiny from the 
official European Commission data sets as mentioned above. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages are focused on certain aspects. First, descriptive 
statistics can be misused, misinterpreted and incomplete (Burnham et al., 2004). Given 
that the graphical representations and tables contain condensed data the need to 
accurately explain, for example, the policy outcomes may lead to misinterpretations or 
poor analysis. Second, descriptive statistics may offer little information about the causes 
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and effects (Stevens, 2012). Due to a limited dataset in the third section of Chapter 5, the 
policy outputs and outcomes at the EU level are compared only with the policy outcomes 
at the level of EU member states. Similarly, the lack of country by country data of policy 
outputs as seen in Chapter 6 with the two case studies may create some gaps in 
understanding about their influential role and thus incomplete conclusions. In this regard, 
they provide a comprehensive analysis only on the policy outcomes. Third, the 
development of descriptive statistics may be dangerous if not analyzed completely (Black, 
1999). Related to the previous point, the lack of data in the category of ‘Impact’ and 
‘Others’ in Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.2.2.: Environmental Infringements by sector) may lead 
to a less detailed description. Fourth, a failure to clearly categorize the different sectors 
may result in a vague analysis and interpretations (Sirkin, 2005). In my case, I did not 
encounter significant problems as the categorization of sectoral infringements was very 
clear in the statistical analyses of the European Commission.  
 
4.5. Data Validity 
 
After the completion of data collection and analysis, the next step is to validate the 
accuracy of the findings, which is paramount. In general, validity is recognized as a 
fundamental problem of the theory (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Validity and reliability are 
simply means to understand the complexity of measurements on causes and effects in 
theory and applied research. The researcher is responsible for securing the accuracy, 
reliability, and trust of the findings by using specific approaches like triangulation and 
member confirmation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Creswell and Miller, 2000). According to 
Steven Downing (2003: 830), “validity refers to the evidence presented to support or 
refute the meaning or interpretation assigned to assessment results”. Reasonably, it is 
now understood that all findings need evidence to prove their validity. Bearing in mind 
that everything related to research cannot be perfectly calibrated, maintaining a degree 
of subjectivity makes the task of checking even more significant. Under these terms, 
validity and reliability are strong pillars of scientific research (Moss, 1994; Riege, 2003).  
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Reliability refers to the process of replicating the same experiment more than once with 
the same conditions and producing the same results (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; 
Merriam, 1995). Therefore, this process strengthens the findings by fulfilling the formal 
research probation. Validity encloses the idea of experiment and demonstrates whether 
the results generated are compliant with the prerequisites of the research methods 
(Kvale, 1995; Drost, 2011). Internal validity defines the structure of an experimental plan 
and includes the necessary stages of the scientific research approach (Campbell, 1986; 
Godwin et al., 2003). External validity investigates the results and searches for other 
possible relationships (Calder et al., 1982; Rothwell, 2005). Content validity deals with 
the adequacy of the content (Holsti, 1969; Brod et al., 2009). In the context of the research 
community in general and this thesis in particular, validity and reliability are very important 
elements demonstrating that the research conducted has accurately reported findings 
and the interpretations are underpinned by strong evidence. 
 
 
4.5.1. Triangulation 
 
Triangulation would be best explained as the technique in which ‘if one side and two 
angles of a triangle are known, the other two sides and angle can be readily calculated’29 
(Britannica, 2016). In the social sciences, the main research scope of triangulation is to 
employ two or more variables to reinforce the capacity for the interpretation of the findings 
(Denzin, 1970; Jonsen and Jehn 2009). In simple words, it is the mix of two or more 
informants, data sources, or channels applied in the same study for the analysis and 
verification of data produced (Denzin, 1970; Kimchi et al., 1991). As can be seen in the 
figure below, triangulation has different pathways to verify the findings. These can be 
checked directly through interviews, interviews, and documents, documents and 
secondary sources, interviews and secondary sources or combination of all. 
 
                                                          
29 Date of access: 18/06/2016, https://www.britannica.com/science/triangulation-trigonometry     
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Source: Davies (2001:78) 
 
For many researchers, a vexed issue is how to achieve validity of their results. 
Triangulation is offered as one of those methods that provide high validity and stringency 
of research (McFee, 1992; Davies, 2001; Golafshani, 2003; Humble, 2009). The basic 
claim is that the validity of research findings is corroborated in the case when at least two 
or more independent sources seem to be aligned or do not oppose each other (Johnsen 
and Jehn, 2009). In this context, triangulation serves the aim of verification, which rests 
on a set of stable, ordinary cross-checks of theoretical approaches, justification, 
judgements, strategies, findings and the researcher. According to the existing literature, 
the adoption of triangulation is very important for a number of reasons (Denzin, 1978; 
Thurmond, 2001; Griffee, 2005). First, it aims to obliterate or diminish biases and at the 
same time to achieve and increase the reliability and validity of the inquiry (Downing, 
2003). Second, it seeks to enrich the conciseness and provide a more integrated 
understanding of the research objective (Kane, 2001). Third, it is the action of enhanced 
confidence concerning the outcomes derived from triangulation for researchers. On the 
other hand, some of the disadvantages are centered on the time-consuming nature of this 
method in relation to single approaches. Moreover, the high volume of data may create 
problems of efficient management. Following this, there is always a risk of 
misinterpretation stemming from the researcher’s prejudgments (Thurmond, 2001).      
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The deployment of elite interviews in qualitative research presupposes that the use of 
primary and secondary sources is vital in the interpretation and validation of data. Based 
on the assumption of Davies (2001: 77) that “alternative primary sources are not always 
available, and in a number of cases, interview data may be the only form of data available, 
or interview data coupled to information from secondary sources”, it is evident that the 
method of triangulation provides a firm ground. Regarding my thesis, data validity is 
grounded in the triangulation of primary sources, including interviews and secondary 
sources like documents and reports. Throughout the course of my fieldwork, I conducted 
26 interviews with a number of key actors from the environmental, governmental, 
business and academic fields, whose input added particular value to my research. More 
specifically, I paid particular attention to cross-checking data coming from within and 
between the data sources, as clearly seen in the graph above. Concerning the primary 
sources (elite interviews), the participants originated from different groups classified by 
their status and position, in which similarities and opposing views were met. In some 
cases, I have interviewed more than one person from the same department which gave 
me the opportunity to test the validity and reliability of their responses from within that 
group by comparing what was being said (see the list of participants above).  
In other cases, the repetition and the similar way of responding constituted a strong sign 
of verification. That being said, a degree of consistency was attained in many of my 
interviews. Likewise, I noticed, as Griffee (2005) put forward, that some of their responses 
were imbued by a progressive and directional evolution, which in turn added a significant 
degree of validity in the interpretation of data. In other cases, where I interviewed only 
one person in each department I tried to cross-check the validity through reports and 
documents, whereas any possible deviation or convergence would be perceived as a sign 
of confirmation or refusal. At the same time, I also had some outside perspectives, such 
as those from NGOs, which helped significantly in cross-checking my data. It is telling 
that most of the officials I spoke to either had a deep and thorough knowledge and 
understanding of the topic researched or active participation. Indisputably, the responses 
from the interviews could be partly confirmed by the availability of documentary sources. 
In those cases, where significant differences were identified between the interviews and 
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official public records, the use of documents and reports was considered to be the most 
appropriate means. 
 
4.5.2. Other Validation Methods 
 
Although triangulation has been employed as the main validation method, other 
approaches were also used respectively (Silverman, 2016). Acknowledging the value of 
interviews and documentary sources for drawing reliable data and conclusions, I 
examined the data produced from a critical perspective, since many factors can intervene 
and affect the final outcome. Any omissions can be extremely harmful and lead to a false 
picture regarding the character and aims of the research itself. Many agree, not unfairly, 
that elite interviews are a difficult process implying the issue of reliability (Carmines and 
Zeller, 1979; Drost, 2011). Being aware of these risks in the interpretation of data was 
necessary to understand the deeper meaning of the interview data and depict largely the 
subjective views based on personal experience, ideas, impressions and memories of a 
range of issues. Simultaneously, bearing in mind the subjectivity of views contained in 
interviews I became very critical of content and analysis of the additional factors, such as 
the stance and behaviour of the respondents (Richards, 1996). In order to avoid 
interpretative preconceptions and pitfalls, the information provided by the interviews was 
not addressed as factual but as the interpretation and reading of the existing system and 
world (see above The Philosophical Framework of this Research). Moreover, preparation 
for interviews, including prior research and study on the points I wanted to mention, 
helped me focus on little details, such as the method of questioning, which could make a 
difference to the accuracy of the responses (Bryman, 2015).  
As mentioned earlier, anxiety and nervousness from both sides at the very beginning of 
the interview process have played a crucial role regarding issues of rapport and trust 
(Roulston and Lewis, 2003). Equally important was the fact that writing a summary at the 
end of each interview about the overall progress made me have a clearer view and be 
more critical in the process of interpreting data. Apart from the evaluation of the interview 
itself, I also included other factors, such as behaviour, stance, and feelings, which turned 
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out to be very important to reach firm conclusions (Denzin, 2001). Through this process, 
it was easier to identify the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. Another reason is 
the risk of misinterpretation of data, especially in those cases where the interviewees 
refused to be recorded and allowed me only to take notes (Kvale, 2006). Under these 
circumstances, I was very careful with the use and analysis of these data because in 
comparison with the recorded interviews the risk was higher due to limited data. For the 
interviews recorded, my notes were used as the means to validate them by focusing on 
the similarities and differences (Mears, 2009). To gain more validity, at the end of each 
interview, each interviewee was asked if he/she wanted a verbatim transcript or the notes 
taken to check what was said during the interview. By that gesture, I aimed to greatly 
reduce the possibilities of misinterpretation and to allow the interviewees to provide any 
clarifications or additions to the information given. At the same time, it was a good 
opportunity to pose supplementary questions, acting as a vestibule for the final decision 
by the interviewees. In four cases, interviewees sent me back the edited version of the 
transcript with some clarifications that were necessary as concluding remarks. 
 
 
4.6. Ethical Considerations 
 
A key term and condition for the conduct of my research were ethics approval from the 
University of Exeter, which I successfully passed (see the consent form in the appendix). 
In an attempt to secure and provide safeguards for both sides (me as interviewer and the 
interviewee) and achieve the successful completion of the interviews, my ethical 
considerations were based upon anonymity, data protection and the purposes of my 
research (Munhall, 1988; Miller et al., 2012). To avoid potential risks during the interview 
process, in the first contact by e-mail I informed the participants about the issues of 
confidentiality, the use and storage of data and the intention of my research. After having 
obtained their consent, I proceeded to arrange the meeting for the interview as well as 
available dates and locations. Simultaneously, I made clear that the participant could 
withdraw at any time. Moreover, the issue of anonymity was highly important for the 
purposes of this research and only on request would the name of the interviewee be 
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published (Israel and Hay, 2006). Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the respondents 
asked to remain anonymous, arguing that much of the information contained sensitive 
aspects, as discussed earlier in this chapter. As a consequence, many interviewees 
expressed the view that it would be easier to give honest and accurate answers under 
the status of anonymity. Respecting their request, I considered necessary for even those 
who accepted the public use of their name to remain anonymous for reasons of self-
protection, respect, and equal treatment. In this regard, interview data were held and used 
on an anonymous basis in accordance with the United Kingdom data protection 
regulations, with no mention of the name but with a reference to the stakeholder group or 
affiliation of which the interviewee is a member. Similarly, all the participants are coded 
according to their background (e.g., officer, special advisor etc.) (Punch, 2013). With 
regard to data security, I provided assurances that any recordings of interviews and typed 
interview transcripts would be encrypted and stored on a secure hard drive for four years 
after the end of the research. Subsequently, I reassured the participants that the results 
of this research would be used for academic purposes, such as my Ph.D. thesis and 
publications in academic journals, excluding commercial or other interests that might 
damage this research. Finally, it is appropriate to stress that the funding of this research 
was granted by the Greek State Scholarships Foundation (IKY), a non-profit organization 
that is a state-owned institution that provides scholarships for new researchers.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To recapitulate, this chapter has presented and examined the diversity of methods 
employed for the purposes of this thesis. The basic intention of this analysis was to 
explain and elucidate all the aspects of the conduct of this research. To begin with, in the 
first section, research design, epistemology and the analytical context of elite interviews 
along with its procedural steps set the foundations for a broader understanding and 
clarification of the reasons for the use of this method. The methodological development 
of elite interviews has emphasized the interaction and generation of information and data 
through people who are specialists. Thereafter, documentary analysis and descriptive 
126 
 
statistics in the second part appear to have mostly an auxiliary role to support the elite 
interviews. Documentary analysis proved to be undeniably critical in the interpretation of 
data along with the utility of descriptive statistics. In an attempt to corroborate the reliability 
and validity of data, the third part of this chapter dealt with the method of triangulation and 
other validation strategies. Based on these methods, the main scope was to ensure the 
validity of data and minimize the risks and various problems that may arise. Finally, in the 
last part ethical considerations touched upon and analyzed the fundamental issues of this 
research, such as anonymity and data protection, which was necessary for both sides to 
be aware of prior to the interviews. After the completion and development of the 
methodological approaches used in this research, the following chapters 5 and 6 will show 
the empirical results of this thesis. More specifically, the next chapter, chapter 5, serves 
the first objective of this thesis, which is the mapping out of the broader EU patterns of 
the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic following the 2008 “credit crunch”.  
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Chapter 5 – Implementation patterns in the EU member 
states 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Building and adding upon the existing literature in Chapter 2, the primary goal of this 
chapter and second of this thesis is to develop and map out the broader implementation 
patterns of EU environmental policy in the member states during the economic crisis by 
highlighting the factors affecting implementation deficit. For the purpose of this study, as 
extensively referred to in the methodology (see Chapter 4), the use of 26 elite interviews, 
documentary analysis, and descriptive statistics (environmental infringements) will 
provide a fresh look at the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic and develop a better understanding 
of the implementation of EU environmental policy. First, I will break down the policy 
outputs and outcomes at the EU level considering the additional factors related to the 
economic crisis. Second, I shall compare the policy outputs and outcomes at the EU level 
with the policy outcomes at the level of EU member states. Third, I will analyze the 
exogenous and endogenous drivers before I assess how all these factors have affected 
EU environmental performance and implementation deficit.  
  
5.1. Policy outputs 
 
In this section, I shall analyze the policy outputs at the EU level derived from the 
descriptive statistics (environmental infringements) of the European Commission 
combined with the data from the 26 elite interviews (see the list of participants in Chapter 
4). Building upon the existing literature (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; Jordan, 1999; Knill 
and Lenschow 2000; Holzinger et al., 2006, 2011; Knill and Liefferink, 2007) the 
categorization of implementation deficit is demonstrated to rest primarily on bad 
application of policies and non-compliance due to the existence of different policy 
practices and capacity amongst the member states on how to apply the EU policies. Due 
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to lack of analytical country by country data on policy outputs, the discussion will be limited 
to the broader set of the EU level policy outputs and not at the level of EU member states. 
Given this restriction, a clearer view will be provided in the comparative section of this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 5.1.1.: Categorization of Implementation deficit 
 
 
Source: Author Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/ 
statistics.htm) (Date of access: 15/03/2015) 
More explicitly, the above graph shows how the European Commission ranks and 
evaluates the categorization of implementation deficit during the period 2008-2014. On 
the vertical axis (y), is portrayed the total number of infringements per category and on 
the horizontal axis (x) the timespan (on a yearly basis) from 2008 to 2014 including four 
main categories of implementation deficit as policy outputs: bad application, non-
conformity, non-communication and not classification. Notably, bad application is referred 
to the weakness to meet certain standards in the application of a directive by a member 
state. Non-conformity issues arise when there are serious shortcomings in the 
transposition of a given directive to a member state. Non-communication emerges if a 
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member state fails to notify the transposition of a specific directive before a given 
deadline. Non-classification regards those cases that are not able to be categorized 
(European Commission, 31st Annual Report 2013). Comparatively, both the EU 
interviewees and the graph above confirm that bad application and lack of enforcement 
are some of the most common categories over time mainly linked to the institutional and 
administrative capacity of the state to impose and successfully implement legislation in 
its territory. This is also corroborated by the words of an EU interviewee (24), “there are 
persistent problems with enforcement and implementation that have not been solved 
efficiently and continue to be a significant barrier”.  
Understandably, the degree of enforcement of a policy relies on how strong a state 
institutionally and constitutionally is. In a similar fashion, for others, such as the 
interviewees (20) and (26), the lack of enforcement is a key issue that stumbles upon the 
systematic challenges and domestic problems of the member states. An example of that 
is waste management in Greece (see also Chapter 6). The same respondents articulated 
that acknowledging that the majority of member states face various pressures 
domestically, such as those referred to above, it is not surprising that bad application still 
continues to be a chronic problem. Similarly, for the majority of the Greek interviewees, 
non-correct and untimely transposition may induce significant delays and omissions in 
the transposition of EU legislation into the domestic level. Non-compliance is emerging 
as another possible category, which is traditionally connected to bad transposition, 
increased opposition from the member states and the existence of different domestic 
standards (see Börzel, 2001; Knill and Lenschow, 2005; Thomson et al., 2007; Falkner 
and Treib, 2008). Many EU interviewees expressed that problems of conformity may be 
associated with a different domestic environmental framework, usually with lower 
standards, the increase of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and worsening economic 
conditions. Particularly from the Greek side, some respondents stressed the volatility of 
the political system and economy resulting in the rise of nationalism and Euroscepticism. 
Interestingly, the interviewee (20) argued that in view of increasing social and economic 
problems, such as unemployment, different prioritizing of needs by the national 
governments may cause a sort of lax attitude towards non-compliance. Although there is 
a slight decrease in the rates of non-compliance, based on the graph above, it remains 
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quite high overall. The greatest variation is encountered in the category of non-
communication. As an EU interviewee (20) put forward, non-communication would mean 
non-responsiveness or lack of communication between the member state and the 
relevant EU institutions. In the end, non-classification seems to exercise little influence 
being statistically insignificant. 
An interesting view that adds to the existing literature (Knill and Lenschow, 2005; 
Liefferink and Jordan 2005; Knill and Tosun, 2009) according to some EU interviewees, 
such as the interviewee (23), explaining the above analysis is the high level and scale of 
regulation from the European Commission that increases the pressure on member states 
to implement policies: “I guess it was easier if you only had to implement two pieces of 
legislation, now you have to implement something in the order of 300 pieces of legislation. 
It's a big demand for the member states”. While it is debatable how the different degree 
of expectation affects that, this statement essentially indicates that increased pressure 
may compromise implementation in a general context. Simultaneously, this may generate 
adjustment problems in the domestic institutional framework of the member states. On 
the same scale, the interviewee (12) ascribed that gap to the divergence between some 
of the higher aspirations and actual achievements.  
On the same wavelength, another British interviewee (12) shared the same view 
contending that there is a lot of concern about the under-implementation of the 
environmental acquis and the 7th Environmental Action Program: “I think my guess is that 
over the next few years it's going to be increasingly challenging for public authorities to 
continue to implement environmental legislation at the level that was intended and 
apparently this is because of a steady reduction in the availability of public expenditure 
for enforcement activities”. Interestingly, the lack of EU environmental inspectorates, as 
some EU respondents argued, exacerbates greatly the monitoring and control of the 
implementation process. According to the interviewee (20), “there are no environmental 
inspectors in the EU. We have fisheries inspectors; we have public inspectors but we 
don't have environmental inspectors. So, we don't have the power to go on the ground”. 
In other words, the capacity of the EU to inspect seems very weak whilst generating 
incentives for laxer implementation. More critically, the interviewee (13) articulated that 
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the dynamics of implementation have had a slower pace because of the wider economic 
changes at the European level and the large scale of de-industrialization in Europe since 
the 1990s. To illustrate that, he gave the example that those measures, in practice, aimed 
at the manufacturing industry which had knock-on effects on other policies such as the 
environmental protection.  
 
5.2. Policy outcomes  
 
Having deployed how the empirical research assesses the policy outputs above, I shall 
analyze here the policy outcomes at the EU level by deploying the views of the 26 elite 
interviewees with the examination of open DG environmental infringements from the 
European Commission. In doing so, I aim to better capture the main trends and explain 
the EU implementation performance.  
 
Figure 5.2.1.: Open DG Environmental Infringements by member states by 
year, 2007-2014  
 
 
Source: Author Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/ 
statistics.htm) (Date of access: 15/03/2015) 
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According to Figure 5.2.1., a remarkable reduction of the total number of open DG 
environmental infringements across the years 2007 and 2014 is presented, that is, the 
official prosecutions from the European Commission to the member states on the basis 
of different types of claims. Indicatively, the y-axis shows the total number of 
environmental infringements and the x-axis the annual distribution respectively. In terms 
of policy outcomes at the EU level and contrary to expectations, the number of open DG 
environmental infringements appears to have gone down during the economic crisis 
rather than up. For some EU interviewees such as the interviewee (26), a possible reason 
would be the external threat of fines by the ECJ which operates as a stick and carrot. 
Furthermore, the same respondent also contended that the need for fiscal consolidation 
in some member states may have played a key role (see Chapter 1 and 3).  
In a broader context, the economic crisis does not seem from this graph to have 
negatively had significant impact. More explicitly, looking at the number of environmental 
infringements, the distinction between pre-and post-crisis data to a large extent marks 
two different phases. During the first period of 2007 to 2010, the number of the 
environmental infringements is higher, peaking in 2008, at the height of the economic 
crisis. The advent of the recession in 2009 is seen as the first step towards fewer 
environmental infringements which continued until 2010. In the second phase, from 2011 
to 2014, there has been an overall improvement, as reflected with the lowest rate of 
environmental infringements in 2012. In this respect, the interviewee (21) epitomized the 
views of the majority of the respondents stating that "we have come a long way in terms 
of effectiveness. It is significantly better than it was". Arguably, this statement is a strong 
signal also for some others such as the interviewee (22) who contended that the decrease 
of environmental infringements would be the object of increased efforts and coordinated 
action by the member states, and the on-going monitoring by the European Commission 
under the 7th Environmental Action Plan and Europe 2020 strategy (see also Wilson and 
Buller, 2001; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2002). Acknowledging that many European 
states face fiscal problems reasonably this results in budget constraints and, 
subsequently, less money to spend in other activities. In the same context, another 
economic factor as expressed mainly by the majority of Greek respondents would be that 
less economic output may lead to less environmental damage. For example, the decrease 
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of industrial production, investments and spending power of citizens may trigger fewer 
environmental ‘spillovers’ or externalities.  
From a different perspective, the interviewee (25) argued that the reduction of 
environmental infringements may be the outcome of a country's long-term planning and 
environmental ambitions. He also used the example that countries whose growth model 
was not efficient such as of Germany sought to make structural changes to stimulate their 
economy towards a more sustainable path (see also Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Liefferink 
and Andersen, 1998; Wurzel et al., 2003; Lipp, 2007). Finally, this tendency would be 
explained for the interviewee (20) under the weight of global environmental challenges 
such as Climate Change and the pressure added on member states to abide by the 
international conventions and agreements. Arguably, according to that respondent, the 
pressure for better environmental outcomes may render the member states to be more 
accountable for their environmental action (see Vogler and Stephan, 2007; Oberthür and 
Kelly, 2008; Kelemen, 2010; Kelemen and Vogel, 2010). To conclude, from the graph 
above it seems that the reduction of environmental infringements at the EU level relies 
on a set of different reasons whereas the economic crisis seems to have a less strong 
pivotal role. In the next graph (Figure 5.2.2.) I will break down the sectoral environmental 
infringements at the EU level that compose Figure 5.2.1. as seen earlier. 
Figure 5.2.2.: Environmental Infringements by sector 
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Source: Author Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/ 
statistics.htm) (Date of access: 15/03/2015) 
The above graph (5.2.2.) presents more analytically the total number of environmental 
infringements by sector (Air, Nature, Waste, Water, Impact and Others) at the EU level 
across the years 2007-2014 as derives from the Figure 5.2.1. The y-axis indicates the 
total number of open DG environmental infringements and the x-axis displays the annual 
basis. To better understand the policy outcomes at the EU level, I based my analysis on 
the compiled data sets from the European Commission/DG Environment, various reports 
from the EEA and the European Commission (see also the secondary data in the 
appendix) and data from the elite interviews with 26 participants (see the list of 
participants in Chapter 4). In doing so, I aim to explain the composition of each column 
as well as the variations of the environmental infringements both annually and throughout 
the economic crisis.  
Initially, in the sector of ‘Air’, a set of factors such as industry, agriculture, waste, and 
households have long been considered to bear a significant share of responsibility for the 
deterioration of air quality (Annual Activity Report DG Environment, 2013). In a broader 
frame, assessments have shown that emissions have fallen in the last decades, thus 
contributing to improved air quality. However, in specific sectors the emissions of some 
pollutants (PM2) have risen, causing possible damage to the economy, human health, 
and ecosystems (EEA, 2015). A thorough analysis by the European Environment Agency 
(EEA) has assessed the impact of air pollution, focusing on the costs of public health, 
work days and other vital sectors of the economy. Drawing on that, it may be argued that 
many problems originate from the weak implementation of the Industrial Emissions 
Directive (IED), the use of Best Available Techniques (BAT) on a range of industrial 
sectors, and the assessment of the implications and setting standards of the industrial 
emissions and emission limit values (ELVs) on air quality. Finally, better control and 
management is essential, particularly in soil contamination caused by industrial 
installations along with easier access to information for citizens about the Industrial 
Emissions Directive (IMPEL, 2015).  
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In the category of ‘Impact’30, the implementation of Environmental impact assessments 
at national level shows noticeable reduction which translates into more efficient 
management. Due to lack of data it cannot be given a detailed analysis. Although the 
implementation of Climate Adaptation is at an early stage, there has been good progress 
in the sectors of freshwater and flood-risk management, as well as in agriculture, because 
of the transfer of these sectoral policies to the national level. Moreover, in June 2014, 20 
member states from 13 in 2008 have drawn up national implementation strategies over 
the above-mentioned sectors, and 17 of those have drawn up a national action plan. For 
most of the member states, there seems to be an increase in public environmental 
awareness for climate adaptation five years ago (EEA, 2015). Only four member states 
currently implement a monitoring and evaluation scheme and nine have proceeded in the 
development of plans on climate change impact, risks, and adaptation. While numerous 
evaluations on climate change are available for 21 European states, more data are 
required on costs and benefits, as well as more elaboration on implementation efficiency 
with regard to future challenges (EEA, 2015).    
With regard to ‘Nature’ and biodiversity, mixed progress has been made in nature 
conservation and the functioning of ecosystems. A rather alarming picture is seen in 
species and habitats due to the loss of biodiversity and significant ecosystem 
degradation. Indicatively, only 23% of animal and plant species and 16% of habitats seem 
to be in a favorable condition. Particularly troubling is the situation of the population of 
many species. For example, there has been a very sharp reduction (50%) in grassland 
butterflies, common bird population (12%) and common farmland population (30%), 
without recovery (EEA, 2015). On the other side, more promising signs are shown in 
particular species (European bats and carnivores), where the recovery is faster for the 
land and species protection. The greatest progress is identified in the expansion of the 
Natura 2000 network of protected sites, reaching 18% of EU land and 4% of the EU 
marine waters. Estimations of the ecosystem service benefits of Natura 2000 are 
                                                          
30 For the category of "Impact", this covers 28 files concerning one of two Directives, either the legislation 
on Environmental Impact Assessment or EIA (currently Directive 2011/92/EU) or the Directive on Strategic 
Environmental Assessment or SEA (Directive 2001/42/EC). All but one of the 28 cases listed concerned 
the EIA legislation and in some cases also additional other Directives and only one case concerned the 
SEA Directive alone. 
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expected to be worth between €200-300 billion per year (Annual Activity Report DG 
Environment, 2013). In this light, the brunt falls on the efficient management and 
restoration of the areas.  
In a similar fashion on ‘Waste’, a recent publication by the European Environment Agency 
for 32 European countries indicated that further improvements and actions on municipal 
waste are required regarding the implementation of objectives under the Waste 
Framework Directive (EEA, 2015). More explicitly, the recycling target seems to have 
been met only by five countries so far, and six countries will meet this objective only by 
keeping the same pace as seen between 2001 and 2010, and the rest have to step up 
their efforts to meet the objectives by 2020. Furthermore, a matter of particular concern 
is the growing propensity in relation to the gap arising from the production and treatment 
of hazardous waste, where 17% of hazardous waste is regarded unidentified. 
Additionally, an increase in the phenomena of waste crime necessitates stricter law 
imposition and better monitoring, especially when it comes to waste shipment (IMPEL, 
2015). According to a report of the European Commission (Annual Activity Report DG 
Environment, 2013), there needs to be further improvement of recycling within the current 
context as well as better inspection and monitoring of the closure of landfill areas. In the 
same vein, better approaches are proposed to be adopted regarding particular problems 
such as the treatment of hazardous waste, end of life vehicles, waste electronic and 
electrical equipment, waste produced in hospitals, dismantling of ships, bio-waste, 
treatment and disposal of contaminated soils by oil industries and management of sludge 
generated in urban wastewater treatment plants.    
In the category of ‘Water’, drawing on the latest assessment by the European 
Commission (2012), only 53 percent of the EU's surface waters will reach a good 
ecological status by 2015, as required by the Water Framework Directive whereby three 
key pressures are identified. First, is the natural alteration of water bodies as a result of 
extensive pressure, known as hydro-morphological pressures. Second, there is an 
excessive abstraction of water due to the disproportionate distribution of water to users 
in river basins, the imminent lack of water resource planning and management, and illegal 
subtraction. Third, is pollution from diffuse sources such as agriculture that has a large 
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impact (40%) on EU rivers and coastal waters. A significant proportion (25%) of 
groundwater bodies are characterized by poor ecological status, mainly due to nitrogen 
compounds from intensive agriculture practices largely seen in the central and north-
western part of Europe (EEA, 2015). Simultaneously, concerted actions and long-term 
planning have resulted in an advanced sewage system and a more integrated wastewater 
treatment under the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive. It is noticeable that 
Europe’s water quality is much cleaner now compared to the past when the level of 
planning and organization was not so advanced. Also, bathing and drinking water is 
reaching a significantly good quality in the context of the Bathing and Drinking Water 
Directives (Annual Activity Report DG Environment, 2013). Taking into account the 
progress achieved over the last 25 years over the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive, significant gaps and insufficiencies in the implementation of the 
directives have prevented it from reaching full compliance with existing environmental 
legislation (EEA, 2015). Finally, in the category of ‘Others’, due to lack of data, a detailed 
analysis cannot be provided.    
From the documentary and empirical data analysis is demonstrated that in terms of policy 
outcomes at the EU level there has been mixed progress but significant improvements in 
almost all environmental sectors. More explicitly, it could be said that there is a correlation 
between the views expressed by the 26 participants and the various trends as shown in 
the graphs above. According to the majority of the respondents, such as the interviewee 
(26), there has clearly been a range of successes in many sectors as a result of 
harmonization, with the imposition of equal standards across all member states (see also 
Tallberg, 2002; Mastenbroek, 2005; Holzinger et al., 2008). However, some others such 
as the interviewee (20), have expressed reservations that there are a few areas where a 
number of member states face significant structural and systemic challenges, such as 
waste management which require more efforts in terms of long term work. Nevertheless, 
it could be argued that the different dynamics of each sector contributes significantly to 
the overall improvement of EU environmental policy over time.   
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5.3. Comparison of policy outputs and outcomes 
 
Table 5.3.1.: Environmental Infringements per member state from 2006 to 
2014 on the implementation of EU environmental legislation 
Infringements 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Austria 16 12 11 13 9 6 10 16 12 105 
Belgium 20 24 21 20 18 13 9 10 23 158 
Bulgaria 0 6 7 17 17 17 14 17 15 110 
Cyprus 7 9 9 7 11 11 7 14 0 75 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 10 
The Czech 
Republic 
4 11 18 26 17 21 5 7 9 118 
Denmark 8 10 17 13 8 7 6 8 4 81 
Estonia 7 12 19 10 11 3 6 9 2 79 
Finland 8 9 12 6 13 6 8 14 6 82 
France 29 32 34 26 19 15 14 19 19 207 
Germany 16 13 9 8 12 7 9 12 13 99 
Greece 30 26 27 24 33 25 22 25 36 248 
Hungary 4 6 12 11 9 10 8 7 4 71 
Ireland 38 34 35 34 25 17 11 8 7 209 
Italy 61 60 45 35 46 40 25 25 18 355 
Latvia 3 9 12 6 7 5 6 5 6 59 
Lithuania 5 10 14 11 9 5 1 3 1 59 
Luxembourg 17 20 16 8 10 8 3 5 2 89 
Malta 13 26 12 12 10 6 6 5 5 95 
The 
Netherlands 
10 8 7 5 4 2 2 4 2 44 
Poland 10 13 16 23 26 21 19 20 20 168 
Portugal 28 26 21 23 26 24 17 13 10 188 
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Source: Author Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/ 
statistics.htm) (Date of access: 15/03/2015) 
The above table, based on the availability of data, compares the policy outputs (Figure 
5.2.1.) and policy outcomes (Figure 5.2.2.) at the EU level as analyzed previously, with 
the policy outcomes as seen above, namely the number of environmental infringements, 
at the level of EU Member states from 2006 to 2014 (due to lack of data on policy outputs 
per member state). Looking at the high number of environmental infringements, on a 
country by country basis, from a policy outcome perspective or legal approach, the 
environmental policy is demonstrated to be clearly ineffective. From a closer look, the 
above table may somehow be misleading in terms of how we interpret the policy 
outcomes at the level of EU member states. Consequently, these data may allude to other 
reasons that are not very clearly visible from the above table. A simple observation would 
be that policy outputs and outcomes differ considerably thus failing to deliver the objective 
of a specific environmental policy or directive (see also Holzinger et al., 2011; Knill et al., 
2012; Nilsson et al., 2012). More explicitly, according to many EU and Greek respondents 
the number of environmental infringements at the level of EU member states would be 
related to other facts such as geomorphological features and the amount of natural 
environment resources a country has to manage. Of particular interest is the view of many 
Greek interviewees who argued that environmental policy is more expensive and 
arguably more difficult for a country (Greece) with a large coastline to be fully compliant 
with the Bathing Water Directive than one with a smaller coastline (see also Tallberg, 
2002; Mastenbroek, 2005).  
Romania 0 3 7 12 17 8 10 13 30 100 
Slovakia 3 8 15 19 13 8 10 17 14 107 
Slovenia 5 7 8 6 10 7 11 18 12 84 
Spain 40 42 37 40 33 27 32 29 30 310 
Sweden 6 10 9 10 14 9 12 11 9 90 
The United 
Kingdom 
33 33 31 26 18 11 13 18 16 199 
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From the UK side, additional factors such as the level of industrialization, urbanization, 
and density of population may play a significant role. The interviewee (14) expressed that 
due to high urbanization and population density, big cities like Paris and London are more 
likely to have more air pollution problems since they accommodate the main bulk of 
economic activities in their region. This would also mean that the implementation of this 
policy becomes even more difficult. Therefore, the main question arising when looking at 
these data is why some member states perform better if the above standpoint is true. 
Based on common sense the more urbanized EU member states would be expected to 
have higher air policy infringements. As the interviewee (19) contended, the level of 
industrialization and infrastructure development may exert significant pressure on nature 
and biodiversity issues mostly in Central and Northern European member states. 
However, a more concrete answer which confirms the existing literature is given by an 
EU (20) and two Greek (9) and (10) respondents claiming that although the European 
south has more natural capital, its management becomes very difficult due to the weak 
administrative practices and capacity of the state and the strong presence of strong 
economic interests (see Börzel, 2000; Knill and Lenchow, 2001; Baker, 2003; Holzinger 
et al., 2006; Jordan 2009; Hanf and Jansen, 2014).  
In this regard, it is important not only to record the number of environmental infringements 
but also to explore the specific causes of these in the context of ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’. 
The research findings, based on the policy outcomes of ‘leaders’ (see Chapter 2) in the 
above table, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, UK and the 
Netherlands, confirm, to a large extent, the existing literature (see Liefferink and Andersen 
1998; Börzel, 2000; Jordan and Leschow, 2000; Jänicke, 2005; Wurzel, 2008; Liefferink 
et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012). At the same time, it also shows their alignment with the 
EU's downward trend as described in Figure 5.2.1. In general, the policy outcomes of 
these states vary slightly, demonstrating either a stability or a small increase thus 
strengthening their reputation and leading position among the EU member states. While 
the impact of the economic crisis was not so strong for these countries, this may have 
helped to keep their environmental infringements at a low level. 
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Contrary to arguments made in existing literature about ‘laggards’ (La Spina and 
Sciortino, 1993; Börzel, 2000), the above table belies this claim (Table 1). Given that the 
economic crisis hit at the economic level more strongly the Southern European countries, 
it is rather impressive that the environmental infringements of some of them has improved 
rather than deteriorated. More explicitly, Ireland, Italy and Portugal demonstrate a 
significant reduction in their environmental infringements thus following the EU downward 
trend as seen in Figure 5.2.1. Although the pre-crisis condition characterizes these 
countries having significantly high environmental infringements and a bad implementation 
record, in the post-crisis period they look like more ‘leaders’ than ‘laggards’ in terms of 
their policy outcomes (see Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012). In a sense, the 
economic crisis may have acted as a lever to more effectively address some of their 
environmental problems. According to some EU respondents, a possible reason would 
be that economic output in these countries was badly weakened during the economic 
crisis thus meaning fewer environmental impacts. Another reason, according to them, 
would be that the environmental infringements imply more fines and for economies of 
such scale, economic costs are very important because the money for the payment of 
fines can be kept and support the domestic economy. Unlike the other ‘laggards’, first 
Greece (Pridham, 1994; Pridham et al., 1994; Koutalakis, 2011) and then Spain (see 
Fernandez, 1994; Pridham, 1994; Börzel 1998; Mazorra, 2001) show the highest variation 
and a significant increase in the number of their environmental infringements. Alongside, 
a great divergence is also witnessed compared to the EU downward trend during the 
economic crisis as seen earlier in Figure 5.2.1.  
For those countries “in between”, according to the existing literature (Börzel, 2000; Jordan 
and Lenschow, 2000; Jänicke, 2005; Wurzel, 2008; Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 
2012), such as Belgium and France, the impact of the economic crisis seemed to be 
different. More clearly, France has seen a significant reduction in their environmental 
infringements at odds with Belgium, which presented a rather abrupt increase. In a 
broader context, both seem to line up with the dominant EU downward trend (see Figure 
5.2.1. The policy outcomes of ‘in-between’ states appear to confirm the existing literature 
as they resemble more the ‘leaders’ than the ‘laggards’ (see Chapter 2). Adding to the 
existing literature, the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), unsurprisingly, 
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demonstrate a small number of environmental infringements which reflects the EU 
downward trend (see Figure 5.2.1.). According to the interviewee (20), this would be 
explained in the context of sharing the same environmental tradition with the 
Scandinavian countries which make them quite efficient when problems arise. “From the 
moment, there is a problem they will try to resolve it, they don't ask for time, they don't 
necessarily wait for judgment, and they are willing to more or less accept the expertise of 
the Commission for what they think is suitable”. Finally, the states from Central-Eastern 
Europe show a wide variation in their policy outcomes confirming the existing literature 
(see Carmin and Vandeveer, 2004; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2007; Sedelmeier, 2008) 
but do not necessarily mirror the EU downward trend in Figure 5.2.1. More specifically, 
this is reflected in the increase (Romania), decrease (Hungary) and relative stability 
(Slovakia) of the environmental infringements. A possible explanation for this mixed trend 
according to two EU interviewees (23) and (25) would be the less strict domestic 
environmental standards following the accession to the EU in 2004, socio-economic 
problems such as unemployment and the need for growth (see also Hicks, 2004; Bauer 
et al., 2007; Burns et al., 2012).  
Finally, the vast majority of the respondents recognized that either inadvertently or 
intentionally the economic crisis has had an effect on the environment. The main 
argument of those who contended that the economic crisis has had a serious impact lies 
in the wide scale of economic constraints which make the environment less attractive in 
the eyes of the politicians and the public. For the interviewee (25), the strong economic 
impact of economic crisis on the Southern European member states has increased the 
pressure on politicians to address issues like unemployment and the decrease in living 
standards. This has, consequently, increased concerns that the environment is slipping 
down the political agenda, he complemented. At the same time, some others expressed 
the view that the environmental policy is very squeezed between other higher political 
objectives such as growth. In a broader spectrum, apart from the implications at the 
economic level, the direct effects of the crisis as many argued are focused on some other 
factors such as the decrease of available resources to member states and the reduction 
of staff employed in agencies for policy implementation. Therefore, in view of these 
problems, it becomes more difficult to secure public enthusiasm not only for new 
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environmental initiatives but also for the implementation of the existing environmental 
measures at national level. As the interviewee (22) noted, “I suspect if you've got a period 
of inequality which is increasing, then there is probably a lot of sense in saying that, at 
the same time, the environment would probably suffer or it won't be looked after as well 
as it could be because resources, capital, and funds are going to areas where people and 
capital are already there, so it's becoming more concentrated”.  
 
5.4. Drivers 
 
Having explored the policy outputs and outcomes at the EU level and the policy outcomes 
at the level of Member states, in this section I will explore the main drivers that lead to 
implementation deficit. For the purpose of this research, the distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous drivers takes as a criterion the EU member state. In this 
regard, the main boundary is set at the domestic or member state level. The data used to 
analyze the main drivers in this section originate from the EU participants (7) (see the list 
of participants in Chapter 4). Hence, in the category of exogenous drivers are included 
the principle of environmental protection as a transboundary problem, the EU internal 
market (single market), and the various international treaties and conventions at the EU 
or international level. On the contrary, as endogenous drivers are classified the 
organizational and administrative capacity of the public administration, economic cost 
(including the subsection of the tradeoffs), economic status and environmental awareness 
at the national level (see also Burns and Carter, 2012).   
 
5.4.1. Exogenous Drivers 
  
To begin with, building upon the existing literature (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Börzel, 
2003; Liefferink et al., 2009; Burns and Carter, 2012; Knill et al., 2012), the research 
findings from seven EU interviewees show that there are three main driving forces that 
act exogenously. These are environmental protection, internal market, and global 
environmental challenges.  
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5.4.1.1. Environmental Protection 
Initially, five out of seven EU interviewees believed that a first and traditional driver is 
environmental protection as the pillar of environmental policy which has led to significant 
increase of environmental standards across Europe confirming the existing literature 
(Liefferink and Jordan, 2004; Hey, 2005; Jordan, 2012; Golub, 2013; Knill and Liefferink, 
2013). Taking a closer look, many of the interviewees put forward that from the outset of 
EU environmental policy in the 1970s the focus was probably much more on the trans-
boundary nature of environmental challenges whilst being more responsive to addressing 
specific environmental problems, such as acid rain (Lenschow, 2000; Jordan, 2012). As 
the interviewee (20) stated, “my water is your water, my air is your air and this was 
immediately obvious from the 1970s onwards”. From a theoretical and research point of 
view, the interviewee (23) reported that there is a strong scientific recognition of the 
severity and causes of environmental problems, which are not constrained to an individual 
country, either ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’, but very often emerge from the national level.  
 
5.4.1.2. Single Market 
According to four out of seven EU interviewees, the second driver is economic and lies in 
the principles of the internal market. In line with the existing literature (Lenschow, 2000; 
Jordan, 2002; Hey, 2005), the vast majority of the interviewees contended that internal 
market draws its legitimacy from the existence of fair rules in trade. Additionally, in the 
name of protecting the European competitiveness, corporate interests exercised 
significant pressure to have a level playing field and avoid competitive disadvantage. This 
has, in turn, led to the adoption of a common set of standards and better environmental 
protection. For the interviewee (26), this is linked to the strengthening of the internal 
market logic by the admission of countries like Sweden, Austria, and Finland, as clear 
front runners in the environmental policy. Despite the strong economic dimension, as 
another EU interviewee (20) stated there is also a strong environmental aspect, “we 
compete on tax and innovation but not on pollution”.  
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5.4.1.3. Global challenges and international agreements 
Two out of seven EU interviewees contended that climate change is another international 
driver that has emerged in the recent years. In accordance with the existing literature, 
some of them expressed the view that apart from the legal aspects of the Kyoto Protocol, 
there is also a keen desire by the EU to become an international climate ‘leader’ having 
already driven and shaped the domestic environmental policy of the member states (see 
Manne and Richels, 2000; Böhringer and Vogt, 2004; Vogler, 2005; Rabe, 2007; 
Biesbroek et al., 2010). For the interviewee (23) global problems such as climate change 
are beyond national borders and necessitate supranational action, which can be seen in 
the International Treaties and Conventions (such as the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the Rio and the Johannesburg Summits).  
 
5.4.2. Endogenous Drivers 
 
5.4.2.1. Organization and Administration 
Adding to the existing literature, according to five out of seven EU interviewees, the level 
and quality of services of public administration have to do with the domestic political 
characteristics, such as the organizational structure of the state (Knill, 1998; Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998, 2000, 2005; Jordan, 1999; Tallberg, 2002; Börzel, 2003). Similarly, they 
argued that serious difficulties often arise from the limited capacity of the state apparatus 
to accept and promote the necessary reforms. In the same vein, they asserted that the 
lack of experience and understanding of those who are responsible for policy 
implementation in the state machinery is very likely to lead to poor implementation across 
the board. According to the interviewee (26) this is summarized as follows, “when Europe 
is a dirty word then it’s difficult to support EU legislation, as a result the environment 
becomes an easy scapegoat for many governments, because if you don’t find the 
environmental protection important then your electorate thinks the same”. This is more 
clearly explained by the interviewee (26), “If you lack the basic economic means to keep 
your government running or you're still building up your administration, it's very difficult to 
engage with anything at the EU level”. Building upon the existing literature regarding the 
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enlargement of the EU after 2000 with the new member states from the Central-Eastern 
periphery of Europe (see Andonova 2003; Jehlička and Tickle, 2004; Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, 2007) the majority of the interviewees argued that the different characteristics 
in terms of culture, history, and economic development, make the implementation of 
environmental policy more difficult due to limited administrative and regulatory capacity 
along with a different institutional framework and mindset.  
 
5.4.2.2. Economic cost 
 
All the EU interviewees agreed that a very strong domestic factor is economic cost. While 
in the existing literature (Börzel, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Falkner et al., 2008; 
Holzinger et al., 2008a) costs for some member states seem quite high, the research 
findings, in contrast, show that they are quite low. Indicatively, the cost for some of the 
respondents, such as the interviewee (20), is significantly low, for example, “it is no more 
than 1% of GDP”, and for the interviewee (26), “it could be close to the bottom”. However, 
costs for some others such as the interviewee (24) are dependent on the targets and the 
level of investment required. Most of them used the example of the Urban Waste Water 
Directive to emphasize how expensive can be for countries that lack infrastructure and 
need huge investments in sewage works.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the large majority of the EU interviewees (six out of 
seven) recognized that the costs of environmental policies are generally low outweighed 
by environmental benefits. For the interviewee (20), costs are quite often exaggerated 
without reflecting the reality. However, this view contradicts the documents for the 
implementation of the new clean air quality package in 2013 estimating that the costs are 
about 10-12 times less than the expected benefits in terms of the environment, human 
health, and ecosystems by 2030 (see the report ‘The costs of not implementing the 
environmental acquis’, EC/DG Environment, 2011). Emphasizing the human dimension, 
the interviewee (22) expressed that a common problem is that due to the nature of 
environmental issues. More specifically, he stated that the actual costs of not having 
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environmental measures are not known by the people that pollute or damage the 
environment.  
An interesting finding according to the vast majority of the respondents is that costs for 
environmental protection may be seen in the eyes of governments during the economic 
crisis as an unnecessary luxury. A common argument which summarizes how specific 
countries such as the UK, Poland, and the Czech Republic see environmental policy is 
that it may damage their growth. According to the interviewee (20), their main argument 
is summarized as, ‘costs, in terms of investment that need to go to the environment, could 
have been invested elsewhere’. In the same vein, particular attention is given to vested 
interests and business lobbying with regard to their influence on the structural nature of 
the economy. It is not surprising, according to the interviewee (25) that quite frequently 
voices from the business sector and some Eastern countries seek to retain the traditional 
model of perpetual economic growth. This is eloquently described in the words of the 
interviewee (23), “when it comes to climate change, the fact that Poland is so heavily 
dependent upon coal does not mean that the Polish are being difficult on climate change 
just for the sake of it, but they have a structural dependence on coal for the moment and 
they want their time to break it”. For the same respondent, a good example is that during 
the designation of protected sites (Natura 2000), some of the member states designated 
more Natura 2000 protection sites in order to get more funding. In both cases, on the one 
hand, the unwillingness to incur more costs is strongly recognized, but on the other hand, 
the incentive for their acceptance is more funding.  
 
5.4.2.2.1. Tradeoffs 
 
As a subsection of the analysis of costs, one of the issues that have been called into 
question after the recent economic crisis is whether economic growth and environmental 
protection can coexist. The economic crisis seems to have changed the plans of many 
national governments according to many EU interviewees to a more pro-growth agenda. 
However, when it comes to the discussion about the actual tradeoffs, all the EU 
respondents argued that in the long-term there can be no tradeoffs. Instead, in the short-
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term they argued it may be possible but these should largely depend on the type of 
environmental issue. For some respondents such as the interviewee (24), tradeoffs are 
unavoidable due to the misconception that the environment is not fully integrated with 
other policies. Correspondingly, for the interviewee (25) tradeoffs sometimes may give 
the impression that they rely on an equilibrium model where the economy needs to 
preserve and grow. In the same context, according to the interviewee (25), they may 
become necessary for economic reasons. As he stated, “countries from the Central 
Europe, having an old industrialization fabric, are welcoming the most advanced factories 
to produce cars with a very high level of recycling”. However, this view may reveal half of 
the truth but for some others such as the interviewee (14) tradeoffs overshadow the 
dynamics of environmental issues. Alongside, the interviewee (21) argued that the 
growing economic pressures demand certain actions, “There is much more pressure now 
to show how good environmental governance leads to long-term economic growth and 
sustainability”.  
 
5.4.2.3. Economic status 
 
The assessment of costs arguably can be associated with the economic status of the 
countries. Although, theoretically, the economic condition of a country would be of great 
importance based on the existing literature (Börzel, 2000; Jordan and Lenschow, 2000; 
Knill and Lenschow, 2005), the empirical research shows that the diversity of views 
among the respondents may weaken this claim, indicating that it is significant but not a 
necessary condition. It is telling that less than half of the EU interviewees believed that 
economic status per se is very important and the rest asserted that other factors, such as 
the potential and the level of organization may have an equally high influence. Initially, it 
seems to be generally accepted that a country which is economically better off may have 
more resources and capacity to meet its environmental targets (see Börzel, 2000; 
Liefferink et al., 2009). In contrast, countries that are in a worse economic condition may 
tend to be more relaxed on environmental legislation with the excuse of being an obstacle 
to economic growth. Interestingly, some of them enunciated that economic condition may 
be linked to issues such as short-term electoral cycle and long-term planning. This is best 
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explained in the words of the interviewee (23), “as a national politician, when you are 
facing austerity measures and a short term electoral cycle, of course, the economic 
situation of your country will affect the decisions you make”.  
 
5.4.2.4. Environmental Awareness 
 
Another factor which has common ground with the existing literature according to four out 
of seven EU interviewees is the level of environmental awareness and support (Börzel, 
2000; Jordan and Lenschow, 2000; Jänicke, 2005; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Knill et al., 
2012). According to the interviewee (22), a crucial parameter is that affluent states may 
have a higher degree of environmental awareness: “The richer or more affluent areas 
tended to have people that were more aware of environmental standards and more 
interested in seeing those standards raised”. Indicatively, according to the interviewee 
(25) environmental awareness varies across EU member states, “I remember very well 
that when some member states like Greece, Spain, and Portugal were joining the EU, the 
level of awareness about the environmental agenda among the public opinion was not 
very high”. Likewise, the interviewee (25) reported that many Central-Eastern member 
states after the fall of the Soviet Union and their accession to the EU still have low 
environmental awareness compared to those from the western part of Europe. 
 
5.5. EU Implementation Performance 
 
The assessment of policy outputs and outcomes previously provides a clearer picture of 
the overall performance of EU environmental policy (see Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et 
al., 2012). Empirical evidence seems to confirm the existing literature (Vogler, 2005; 
Jordan, 2012; Golub, 2013) (see also Chapter 2) with regard to the significant 
improvement but there is mixed progress across many sectoral policies such as air, 
waste, and water (see also the EEA report on the state of environment, 2015).  According 
to the vast majority of the respondents, implementation is linked to better compliance and 
enforcement of the EU law by the member states as policy outputs. More specifically, all 
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the EU interviewees (7) recognized that EU environmental policy in terms of policy 
outcomes is very effective having significantly increased and improved the environmental 
standards and protection across Europe since its establishment as well as in many 
sectors, such as air, nature conservation, water, waste and climate change. Many of the 
respondents have also agreed that the all-encompassing perception and scope of EU 
environmental policy shows that the environment is not just a sectoral policy as 
traditionally thought to be, but integrated into all EU policies. According to the interviewee 
(21), the EU environmental policy seems very effective: “On an of scale 1-10, where 10 
is completely effective and 1 is totally ineffective, I would predict it as something like at 
least 8”. Although this statement is a strong indication that effectiveness is generally 
perceived very high, the remaining gap nevertheless triggers further thoughts and 
reflection about whether and how it can be improved. Some of the influential factors 
reported, building upon the existing literature, are the consistency of the EU rules and the 
stability of the regulatory framework (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003; Jordan and Lenschow, 
2010; Jordan, 2012; Runhaar et al., 2014). Less so, but equally significant were the 
forward-looking environmental strategies, the adoption of ambitious environmental 
legislation and the regulatory expansion of the environmental acquis, the imposition of 
equal environmental standards for the purposes of the internal market, and the increase 
of environmental awareness after some environmental accidents in the past (e.g. 
Seveso). This progress is best described in the words of a Greek interviewee (1): 
“Compared to other continents, countries, and regions in the world, EU environmental 
policy is far ahead. That is in terms of incorporating the environmental dimension into 
many aspects of society and people's lives, so I think it has a better environmental policy 
and management than other geographical areas of the world. This is also quite evident 
when speaking in terms of sustainability and overall quality of life and well-being of 
citizens”. On the other hand, what appears to be a strong cause of concern among the 
EU respondents is the systemic challenges at the domestic level. Developments in the 
political and economic realm, such as the frequent elections, financial uncertainty, and 
economic problems, are thought to be critical factors. Indicatively, many of the 
respondents also enunciated the impact of Euro-skepticism and national sovereignty on 
further progress operating mostly as a stumbling block. 
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Conclusion 
 
Contrary to expectations, EU environmental policy has seen improvement during the 
economic crisis and not a regression in its performance. Interestingly, the economic crisis 
has not played that hefty role as anticipated and affected to a varying degree the 
implementation of EU environmental policy in the member states. However, there are still 
many challenges to be addressed as analyzed in the sections of policy outputs and 
outcomes among the member states. Non-compliance and lack of enforcement as policy 
outputs are seen to be some of the main causes of implementation deficit along with the 
endogenous and exogenous drivers. Simultaneously, in terms of policy outcomes, the 
number of environmental infringements at the EU and member state level demonstrate 
that the delivery of the environmental policy requires more efforts. Despite the various 
problems and weaknesses in each sector, EU environmental policy appears to have great 
dynamics. This chapter has demonstrated that there is not ‘one size fits all’ model but 
there are different patterns to analyze the broader implementation dynamics and trends 
in the EU member states. The development of the two case studies, Greece and the UK, 
in the next chapter paves the way for a more in-depth analysis of policy outcomes at the 
level of member states.   
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Chapter 6 – Implementation performance of the UK and 
Greece: Two case studies 
 
 
Introduction 
  
Looking at the broader EU implementation patterns and how these were developed 
among the member states in Chapter 5, I will now focus on two case studies, the UK as 
a reputed 'leader' and Greece as a traditional 'laggard' that seem to have diametrically 
opposing implementation performance during the economic crisis using data only from 
the Greek and British interviews (elite interviews), documentary analysis and descriptive 
statistics. Empirical research demonstrates that the stronger economic position, the 
institutional and administrative capacity of the state and the better functioning of public 
administration make the UK perform better than Greece. In this regard, the aim of this 
chapter is to explore, analyze and explain the UK’s and Greece’s implementation 
performance in light of the recent economic crisis. First, I will give a brief description of 
the historical background and relationship of both states with the EU as a first step in 
understanding their domestic framework. Second, due to lack of data, I will examine the 
policy outputs based on the documentary analysis and elite interviews only and then I will 
discuss the policy outcomes tapping the elite interviews (Greek and British participants), 
documentary analysis and descriptive statistics (environmental infringements). Third, I 
will only point out the significance of the endogenous factors in explaining implementation 
deficit since the exogenous factors are identical with those analyzed in Chapter 5. Finally, 
I will analyze the performance of both states and then I will conclude by comparing and 
highlighting the main differences between the two countries. 
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6.1. A History of the British and Greek Environmental Policy 
 
i. The UK 
 
Initially, the roots of British environmental policy date back over a century with a range of 
environmental measures to tackle air and water pollution (Jordan, 2002). Britain was one 
of the first nations in the world that set up a national pollution agency and a very inclusive 
mechanism of land use planning (Vogel, 1986: 144; Hanley et al., 1998). Although the 
post-war era set the foundations for the formation of British environmental thinking until 
the mid-1970s, it was then largely characterized by uncertainty over development and 
conservation issues. The development of an advanced system of environmental 
regulation was designed to meet the needs of Britain as an island (Lowe and Ward, 1998; 
Dunleavy et al., 2006). The period from 1973 to the early 1990s coincides with the 
Europeanization of British environmental policy and a set of sweeping changes at the 
domestic level (Buller, 1998; Jordan, 2004). While the transformation of domestic 
environmental policy in the wake of EU membership has been pivotal, this was driven by 
high suspicion and opposition and was often considered as a direct threat to the domestic 
system (Hanley et al., 1998; Barnes and Barnes, 2000). Inconsistency between domestic 
and EU environmental standards and poor compliance gave Britain the reputation of ‘The 
Dirty Man of Europe’ (Rose, 1990; Jordan, 2002). The longstanding dispute arguably 
disclosed a deeper gap between Britain and the EU on issues like acid rain, radioactive 
contamination of the Irish Sea, and low standards of water and air quality. The beginning 
of the next phase in 1992 presented a significant de-escalation of the tension between 
the UK and the Commission with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (Buller, 1998). 
Broadly, after the signing of this Treaty, the compatibility and convergence of domestic 
environmental policies with European policies showed that they were a step closer. 
Despite the widespread skepticism, Britain showed its commitment to the European path 
by inaugurating a reinvigorated environmental policy and a kind of political consensus 
with Europe (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Jordan and Lenschow, 2009). This change is reflected 
in the development of policies and policy structures where the UK has been influential for 
example, in the area of climate change and emission reductions (Wurzel, 2002; Tompkins 
et al., 2010).  
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ii. Greece 
 
On the other hand, although it is often suggested that environmental policy in Greece is 
relatively new; some policies can be traced to the beginning of the last century (Pridham, 
1994; Lekakis, 2000; Giannakourou, 2005, 2011). For example, the first measures for the 
regulation of industrial activity came to the forefront in the early 1920s, for cars in the 
early 1930s, and for pesticides in 1967. The genesis and evolution of Greek 
environmental policy are distinguished into two separate periods. The first period 
commenced in the early 1970s with the development of policies for environmental 
protection. During the first period, Greece ratified most of the international conventions 
and signed bilateral or multilateral agreements with neighboring countries on issues of 
transnational interest, especially in the management of natural resources. The 
establishment of the Environmental Pollution Control Project (EPCP) in the first half of the 
1970s was the first organized effort by Greece to address environmental problems under 
the aegis of the Greek Ministry of Social Services, the World Health Organization (WHO), 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Kousis, 1994; Lekakis, 2000). 
Legislative initiatives during the first period included precautionary measures for the 
protection of the environment and the health of citizens, as well as the increasing 
urbanization and industrialization (Pridham et al., 1995; Lekakis, 2000). At the same time, 
there was the development of legislation on residential issues but this was mostly 
confined to the level of spatial planning and to a set of measures such as antiquities, 
national parks, waste management, health and safety of the workers, quarrying and 
mining activities, and seashores. However, the piecemeal character of the governmental 
action and the lack of strong political interest before and shortly after 1970 was affected 
by significant weaknesses in political priorities and infrastructure (Pridham et al., 1995; 
Koutalakis, 2011).  
The second period, after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and the EU membership in 
1981, officially constitutes the birth and development of a more comprehensive national 
environmental policy, which continues until to date (Kousis, 1994; Featherstone and 
Kazamias, 2000). During the second period, the environment is recognized as an 
autonomous policy area with the development of environmental policy and political 
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structures to underpin it (Giannakourou, 2005, 2012; Koutalakis, 2011). According to the 
Constitution of 1975 and the revisions of 1986 and 2001, Article 24 clearly states that "the 
protection of the natural and cultural environment constitutes a duty of the state. For its 
preservation, the state is bound to adopt special preventive or repressive measures." 
Furthermore, with the entry of Greece into the European Community in 1981, the 
harmonization of Greek and European legislation began by a plethora of new legislative 
provisions over a broad range of environmental issues that were not previously included 
in the domestic environmental framework (Kazakos, 1999; Ioakimidis, 2000; 
Featherstone, 2005). A key milestone on the progress of domestic environmental policy 
was the enactment of law 1650 in 1986, which set out the basic legal principles and the 
context of the current environmental policy (WWF, 2014).  
 
6.2. The UK – EU Relationship 
 
Both the literature and empirical research show that the traditional relationship between 
Britain and the EU is characterized by high reluctance and skepticism (Lowe and Ward, 
1998b; Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001, 2004; Bache and Olsson, 2001; Börzel, 2002; 
Jordan, 2002, 2004; Jordan et al., 2003; Bache, 2007; Bailey, 2007; Gray, 2016). The 
view of the interviewee (17) essentially summarizes the dominant perception of all the 
British respondents (9), regarding the relationship with the EU as still very antagonistic. 
“It's the general political antagonism between the British government and Europe at the 
moment”. Although the majority recognized that there is close collaboration with the EU, 
opposition, however, has increased giving the impression of a constant political conflict. 
A possible cause for most of them would be the issue of national sovereignty and the 
existence of competitive political and economic interests. Another troubling issue 
according to two interviewees (17) and (18), is the political debate over the referendum 
(Brexit) which raises many doubts over whether the British government will be able to 
renegotiate not only its political relationship with the EU but also the environmental 
legislation declared by former Prime Minister David Cameron:  
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"We've been very clear about what we want to see changed," he told Parliament. 
"There is a series of areas - social legislation, employment legislation, 
environmental legislation - where Europe has gone far too far" (ENDs Report, Jan-
Feb 2013).  
Apart from the political considerations, some respondents enunciated that 
Euroscepticism and increased resistance may undermine the concept of environmental 
policy with a possible retreat in environmental legislation for domestic political and 
partisan purposes. According to the interviewee (11):  
“it has brought huge benefits to those of the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole. The 
impact on air quality, water quality, climate change and across a whole range of 
environmental areas has been hugely invaluable because most of the big environmental 
challenges the world faces do not respect national borders and for this reason, there is 
the need of supranational institutions to address them. The EU is probably the most 
effective supranational organization in the world by taking the environment seriously. In 
this sense, green issues are a clear example of Europe being necessary”. 
The transition of Britain from a policy taker to a policy shaper after a long period of 
laborious efforts to Europeanize domestic policies gave Britain the opportunity to be 
presented as ‘leader’ contributing decisively to policy making and EU policies31. In line 
with the existing literature (Jordan, 2004; Jordan and Liefferink, 2004; Jordan and 
                                                          
31 The UK exerted significant influence on many EU environment and climate change policies. For example, 
a number of pieces of EU legislation have been based, partly or in full on preceding UK policy and 
legislation: First, the EU’s integrated pollution prevention and control regime (now integrated into the 
Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75/EU) was heavily affected by the UK’s system of integrated pollution 
control under the Environmental Protection Act 1990; Second, the UK emissions trading scheme was a 
pioneer of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (Directive 2003/87/EC), and developed valuable 
experience in the mechanics of running an emissions trading system; third, the concept of Exposure 
Reduction Commitment for PM2.5 was first set out in the UK Air Quality Strategy before its incorporation 
into the EU’s revised Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC.4. Fourth, on climate change, from the establishment 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the subsequent agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the UK Government has consistently supported ambitious and effective EU action to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and argued for a strong leadership role for the EU in securing a global agreement. The UK 
played a significant and influential role in securing the adoption of the EU’s own emissions reductions 
targets for 2020, and has also played a key role in ensuring the adoption of EU negotiating positions that 
have enabled the EU to play a leadership role within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) process. (DEFRA Report on Environment and Climate Change. Review of Balance of 
Competences: Final Report, February 2014; Third Report of Session 2015-16 on the EU and UK 
Environmental Policy, House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, April 2016). 
 
157 
 
Lenschow, 2009; Gray, 2016) all of the British interviewees expressed that the EU as a 
driving force pulled the UK from the relative ‘isolation’ and made it a very important player 
in the international European scene. For the interviewee (12) this unfolds as, “I think it is 
clear that the overall impact of environmental legislation has been significantly beneficial 
from the point of view of environmental interests and that is certainly the perspective of 
the UK”. Undeniably, it was also expressed that due to the adaptation pressure (see 
Chapter 3 – ‘goodness of fit’) from the EU, the UK was compelled to adopt a higher level 
of environmental standards. According to the same respondent (12), “environmental 
NGOs are convinced, and I think very rightly convinced that the level of environmental 
ambition adopted in legislation at the European level will not be replicated in decisions at 
national level”. For the majority, admittedly, the EU first changed the existing policy 
paradigm by introducing detailed actions under a strict reform context, and second, it 
proceeded to a redefinition of the aims of British policy by exercising significant influence 
on domestic standards.  
 
6.3. The Greece-EU Relationship 
 
In a similar fashion, the relationship between the EU and Greece has very strong 
elements of interdependence with many benefits for the latter. Drawing on the literature 
about the Europeanization of Greece, it is evident that Europe has exerted a strong 
influence on shaping the structures of domestic policy (Ioakimidis, 1994, 2000; Kazakos, 
1999, 2004; Featherstone, 2005; Hibou, 2005; Ladi, 2005a, 2007). As Ioakimidis (2000) 
very aptly stated: 
“The Greek experience, therefore, indicates a downward flow of policy 
competencies, from the EU to the state. The state is forced in certain cases to 
assume functions and shape policies, choices and performance which would not 
have been considered in the absence of the EU’s impact”. 
Building upon the existing literature (Pridham et al., 1995; Kazakos, 1999; Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou, 2008; Bache et al., 2001; Hibou, 2005; Lavdas, 2016), the EU 
membership has been a great incentive for the formulation of domestic policy because 
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the requirements of EU legislation and financial resources have played a crucial role in 
the embodiment of new policies into the domestic level. However, many scholars 
(Diamantouros, 1994; Lavdas, 1997; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004; Featherstone, 
2005; Ladi, 2007; Giannakourou, 2011) perceived Europeanization as a way of 
modernizing the state or, more specifically, a ‘westernization’ of domestic policy and state 
functions. Moreover, some others, such as Pridham et al. (1995), contended that the 
Greek experience has been a good example of reinforcing democratic institutions and 
broadening democratic procedures in the political system. The adoption of EU institutional 
structures aims to consolidate the democratic and reformative character of the policy 
processes and political stability as part of a political and systemic spillover (Ioakimidis, 
1994, 2000). Indisputably, a common assumption amongst scholars is that the EU has 
had a positive impact on the Greek legislative framework, institutions, regulations and 
policies. In the same vein, all the Greek respondents (11) recognized that the EU has 
been a determining factor in shaping Greek politics as confirmed by the existing literature 
(Ioakimidis, 1994, 2000; Kazakos, 1999, 2004; Featherstone, 2005; Hibou, 2005; Ladi, 
2005, 2007), with the introduction of new policy structures and a culture of modernization. 
Some of them, such as the interviewees (1) and (9) argued that the connection with the 
EU has significantly transformed the environmental policy of Greece, resulting in the 
improvement of the legislative framework and sectors such as spatial planning.  
Taking into consideration the centralization of the Greek state before their admission to 
the EU, the regional impact of EU membership has been remarkable in terms of territorial 
allocation of political power and funding (Ioakimidis, 1996; Kazakos, 1999, 2004; 
Featherstone, 2005). Thus, a valuable tool of the integration process for southern 
member states like Greece has been the EU structural and cohesion policy (see 
Featherstone, 1998; Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi, 2004; Bachtler and Gorzelak, 
2007). The adoption of these programs significantly helped territorial decentralization and 
empowered the autonomy of the regions (Verney and Papageorgiou, 1993). Likewise, the 
application of the new structural policy (Delors package) between 1988 and 1993 in the 
form of Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) added a developmental perspective 
based on the regions’ needs (see Chapter 3 – fiscal federalism). Consequently, the 
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domestic environmental policy has benefitted from the quality and range of the EU 
policies (Andreou, 2006).  
Reflecting on the evolutionary context of the Greek domestic environmental policy and 
the political relationship with the EU is well-understood that although the UK and Greece 
had a different starting point in terms of developing their environmental policy, EU 
membership has been a common link by which a great boost was given to a revamped 
and modernized environmental policy under a new institutional environment. Therefore, 
the analysis of the impact of the economic crisis, policy outputs, and outcomes in both 
countries below will shed light on to what extent environmental policy has been affected. 
 
6.4. Policy Outputs 
In this section, due to lack of data from the descriptive statistics on policy outputs per 
member state, that is, UK and Greece, I will analyze the policy outputs using only data 
from the elite interviews (Greek and British participants) and documentary analysis. 
Adding to the existing literature (Börzel, 2000; Knill and Lenschow, 2000, Jordan, 1999, 
2012), the comparative analysis between the UK and Greece highlights how the 
economic crisis has affected the policy outputs. To begin with, according to the majority 
of the British interviewees regarding the UK (six out of eight) the impact of the economic 
crisis has been unavoidably noticeable across the different tiers of government and the 
state functions without significant impact on the transposition, compliance, and 
enforcement process as some might have anticipated. For the majority of the British 
respondents the policy implementation has been quite good without major problems 
during the economic crisis. However, what the economic crisis prompted, based on two 
interviewees (13) and (17), was to very much slow down the level of ambition, in terms of 
implementing new measures and reducing willingness to invest in the existing ones. A 
possible cause for these two respondents would be the less government funding and staff 
redundancies in the sector of environmental protection: “There is certainly less money 
available in the bodies of government to track and regulate environmental protection…the 
significant amount of income that came from grants direct from the government is now 
almost nothing”. On a more critical tone, the interviewee (16) argued that despite the large 
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increase of financial resources on the environment in the previous years, this has 
currently been reduced notably but does not mean that the environment has been 
affected as much as people perhaps think: “I’m not so convinced that the economic crisis 
has affected environmental initiatives. Things always change. It's very convenient to 
blame the economic crisis for that change but I do wonder to what extent it would have 
changed it anyway”.  
For some others, the economic crisis sparked rather unintentionally a set of necessary 
reforms for better implementation. As the interviewee (12) contended, it has triggered a 
debate in the UK about whether the number of separate bodies which have a role in 
environmental protection and policy implementation at government level can still be 
afforded. The example on whether a merger of Natural England with the Environment 
Agency should occur captures the main reformist rationale. In such a context, the 
interviewee (11) argued that very often the government has to clarify its position. From a 
different perspective, some others such as the interviewee (14) asserted that political 
pressures and sectorial interests may have affected to some extent the decisions of the 
government to implement policies. In the same vein, the interviewee (15) contended that 
the austerity measures in the UK have had less impact on green issues because they 
mainly aimed at low-income groups which have not been major players in the green 
agenda. However, as he claimed, this may have affected enforcement but historically 
there have not been significant problems. The main change noticed, according to him, is 
before 2010 where the resources of the Environment Agency have been substantially cut 
and enforcement has become less strict than it was. Finally, the interviewee (19) argued 
that economic crisis and austerity are being used by the government as an excuse to 
avoid the implementation of environmental policies due to business pressures. However, 
he complemented that, in practice, policy implementation performs quite well in the UK. 
Unlike the UK above, and adding to the existing literature (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993; 
Pridham, 1994; Börzel, 2000, 2002) the impact of the economic crisis in Greece has been 
seemingly very strong in the field of economy and environment. The victims of that are 
compliance, enforcement, and implementation. More specifically, the majority of the 
respondents (eight out of eleven) asserted that the impact of the economic crisis was very 
strong and the rest (three out of eleven) argued that it has affected the implementation of 
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environmental policy to a much lesser extent than expected. Indicatively, from an NGO 
perspective, the negative effects of the economic crisis have resulted in the suspension 
of the implementation of many environmental plans by lowering the ambitions for better 
environmental policies: 
“I see that what has been achieved over the years is currently at risk and sadly it 
drives us several decades back, or maybe even worse. Unfortunately, instead of 
being a great chance to sort out some things, like creating growth and ultimately 
getting out of the economic crisis more quickly, the economic crisis in Greece is 
used as an excuse to promote specific policies which harm the environment in a 
completely absurd way”, the interviewee (10) argued. 
In line with the literature (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993; Pridham, 1994; Börzel, 2000) the 
influence of strong vested interests and incumbent perceptions dominating in Southern 
Europe, have resulted in non-compliance phenomena in Greece with the EU 
requirements reflecting also the lack of an overall strategic plan as argued by the 
interviewee (9). From a business point of view, the interviewee (8) contended that the 
economic crisis has further weakened the capacity of the state to enforce policies due to 
a large scale institutional inefficiency. He explained that by saying that it has undoubtedly 
slowed down the completion of existing environmental projects. Simultaneously, it led to 
increased corruption because of the narrow profit margins for large companies when 
implementing the environmental policies. In the same vein, the interviewee (3) has 
expressed that “once there is no growth, the implementation of environmental policy is 
getting more difficult”. On the other hand, the interviewee (7) argued that the economic 
crisis has affected the environmental policies, to a much smaller extent than expected, 
but this optimistic quote contradicts the majority of respondents as reported above: 
“While other sectors, such as the economy, development, and employment, have 
been very strongly affected by the economic crisis of 2008 until today, the 
environmental sector is among those accepted as having lesser effects. At the 
same time, although the level of economic activity has decreased to a rather small 
extent around the environment, particularly in waste or forestry, the loss of key 
environmental activities was replaced by new environmental business activities, 
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such as waste management from excavation, construction, and demolition. 
Recently, amid the crisis, a small but flourishing economic sector in the form of 
environmental industry has started to be created, which at macroeconomic level 
compensates the losses occurred in more traditional environmental industries. 
More specifically, I don't have in mind any retreats done institutionally. Also, there 
has not been industrial disinvestment, such as funds transferred to and invested 
in productive units in other countries or closed down. There has not been such 
environmental disinvestment”. 
 
6.5. Policy Outcomes 
 
Figure 6.5.1.: Comparison of the total number of open DG environmental 
infringements from 2006 to 2014 between the UK, Greece and the EU-
average. 
 
Source: Author Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm) (Date of access: 15/03/2015) 
The above graph examines the total number of open DG environmental infringements 
(policy outcomes) on a yearly basis (2006-2014) for the UK and Greece and compares it 
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with the EU average (environmental infringements) per year including 27 member states 
except for Croatia. The y-axis shows the total number of environmental infringements and 
the x-axis the time period (per year). Looking at the UK’s trend before the outbreak of the 
economic crisis, the total number of its environmental infringements is witnessed as 
significantly high. With the advent of the economic crisis in 2008 a considerably constant 
reduction is shown until the peak in 2011. From 2011 to 2013, there is a gradual increase 
and a slight drop in 2014. Alongside, the EU average seems relatively stable throughout 
the economic crisis with a slight fall from 2010 until 2014. Both Greece and the UK 
reached their lowest record between 2011 and 2012 at the peak of the economic crisis. 
According to the Annual Reports (28th – 32nd ) of Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(DG Environment/European Commission), one of the reasons for this decline, as reported 
clearly, was that more cases were being resolved by EU mechanisms, such as EU Pilot32 
and SOLVIT33, designed to improve communication between the European Commission 
and Member States on issues concerning the application of EU law or the compliance to 
national rules with EU law at an early stage before an infringement procedure is launched. 
At first glance, the policy outcomes of the UK compared to those of the EU average 
appear outstanding. More specifically, the UK’s trend seems to contradict the view of 
those respondents who believe that the economic crisis has negatively affected the 
environment. From this graph, is clearly demonstrated that, instead of being an obstacle, 
the economic crisis operates as a stimulus. Some possible reasons for this progress, 
according to the majority of the respondents, would be the risk of imposing fines by the 
ECJ implying further costs on the public budget. Moreover, some others such as the 
interviewee (19) and (14) reported that the decline in economic activity and investments 
would mean fewer environmental externalities and thus a cleaner environment. For 
                                                          
32 According to the official website of the EU Commission, “EU Pilot” is a scheme designed to resolve 
compliance problems without having to resort to infringement proceedings. It works by the Commission and 
national governments using an online database and communication tool to share information on the details 
of particular cases. This then gives governments a chance to remedy any breaches voluntarily Date of 
access 19/05/2017: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/eu 
_pilot/index_en.htm  
33 SOLVIT is a service provided by the national administration in each EU country seeking to find solutions 
within 10 weeks starting on the day the case is taken on by the SOLVIT centre in the country where the 
problem occurred, Date of access 19/05/2017: http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/what-is-solvit/  
. 
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example, the same interviewee (19) mentioned that people drove less because of higher 
fuel prices resulting in better air quality.  
On the other hand, the majority of the Greek respondents stated that the impact of the 
economic crisis was strong on the environment in Greece. Subsequently, the above graph 
corroborates, to a large extent, that view by the high number of environmental 
infringements of Greece. From a closer look, the comparison between Greece and the 
EU average shows two very interesting findings. First, the number of environmental 
infringements attributed to Greece far exceeds the EU average, with almost more than 
double rates in some cases. Second, while the trend of the EU average is relatively stable 
with a gradual decrease, the trend of Greece shows significant variation and a sharp 
increase in the most recent years. However, it is witnessed that even before the outbreak 
of the economic crisis in Europe (2008), Greece has already had a high number of 
environmental infringements. A good example, according to the majority of the Greek 
interviewees, that illustrates the poor policy outcomes of Greece during the economic 
crisis is the tax hikes on fuel that led to a deterioration of the air quality in many urban 
centers (mostly in Athens and Thessaloniki) and the appearance of smog (see 
Kathimerini, 2013). 
 
6.6. Causes of Implementation Deficit – Endogenous Drivers 
 
Apart from the analysis of the policy outputs and outcomes in the UK and Greece above, 
there are some underlying endogenous factors that have affected their implementation 
dynamics throughout the economic crisis as will be analyzed below. Of these, I will 
develop the organization and administrative capacity, the strong NGO intervention in the 
UK as a new research finding, the economic pressures, and costs (including the 
subsection of the tradeoffs) and the level of environmental awareness in both case 
studies. For the economy of analysis and convenience, I deliberately do not examine the 
exogenous factors here since they are identical with those analyzed in Chapter 5. 
Acknowledging that many European states are plagued by the syndrome of 
implementation deficit based on the existing literature (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; 
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Jordan, 1999; Mastenbroek, 2005; Steunenberg, 2006; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; 
Treib, 2008; König and Luetgert, 2009; Toshkov, 2008, 2010, Knill et al., 2012), in this 
thesis, mostly Greece and less so the UK show many of these elements. 
 
6.6.1. UK 
6.6.1.1. Organization – Administrative capacity 
Adding to the existing literature (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Weale et al., 2000: 320; 
Jordan, 1998, 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Wurzel, 2002) from an administrative and 
organizational point of view, the UK is believed to have strong administrative capacity. 
Initially, the majority of the British interviewees recognized that the quality and practices 
of implementation vary from country to country and sector to sector often seen as the 
‘Achilles heel’ of EU environmental policy. However, what makes the UK’s administrative 
mechanism stand out is the better record of compliance compared to other European 
states, a consistent and advanced system of administrative control based upon fixed 
standards and timetables, the 'neutral' stance and non-party affiliation of public 
administration, the transparent model of governance, the cooperation with the scientific 
community and the receptiveness of new regulatory, administrative and market 
approaches. Indicatively, half of the UK respondents contended that since the EU 
legislation has become more complex in terms of measures and directives, the highly 
skilled staff, the strong institutional and administrative capacity of the UK have responded 
well in designing a domestic functional system to deal with these issues. This view is best 
expressed according to the interviewee (13) with the key role of the advisory bodies. He 
stated that, as a ‘northern’ European country, the UK has established institutions such as 
the Environment Agency, which are instrumental in efficiently managing demanding 
measures with great specialization on various sectors regarding policy implementation.  
Finally, less than half of them asserted that devolution has contributed significantly to the 
efficiency of the system as cooperation with the local authorities is strengthened.   
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6.6.1.2. Strong NGO intervention 
A new research finding that adds to the existing literature (Jordan, 1998, 2002; Jordan et 
al., 2003; Wurzel, 2002) according to some British respondents such as the interviewee 
(11) is the active involvement of the strong NGO community in the UK which exerts 
significant pressure (e.g. WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Soil Association) and 
acts as watchdog for the monitoring of environmental policy and progress in the country. 
In this regard, as he eloquently stated, it is more likely for the NGOs to complain formally 
and appeal to the ECJ. In a similar fashion, this is corroborated by the words of the 
interviewee (17) that the large number of very influential pressure groups and NGOs 
provides a kind of implementation safeguard in the UK: “We've got some very active 
groups in this country that are watching every step we take in the implementation of EU 
legislation and they will act if we don't do it properly. I don't know if a lot of the other 
countries have that.” In this light, the importance of civil society and its active role through 
the NGOs in monitoring the implementation process is highlighted. 
 
6.6.1.3. Economic pressures – Costs 
For much of the literature34 (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Jordan, 1999; Fairbrass and 
Jordan 2001; Jordan and Liefferink, 2004) cost is very important in the implementation of 
the environmental policies as confirmed by all the British respondents. This is clearly 
reflected in the responses when they described how costs affect the overall stance and 
attitude of the UK. From an NGO perspective, the interviewee (19) claimed that the UK is 
very good at easy policies, as seen above, but when it comes to more demanding 
measures such air pollution35 is lagging behind. This may be due to purported high costs 
for the government, which is not willing to take over (see also the policy paper 2010 to 
2015 government policy: environmental quality from Defra, 2015). A typical example is 
                                                          
34 See the policy paper of DEFRA on environmental quality from 2010 to 2015 (2015) and the Third Report 
of Session 2015-16 by the Environmental Audit Committee (House of Commons) on EU and UK 
Environmental Policy, 2016 
35 i) European Commission – Press Release Commission warns Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the 
United Kingdom of continued air pollution breaches, Brussels, 15 February 2017. ii) European Commission 
takes action against UK for persistent air pollution problems, Brussels, 20 February 2014. 
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the alarming rate of air pollution36 in the main urban centers such as London and 
Birmingham that may pose a major health hazard for citizens. Instead, more priority was 
given to issues that generate growth, for example, infrastructure development under the 
guise of employability (see the EU warning to the UK for failing to address repeated 
breaches of air pollution limits for nitrogen dioxide (NO2)37. Similarly, at an economic 
level, the interviewee (17) believed that the allocation of costs is very important because 
there is the perception that it often falls on either government or certain industrial sectors 
and businesses, which, in turn, affects the stance of the policy makers: “So when it comes 
to really difficult environmental decisions or changing the habits they have to make, I think 
the UK isn't doing very well. It is not taking the lead in particular but they are probably not 
that different from many of other leading EU countries in that respect”. In the same vein, 
for the interviewee (14) the environmental policy in the UK has been largely characterized 
by a strong presence of corporate interests and pressures from economics which 
minimizes the development of long-term visions and actions programs for the 
environment. Hence, this condition according to him, may be largely favored by the 
dominant model of the British economy which comes into direct conflict with the values of 
environmentalism. 
 
6.6.1.3.1. Tradeoffs 
The general sense among all the British respondents is that tradeoffs (as a subsection of 
the economic costs above) are inevitable. For the vast majority (seven out of eight), 
tradeoffs mirror the discrepancies in perception between the environmental protection 
and economic development. This also implies the changes at the environmental and 
economic sector along with the synergies required. It has also been explicitly stated that 
in the wake of economic crisis most politicians see growth as the only solution thus 
undermining the value of the environment. A more insightful view on this issue is given 
                                                          
36 See also the sixth Report (2014-2015) on Air quality of the House of Commons, 26 November 2016. Date 
of access: 30/05/2017, https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmenvaud/212/212. 
pdf  
37 European Commission – Press Release Commission warns Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the 
United Kingdom of continued air pollution breaches Brussels, 15 February 2017, IP/17/238.  
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by the interviewees (13) and (18) who enunciated that tradeoffs are dependent on the 
nature of the environmental issue but, most importantly, take personal and economic 
considerations which may have an increased degree of bias. Beyond the narrow terms of 
the understanding of tradeoffs, the interviewee (14) argued that they are necessary as 
they help to overcome their sterile depiction and see their actual utility as a synthesis of 
environmental protection and economic development rather than separate things for 
reasons of better efficiency. In a similar fashion, the interviewee (16) suggests that at the 
moment we need environmental development or enhancement which can include lots of 
synergies in environmental and economic development for a more dynamic process.  
With a rather high degree of assertiveness, some interviewees such as the interviewee 
(17) assumed that the priorities of the British government are unambiguous to more 
economic development than in the past. The same view is shared by other participants 
such as the interviewee (11) who affirmed that the economic crisis has increased the 
pressure at all layers of the society and politicians by setting divisive dilemmas and 
questions in the context of economic affairs. For the interviewee (15) tradeoffs are a 
significant part of modern politics but are not as many as generally alleged. “For example, 
the landscape and habitats' protection requires some constraint on economic activity and 
the benefit of that is more spiritual than economic. But in terms of climate change, air 
pollution, water pollution and waste there is no tradeoff because costs are greater than 
the investment required to clean up.” Finally, from an NGO perspective, the interviewee 
(19) asserted that environment has always been traded off to economic growth and 
especially under austerity this trend is perhaps stronger and well-embedded in decision 
making that affects policy implementation.  
 
6.6.1.4. Environmental Awareness 
Drawing on the existing literature (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Jordan, 1999; Jordan and 
Lenschow, 2010) the majority of the British interviewees enunciated that the environment 
is not a major issue in the political scenery, but its importance among the British citizens 
is gradually increasing conversely. However, the level of environmental awareness, as 
they stated, varies comparatively to other EU states. For example, they voiced that it is 
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lower than the Scandinavian but higher than the Mediterranean states. They ranked it as 
somewhere in between. Indisputably, there are some voices, such as of the interviewee 
(15), who described the current condition as, “The Norwegian public is very 
environmentally turned on but that is not true for the British public instead.” For some 
others such as the interviewee (14), the low level of environmental awareness is due to 
the lack of high public pressure and engagement (environmental movements) around 
environmental issues (see the Report on Environment and Social Trends from the Office 
for National Statistics, 2011).  
 
6.6.2. Greece 
6.6.2.1. Organization – Administrative capacity 
Adding to the existing literature (Spanou, 1996; Sotiropoulos,1993; Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou, 2009; Featherstone, 2011) the vast majority of the Greek respondents 
argued that Greece lacks a strong organizational and administrative capacity. To begin 
with, the interviewee (9) stressed the issue of overregulation and the absence of a 
concrete framework with clear directions, which quite often creates confusion and 
vagueness due to misinterpretation: “The law quite often misses the target through a 
plethora of laws, circulars, presidential and ministerial decrees, which refer to the same 
object or modify some paragraphs, resulting in an overlapping of competences between 
the various bodies, such as the Environment Ministry and the Regional Directorates of 
the Environment”. Alongside this issue, the vast majority of the Greek respondents noted 
that the frequent changes in the domestic legislative and institutional framework generate 
confusion and affect policy acceptance. In particular, the interviewee (2) contended that 
“usually the acceptance of a policy is the first important step for those being in charge of 
implementation because it requires some time to learn, understand and apply it. They key 
point is that it has to be better than the previous condition in order to be accepted by those 
who are responsible for the implementation: firstly, the officials and then the people”. 
Furthermore, the interviewee (4) added that “the institutional framework, especially in 
Greece, creates confusion because it undergoes constant changes by encompassing 
conflicting directions of environmental legislation on other matters. This largely disorients 
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the main targets and overshadows the efforts made for the simplification of environmental 
procedures”. Undeniably, these two viewpoints aim at the core of the problem, denoting 
that the implementation of the environmental policy is subject to an unstable institutional 
environment. In a wider sense, the majority of Greek respondents suggested that 
difficulties in the implementation of environmental policy stem from the formulation of 
policies by the central ministries, which disregard or fail to take into account the particular 
geographic features of the regions as insular or mountainous areas. For the interviewee 
(9), a very good example that boils down this questioning is the issue of municipal waste 
management: “Greece has many small, remote villages in the mountains, which are 
inaccessible areas, and because of that it is very difficult to build infrastructure for the 
collection of waste and its ecological management”.  
On the other hand, the interviewee (1) had a slightly different opinion, noting that “it has 
not to do with the waste policy itself, but the main blame is attributed to the significant 
delays of local communities to take decisions. in combination with the physical 
peculiarities of Greece under an extensive agricultural character, which might not have 
been sufficiently taken into account when deciding the appropriate method of municipal 
waste management”. However, the above excerpt depicts very vividly some aspects of 
why the implementation of a sectoral policy in Greece has met so many problems. In 
particular, the respondents (1-4) expressed complaints about their marginalization by the 
central state, arguing that the role of the local and regional authorities is vital because of 
their proximity, easy access and knowledge of the greater area. Therefore, as the 
interviewee (1) put forward, in policy implementation the local authorities are asked to 
apply something in which their involvement is essentially absent. In order to overcome 
this stalemate, he mentioned that further devolution would be the appropriate solution. In 
the same context, but at the central government level, three interviewees (5, 6 and 7) 
admitted that very often there is poor coordination and collaboration between state 
agencies across all the tiers. Similarly, the importance of local opposition is underlined as 
in many cases regional or local authorities refused to join the implementation of policies 
in order to secure their regional interests. For some respondents, such as the 
interviewees (5) and (7) this is a great obstacle which in many cases has led to the 
suspension or cancellation of environmental projects. According to them, it is telling that 
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“central decisions that need to be adopted by the local authorities are rejected, followed 
by convictions and fines”. In some other cases, “the beginning of a project under specific 
requirements impinges on environmental organizations, which appeal to the Council of 
State to defer it, thus entailing significant delays in the procedure until the rulings come 
out". By this description, it is understood as the problem of poor collaboration between 
the central and local governments. As the interviewee (10) critically stated, “you can 
discern an inability of the central government to get things to move in the right direction 
and provide solutions”. Another important issue formulated by all the respondents (1-4) 
is that Greece’s implementation problems are associated with the lack of an 
Environmental Agency with standards close to those of the Nordic states and the UK, in 
order to deliver better and more effective environmental services. More explicitly, the 
interviewee (3) clarified that through an example, "we cannot implement the same 
measures in Greece as member states of the European North because they are more 
organized in terms of environmental services and this results in better environmental 
performance. For us, it's like going to the kindergarten wanting to apply the same things 
as a member state that is in the high school." Some of the main points raised are related 
to different perceptions of the administrative model and the existence of basic and 
functional mechanisms to facilitate the implementation procedure. For some others, like 
the interviewee (1), their existence is the means to achieve a strong administrative 
capacity.  
Additionally, for most of them, such as the interviewee (7), the misallocation of staff, 
fragmentation and overlapping of responsibilities in the administrative pyramid of the 
Greek state are a serious administrative barrier, which often creates problems in 
cooperation and coordination with other agencies and the private sector respectively. 
Also, a kind of disappointment, from the vast majority of interviewees, is observed that 
the understaffing of local agencies and overstaffing of central government agencies 
brings about an administrative disequilibrium in terms of competencies and workload. 
Indicatively, the interviewee (8) mentioned that wage differences between employees at 
local and central government agencies are a strong disincentive. Admittedly, the large 
majority of the respondents have expressed their deep concern that lack of control and 
enforcement mechanisms is the “Achilles heel” of the state apparatus due to 
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understaffing. They contended that proper allocation of human resources is required in 
the state machinery to establish strict control mechanisms for the correct implementation 
of legislation and imposition of fines. For the interviewees (3) and (4), misallocation and 
the lack of staff are strongly observed in their agency: “Due to lack of staff, we are unable 
to get out continuously to check the progress of the ongoing environmental projects”. A 
good example of such an administrative tool is the absence of national register, according 
to the interviewee (2), which unavoidably intensifies the issue of bureaucracy and 
opaqueness. In simple words, it involves many state and public agencies to consult on 
every step of environmental policy thus making the implementation process very slow. 
 
6.6.2.2. Economic pressures – Costs 
Drawing on the existing literature (Pridham, 1994; Börzel, 2000, 2002; Koutalakis, 2004) 
among all the Greek respondents (11), the issue of cost is ranked very high. For many of 
them, the implementation of environmental policy always bears a cost but it can vary 
significantly depending on the needs of individual sectors. In this light, as the interviewee 
(1) stated, “it is not a narrow economic term, but it should be seen in a larger frame, 
including different types of costs, such as environmental, social and economic ones”. A 
very good example is how Greece, as a very popular tourist destination, treats the water 
and waste management issue. For some respondents, such as the interviewees (1) and 
(7), the difficulty stems from the fact that environmental policies have different internal 
and external costs. Although Greece has traditionally had a bad environmental 
performance, as the interviewee (6) supported, the condition of the bathing waters and 
the quality of water is very good generally because is seen as a tourist product 
contributing to the national economy.  
Comparably, in the case of waste management38 the opposite is  noticed. Greece is 
confronted with many convictions and fines by the ECJ on illegal landfilling and dumps 
but so far very little has been done to comply with EU legislation. On the one hand, this 
                                                          
38 Waste management: European Commission refers GREECE to the Court of Justice of the EU over illegal 
landfill. Brussels, 10 December 2015, Date of access 30/05/2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
15-6224_en.htm  
 
173 
 
may be a cost issue, which, in the eyes of the Greek government, the payment of fines 
may be more economically affordable than building infrastructure. On the other hand, 
there may also be some other factors, such as the fierce opposition from the local 
communities and the low level of environmental awareness. As explained by the 
interviewee (6), there is also a personal dimension, “apart from the anthropogenic 
activities (dams), water is considered as a separate thing that the citizen feels on his body 
and is a health issue, unlike waste, which he throws down without visual and physical 
contact. Unavoidably, with direct contact issues, citizens are more sensitive. Thus, waste 
has less to do with him because he does not see the problem and is not directly involved. 
Therefore, water more easily has a personal dimension. The ones who live with the 
problem and reside near the landfills are more sensitive and at the same time seek a 
solution, in contrast to those who do not live close, simply because it does not affect their 
daily lives”.  
The interviewee (9) expressed the view that everything has a cost at the very beginning 
and, particularly in the Greek case, these costs have been covered by the EU through 
various funding programs, such as Cohesion Funds, but Greece is still not on a green 
track (see fiscal federalism in Chapter 3). On a more critical note, the interviewee (1) 
stated that environmental policy is expensive at the beginning but becomes cheaper 
during the implementation process. For example, if a country lacks infrastructure and 
wants to create it, this is unavoidably accompanied by short-term costs and long-term 
environmental and economic benefits by producing revenues that can amortize the initial 
investment. “Environmental policy always has an extra cost. In my opinion, it should also 
include quantifications of the social benefits and costs of non-implementation. In this 
context, the magnitude of health problems, medical costs, and pharmaceutical outlays 
must be considered which bear a cost in strictly economic terms”. In some other cases, 
the structural character of a country’s economy may be a key factor for the quantification 
of these costs. According to the interviewee (6), “it is expensive for Greece because of 
the existence of small-scale businesses and production units which are the backbone of 
Greek industry. However, amid the economic crisis, they cannot afford to proceed with 
the green investments due to the increased costs as part of the general uncertainty at the 
political and economic level”.  
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6.6.2.2.1. Tradeoffs 
For the vast majority of the Greek respondents (six out of eleven), tradeoffs (as a 
subsection of the economic costs above) are seen rather negatively but, given the 
economic circumstances, they may be necessary for the short term, claiming that the 
combination of environmental protection and economic development offers more 
sustainable solutions in the long term. Therefore, there is a strong sense that the 
economic crisis tends to lead to a complete disruption with negative effects on both sides. 
Given these circumstances, almost all the respondents argued that economic growth 
clearly prevails over the environmental protection. Not surprisingly, this may be 
underpinned by the lack of strong political will on the environmental issues. In this context, 
there is also a belief that strong private interests in liaison with politicians and the 
economic and business sector are very powerful confirming the existing literature (Börzel, 
2000). For some of them, it is preserved a model that exclusively aims to ensure easy 
profit in favor of strong businesses. For the interviewee (8), a tradeoff would be possible 
under different economic conditions: “There could be some tradeoff with the environment 
as a driver of growth, but there is no time for that”. In the same vein, the interviewee (2) 
contended that economic growth should be part of the environmental protection for the 
creation of a flourishing market. This would tackle unemployment and provide strong 
incentives for environmentally friendly entrepreneurship. For some others, like the 
interviewee (1), economic profit has predominantly become the main driving force: 
“Economic crisis does not lead this relationship with reconciliation, but results in net profit 
and net environmental damage”.  
From an NGO perspective, it seems to be very straightforward because environmental 
protection means the conservation of natural resources for sustainable growth, but in 
Greece, the opposite seems to be, according to the interviewee (9): “I would say that 
there is absolutely no concern for the environment. Everything is done in the name of 
economic growth. In response to the economic crisis, the environmental legislation is 
deliberately downplayed and undermined, which does not help the economy to recover 
just because we are stuck in the past, basically trying to continue to do what we did”. The 
same spirit is also expressed in the words of the interviewee (10): “I think we have focused 
too much on the short-term and opportunistic than the long-term interest and that is 
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something that we have repeatedly seen happening in Greece as it is reflected in the 
policies and legislation of the country. Currently, at a more practical level, the problem is 
that the existing environmental framework, seemingly, protects the environment and is 
made in such a way to secure certain interests by promoting a kind of development that 
is not related to the protection of natural resources, the country, and the future 
generations”. On a similar scale, the interviewee (9) argued that the above legislative 
retreat is seen in many laws on forestry and seashore passed in the Greek Parliament. 
The political narrative and actions of governments throughout the economic crisis shows 
a blatant attitude in favour of the traditional model of economic growth, so that “we [the 
national government] have so many beaches and forests, so it does not matter if we build 
upon them because we need growth”.  
 
6.6.2.3. Environmental awareness 
Building upon the existing literature (Pridham, 1994; Pridham et al., 1995; Börzel, 2000), 
environmental awareness is scored at a low level according to all the Greek interviewees. 
Other factors reported are the individualistic culture and the absence of collegiality. A 
common belief is that the level of environmental awareness of a society greatly influences 
the implementation of policies (see Börzel, 2000). In this regard, it is strongly believed 
that there is a lack of cooperative culture and mutual understanding in the Greek society. 
For the majority of the Greek respondents, the individualistic culture is a serious obstacle 
in the planning and implementation of environmental policy. Indicatively, some of the 
respondents mentioned that the individualistic culture originates from the family-based 
structure of the Greek society. More analytically, some respondents, like the interviewee 
(10), attributed this characteristic to the lack of environmental education and awareness 
that penetrates all the levels of education and society in Greece. Similarly, the interviewee 
(6) added that “environmental protection is a matter of education, where family plays an 
important role. The new generation better understands the problem. The dominant 
perception that is summarized as ‘not in my backyard’ has led to this problem. In a similar 
fashion, the interviewee (2) contended that “the environment is a matter of consciousness 
but even though there is no such consciousness then at least there can be environmental 
176 
 
education. And we have not mentioned anything about environmental education that is 
part of environmental policy. Often by ignorance, this leads to actions that pollute the 
environment. So, I think one of the main disadvantages is the inability to have strong 
environmental education, which results in the absence of collective consciousness”. 
Finally, for the interviewee (3) is evident that during the economic crisis there has been a 
change in the environmental behavior of people, who overlook the environment in order 
to ‘survive economically’.  
 
6.7. Implementation Performance 
 
6.7.1. UK 
Initially, the overall implementation performance of the UK based on the existing literature 
(Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Lowe and Ward, 1998; Jordan, 1999, 2012) does not differ 
from the findings of the empirical research. In line with the majority of British respondents, 
there has been a significant improvement in implementation but a rather mixed picture in 
sectoral policies. More explicitly, the implementation performance is good on a range of 
policies, such as land and catchment management, fisheries and marine environment, 
climate change, emission reductions, nature conservation and waste, unlike in other 
sectors such as air quality, water framework directive, transport, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sources. Simultaneously, all of them admit that the implementation 
procedure has considerable scope and potential for further improvement (see EEA, 
2015). According to the interviewee (17), “I think we are very good at compliance. We do 
what we're asked to do. But looking beyond that, lots of things need to be done.” From 
the perspective of policy outputs, the UK is generally seen to be doing very well in terms 
of transposing the EU legislation into the domestic level and complying with the EU 
requirements. They justify that as a result of an advanced and integrated system of 
policies, strong scientific knowledge, increased accountability and strong capacity of 
public administration. This is also corroborated by the interviewee (14) with the adoption 
of market-based instruments such as the Emissions Trade Scheme characterized as a 
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great advantage to more efficiently address sectoral challenges such as Climate change 
(see Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Ellerman, 2008).  
 
6.7.2. Greece 
The existing literature on the implementation performance of Greece (Kousis, 1994; 
Kazakos, 1999; Koutalakis, 2004; WWF, 2014) partly contradicts the optimism of the 
Greek respondents but concurs with the causes leading to implementation failure 
(Pridham et al., 1995; Börzel, 2000). A common assumption of the majority of Greek 
respondents is that Greece’s implementation performance is better in terms of policy 
progress compared to the past but there is still leeway for further improvement. 
Surprisingly, the notion of improvement for most of them is linked to better policy outputs 
such as compliance, transposition, and adoption of European directives and laws into the 
domestic legislative framework, but not clearly to correct application of policies. All of 
them agreed that the interaction with the EU helped in the modernization of the domestic 
environmental framework in terms of quality and breadth of legislation, as well as the 
practices, strategies, structures and funding opportunities as confirmed by the literature 
above. As the interviewee (9) clearly pointed out, the economic crisis accounts for a 
significant regression of environmental legislation and any environmental progress made 
in previous years: “Greece has never been great in terms of environmental performance 
but some things have been done in recent years. There is an attempt to restore the bad 
economic growth model we knew under the guise of the economic crisis”. According to 
the responses of the Greek interviewees, the main problems lie in the increased 
bureaucracy, overregulation, fragmentation and overlapping of competencies, 
administrative and structural inefficiencies, misallocation or lack of staff and expertise, 
individualistic culture, lack of control mechanisms and political will, cliental practices, 
corruption, lack of environmental education, strong economic interests, and opposition 
from local and regional authorities (see La Spina and Sciortino, 1993; Pridham, 1996; 
Börzel, 2000). Reasonably, the implementation procedure is seen largely as a 
labyrinthine issue (see also chapter 2). For example, the interviewee (6) claimed that the 
project of restructuring the public administration, called 'Kallikratis’ and put into effect in 
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2012, has perhaps affected the allocation with the expulsion of experienced and skilled 
executive staff. Additionally, some others such as the interviewees (5) and (8) argued that 
Euroscepticism, populism, high polarization between the political parties and frequent 
elections may have weakened the capacity of governments to policy implementation (see 
Dianeosis, 2016). For less than half, the adoption of various financial rescue plans 
(memoranda) may have triggered a surge of national division affecting the implementation 
of the policies due to political instability. In this sense, the main explanation provided is 
that the Greek governments were very hesitant in taking new measures due to fiscal 
deficits and public debt (see the Report of Bank of Greece, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the analysis of the impact of the economic crisis on the implementation 
performance of the UK and Greece based on the empirical findings above demonstrates 
that Greece has seemingly been hit more severely at the economic level compared to the 
UK. First, empirical research confirms the improvement and better policy implementation 
of the UK whereas policy implementation in Greece remains poor. It may be argued that 
the origins of the bad performance of Greece do not lie exclusively in the advent of the 
economic crisis but to a large extent preexisted. A broader overview of the comparative 
approach above shows that the main difference between the UK and Greece draws on 
the organizational and administrative capacity of the public administration to effectively 
implement the environmental policy. Some other reasons are the economic costs and low 
environmental awareness.  
On the other hand, both countries appear to have some similarities in how they see 
environmental policy from an economic perspective. A common perception is that 
environmental policy bears a cost which cannot be taken on by the national governments 
with the excuse of imposing an unnecessary financial burden on state budgets and 
businesses. Furthermore, the lack of political will and environmental interest from the 
political parties makes the environment a minor issue. It is not surprising that the main 
government efforts and priorities are focused on growth rather than environmental 
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protection. This is corroborated by the view that environmental regulation is seen as a 
brake on growth in times of crisis. Therefore, the pro-growth agenda is heavily prioritized 
against the environment. Arguably, the economic situation of a country is not so influential 
as expected by looking at the cases of Greece and the UK which share similar ideas 
about growth. Consequently, in terms of policy outputs and outcomes, the 
characterization of Greece as a traditional ‘laggard’ and the UK as a purported ‘leader’ 
based on the analysis in this chapter is realistic. Finally, in the next chapter, I will analyze 
the theoretically informed discussion of my research findings with the use of the federal 
theory. 
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Chapter 7 – Discussion of Empirical Findings 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The deployment of the literature in Chapters 2 and 3 set the foundations of this research 
to understand the nature and utility of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic underpinned by the 
federal perspectives (cooperative, regulatory and fiscal) for a more contemporary 
theorization. Thereafter, the analysis of the empirical research in Chapters 5 and 6 
focused on the EU implementation patterns and the two case studies (UK – Greece) 
respectively. Having examined these parts separately, I will attempt here to test the 
applicability of the federal theory as outlined in Table 3.10 (see Chapter 3) with the 
provision of a theoretically informed discussion of the empirical findings. Therefore, I will 
start off the discussion of each federal perspective by giving a brief description of the 
general context and then I shall proceed to the main analysis of the findings. Finally, I 
shall develop the critiques of the federal perspectives.  
 
7.1 Cooperative Federalism 
 
Linking back to the theory chapter (Chapter 3), in a nutshell, cooperative federalism draws 
its origin from the US during the 1930s with the New Deal and lasted until the 1970s. Its 
main scope was to explain the relationship between a central authority (national 
government) in this case, the EU, and its constituent parts (states, counties, provinces) 
member states respectively (Weiser, 2003). More explicitly, it analyzed how power is 
distributed in the pyramid of governance within which the national or federal government 
(EU) undertakes a strong role and authority, while the constituent parts (Member states) 
are obliged to implement policies dictated by the central unit (national or federal 
government) (Zimmerman, 2001).  
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First, looking at the existing literature and the table in Chapter 3, the main argument of 
cooperative federalism would be that cooperation due to the existence of spillovers, 
namely, cross-boundary environmental issues becomes necessary. More specifically, the 
theory focuses on the transnational nature of the environmental problems which 
precipitates concerted actions at the political level between the EU and member states. 
Empirical research has demonstrated that the high number of environmental 
infringements (such as Climate Change, air pollution, waste management, nature and 
biodiversity in Figure 5.2.2.) has driven the EU and the member states to collaborate 
together in order to improve the correct application of policies and more efficiently tackle 
these environmental problems during the economic crisis. Second, according to the 
theory a significant driver would be the divergence in regulatory standards in member 
states due to a more or less advanced domestic environmental framework and economic 
condition. Empirical research confirms that there is divergence of environmental 
standards only in the Central-Eastern member states due to mainly political and economic 
issues following the fall of the Soviet Union. However, the issue of divergence is not 
related to the economic crisis but dates back to their accession to the EU in 2004. 
Therefore, it is not a new phenomenon but preexisted. With regard to Greece and the UK, 
no divergence of environmental standards is observed. Third, based on the theory, the 
relationship between the EU and member states would be collaborative in order to tackle 
systematically the implementation problems and environmental challenges. Empirical 
research affirms that the relationship of the EU with the member states during the 
economic crisis is based on high collaboration irrespective of the sporadic problems and 
tensions. A prime example is that the UK despite the high levels of Euroscepticism and 
traditional antagonism (at least before the referendum on Brexit) and Greece, to a lesser 
extent, collaborate very closely with the EU to address the environmental and 
implementation challenges (see Chapter 6). The Europeanization of their national policies 
shows the two-way interaction and the level of dependence, between the two case studies 
with the EU and vice versa. Additionally, this is also explained by the successful change 
of domestic structures which affects the capacity and policy outputs of the states to 
‘download’ the implement the EU policies.  
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Fourth, drawing on the theory, the allocation of competences would rest on the principle 
of subsidiarity under the founding treaties. In doing so, the EU would internalize the 
externalities and member states would be charged with policy implementation. 
Consequently, tasks would be distributed more evenly taking into account how the 
implementation of EU environmental policy can be executed more efficiently by conceding 
this right to the member states as they better understand and deal with the needs of their 
jurisdictions. Against this backdrop, empirical research strengthens the value of the 
principle of subsidiarity as it shows that EU member states during the economic crisis 
implement the environmental policy differently in terms of practices and availability of 
means in order to achieve specific policy outcomes. However, the number of 
environmental infringements may reflect that some policies are implemented 
unsuccessfully thus requiring the aid of the EU. A good example that summarizes the 
above view is the ineffective implementation of the Water Framework Directive. As 
analyzed in Chapter 5 and 6, this directive presents several problems in its 
implementation across many member states such as the UK due to light-touch approach 
and lack of comprehension of the specificities of each country by the policy makers at the 
EU level. In this regard, policies can be executed more efficiently at national, regional and 
local level due to better understanding, knowledge, and experience of the territorial 
particularities.  
Fifth, in terms of the ‘leader-laggard’ relationship, the theory would explain that due to the 
existence of different environmental standards, countries with lower standards may have 
a competitive advantage against those with higher thus resulting in possible distortions in 
the single market. Theoretically, the inter-jurisdictional competition would threaten the 
operation of the single market. In contrast, the empirical research reveals that there is no 
large-scale divergence of the environmental standards during the economic crisis 
between Greece and the UK with the exception only of the Central-Eastern European 
states which were prior to it as said earlier (see Chapter 5). However, this divergence has 
not been proven threatening to the operation of the single market. Based on the empirical 
research, it cannot be concluded that ‘laggards’ pursue deliberately to gain a competitive 
advantage, such as Greece, during the economic crisis. At the other end of the scale, a 
‘leader’ according to the theory would not be very willing to lower its standards due to 
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domestic pressures, advanced regulation, technology, and innovation. As a result, they 
would prefer a level playing field at the EU level within which their domestic interests will 
be secured. The empirical research indicates that for a number of states in the European 
North and the UK this is true followed by fewer adaptation costs in policy implementation 
(see also Chapter 2). More specifically, the UK as ‘leader’ has contributed to the directives 
of REACH and Climate Change meaning policy innovation and economic benefits for the 
British industry (see Chapter 6). Therefore, a level playing field would be in the interests 
of the UK as ‘leader’ because the ‘downloading’ of policies implies that they implement 
their own standards and policies without having high adaptation costs (see Chapter 2). A 
very interesting but contradictory finding here is that the UK as a purported ‘leader’ would 
be really content to lower the environmental standards in the name of growth drawing up 
with some other ‘laggards’ from the Central-Eastern Europe and Greece who see the 
economic crisis as a great opportunity to boost development. In this regard, the theory 
has some gaps with regard the stance of the UK as a ‘leader’. While considered to belong 
to the group of ‘leaders’ due to its good record of compliance and effective implementation 
there is a strong evidence that weakening environmental standards will bring about more 
economic benefits to the UK economy. The theory is, arguably, correct in analyzing that 
the ‘leader’ states would not be willing to lower their standards due to economic 
pressures, a regulatory framework, and technological supremacy.  
Sixth, linked to the previous point, concerning environmental politics, the theory suggests 
that seeking to set up a level playing field at the EU level and then to forward the standards 
of the ‘leaders’ would trigger a demand for cooperation with the supranational EU bodies. 
Hence, the EU would live up to these demands but mostly would be concerned to rectify 
the inefficiencies of the national governments by introducing a stricter set of 
environmental policies. From the data collected, I found that a level playing field is 
necessary for the maintenance of the single market, equal access, common rules and 
collaboration between the member states and supranational organizations. This is best 
understood in the case of the UK and its collaboration with the EU institutions to shape 
EU policies (e.g. REACH and Climate Change Act), as they can more easily implement 
their own standards by harnessing the willingness of the EU to keep the environmental 
standards high. In cases of serious incidents of distortions of the single market such as 
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environmental degradation, I found that the EU Commission urges for immediate action 
its member states to solve the disputes before the recourse to the ECJ (see Chapter 5). 
Both the theory and empirical findings confirm that for reasons of competitiveness the 
adoption of stricter environmental standards is a prerequisite that favours mainly the 
‘leaders’ in the implementation process due to fewer adaptation costs. 
 
7.2 Regulatory Federalism 
 
As analytically examined in Chapter 3, regulatory federalism was the outcome of a big 
surge in national governmental activism in the US during the 1960s and 1970s offering a 
fertile ground for legislative efforts to tackle large-scale social, economic and 
environmental problems (Oates, 2003). It mainly acted as a counterbalance to the 
increasing trend of taxes, deficits and federal bureaucracy in the mid-1970s, by providing 
grants-in-aid programs to secure federal involvement in most areas of state and local 
governmental functions (Rodden, 2002). In this effort, the scope of regulatory federalism 
is to determine and arrange the distribution of power within an institutional context (EU). 
Moreover, it examines the task allocation such as the EU to set standards and member 
states to implement policies (Kelemen, 2000, 2004).  
Initially, according to the existing literature, the main argument of regulatory federalism is 
based on the idea that the alarming rise of social, financial and environmental problems 
stemming from the divergence of regulatory standards in the member states would affect 
the formulation of regulatory policies at the EU level. From the empirical research, in a 
broader context, I found that after the 1970-1980s in view of different domestic standards 
and many socio-political and environmental problems (Seveso accident and acid rain) EU 
environmental legislation has become more expansionary, comprehensive and ambitious 
in terms of the quality thus setting up an advanced legislative and regulatory framework. 
For example, the increase of “acquis communautaire” was accompanied by specific sets 
of legislative provisions and stricter regulations on environmental protection as a 
response to the environmental challenges of the time at the international level. During the 
economic crisis, a divergence of environmental standards is witnessed only in the 
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Central-Eastern member states but this dates back to the fall of the Soviet Union and their 
EU membership in 2004.  
Second, based on the theoretical assumption that the presence of different standards 
would be the operative event of more complex problems, empirical research confirms the 
theory, in the sense, that EU legislation aims to obliterate any distortions in the single 
market as seen in the case of the Central-Eastern member states by harmonizing the 
environmental standards across the member states. However, this divergence is 
associated with the endogenous drivers such as a less strict environmentally domestic 
framework, low awareness, economic issues, future ambitions and planning (see Chapter 
5). Accordingly, the scope of EU norms and regulations is to increase environmental 
quality and strengthen correct implementation. Acknowledging that each member state 
has distinct cultural, political and economic features, correct implementation becomes 
very challenging because it impinges on different political priorities, economic choices 
and domestic interests which in light of the economic crisis may vary significantly (see 
Chapter 5). This is more evident when looking at the integration process of the Eastern 
European states and their negative stance towards the climate pact on the use of fossil 
fuels (the coal industry) which is vital for their economic growth and the flourishing of 
domestic industry (see Chapter 1). However, going back in time both the literature and 
many respondents contended that the Southern European states were in similar position 
when they joined the EU with a significantly less strict domestic environmental framework, 
standards, and environmental awareness.  
Third, based on the theory we would expect to see the relationship between the EU and 
member states to be very competitive with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) acting as 
a mediator for the dispute settlement in policy implementation. The research findings 
strengthen this view by presenting that the relation between the EU and Member states, 
such as the UK and Greece is very collaborative despite the rise of Euroscepticism, 
nationalism and traditional antagonism culminating with the recent referendum (Brexit) 
(see Chapter 6). Similarly, domestic drivers determine largely the implementation of 
policies due to their great influence on the national government as seen in the two case 
studies (see Chapter 6).  However, the involvement of the ECJ is very important for those 
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who are systematically non-compliant, such as the UK with air pollution, and Greece with 
waste management. It may be argued that the main reason for non-compliance and bad 
application lies in the issue of costs which during the crisis are considered as unnecessary 
burden for both countries.  
Fourth, in accordance with the theory, the divergence of standards requires clear 
competencies followed by concrete actions by the EU and the member states thus leading 
to ‘politics of competence’ and ‘politics of discretion’. Building upon that, the empirical 
research indicates that in terms of the ‘politics of competence’, at the supranational level, 
due to a lack of an EU formal federal government, the EU Institutions, European 
Parliament, and Commission undertake the task of policymaking in cooperation with the 
national governments, and member states take over the policy implementation. In this 
context, policymaking is subject to increased lobbying and interplay between states with 
institutions, business sectors, environmental groups and state agencies that affect policy 
implementation. In terms of ‘politics of discretion’, as seen above, the research findings 
demonstrate that when it comes to distributing the power across the legislative and 
executive bodies, the role of the ECJ is very crucial in cases of dispute settlement (see 
the cases of Air pollution in the UK and waste management in Greece). It may be argued 
that the involvement of the ECJ signifies a precautionary means to avoid or reduce any 
discretion of the states in the implementation of policies in the absence of an EU federal 
government. At the same time, this means that objectivity and transparency are 
guaranteed primarily by the ECJ and less by the national courts due to domestic political 
and economic pressures. Finally, empirical research shows that the ECJ rulings tend to 
have a massive impact on member states actions operating as a stick to get governments 
to be compliant and improve policy implementation due to fines which in light of the recent 
economic crisis are essential for the national economy. Therefore, the risk of infractions 
and imposition of fines is often a serious threat with economic implications on member 
states to meet their targets. To a large extent, the ECJ constitutes the guardian of the 
treaties and, as such, ensures that all member states enjoy equal and fair treatment thus 
furthering the interests of the EU and the correct policy implementation. 
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Fifth, regarding the relationship of the ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’, the theory suggests that 
member states would seek to preserve the integrity of the single market by incurring the 
cost of implementation. In this regard, due to higher economic, political and technological 
capacity, we would expect to see ‘leaders’ be more compliant with the new policies. Unlike 
‘laggards’ would be expected to resist more in adopting new measures because of the 
domestic pressures from economic interests, weak policy structures, and high adaptation 
costs. From the empirical research, I found that there is a high correlation between the 
theory and research findings as to the fact that both ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ in the name 
of the single market, have to implement EU policies. In effect, it has been demonstrated 
that the Northern European states including the UK as ‘leaders’ despite the economic 
crisis can afford and take up the cost of adopting new policies as it is actually easier 
because they implement their own standards (e.g. REACH, and the Climate Change Act) 
due to an advanced environmental and regulatory framework, domestic structures, 
technological supremacy and economic condition (see Chapter 6).  
In contrast, from the empirical research is observed that the Central-Eastern European 
states as ‘laggards’ appear to be more resistant and cost-sensitive to implementation 
looking for more funding through side-payments in order to keep up with the broader 
regulatory and implementation trends. In the same context, Greece as ‘laggard’ seems to 
be very susceptible to costs as the theory argues and despite the funding from the EU 
through Cohesion Funds still continues to have significant problems (e.g. waste 
management) in policy implementation due to lack of administrative capacity and 
economic problems (see Chapter 6). However, there is no strong evidence for Greece to 
seek purposefully to receive more funding apart from those projected (Cohesion and 
Structural Funds). However, a good example is given by the interviewee (23) that in the 
past some EU countries had sometimes accepted higher environmental legislation with 
the condition of receiving more funding in the form of compensation but this cannot be 
confirmed by this research during the economic crisis (see chapter 5). More specifically, 
the designation of territory for protected species concerning the Habitats Natura 2000 
sites revealed that some member states designated more Natura 2000 sites than 
expected because at the time there was the belief that that funding would be used for the 
protection and restoration of those sites. By using this example, it is understood how 
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some states use environmental issues for receiving more funding. "Ok, we'll accept higher 
standards but there needs to be some kind of side payment through other financial 
mechanisms to allow us to be able to meet our commitments" as the interviewee (23) 
argued.  
Sixth, from the environmental politics perspective, we would expect to see, due to the 
allocation of competencies under the principle of subsidiarity as analyzed above, the EU 
to be a regulatory state taking over the task of setting standards and promoting regulatory 
expansion. Reasonably, the regulatory expansion would reinforce the content and quality 
of environmental policies. Research findings build upon the theory contending that many 
environmental problems, such as the high number of environmental infringements in 
member states, have local or regional origins thus requiring broader cooperation with the 
EU (see Chapter 5). Simultaneously, this also shows that the delivery of policy may be 
unsuccessful. Against this backdrop, the EU Commission urges member states to 
implement correctly the policies pushing for higher environmental standards and ensuring 
the functioning of the single market. However, this does not mean that regulatory 
expansion and adoption of new policies are accepted positively by the national 
governments particularly during the economic crisis as seen mainly in the Central Eastern 
European states, the UK and Greece. Although it seems oxymoron, a very interesting 
research finding is that the European Commission under Juncker, in particular, seems to 
be moving in the opposite direction with the introduction of the ‘REFIT’ process, namely 
the withdrawal of specific provisions of the environmental legislation as an incentive to 
boost economic activity. From a critical point of view, there is a great antithesis between 
words and deeds, namely, official announcements and legislative actions as described 
above. This attitude has also been heavily criticized by many actors and especially all the 
NGOs portraying a clear backtracking of the EU from a sustainable path and undermining 
the goals of Europe 2020 during the economic crisis. In broader terms, it may be argued 
that the European Commission apparently sends out a contradictory message to the 
member states to openly challenge or refuse further regulatory expansion with the excuse 
that high environmental standards in times of crisis imply higher costs. Additionally, this 
message would give the sense that such as action is permitted by the EU institutions 
instigating a 'rebellion' by the member states against the adoption environmental 
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measures and implementation of EU environmental policy. In a sense, this reflects the 
argument of many member states that further costs cannot be borne due to fiscal or 
economic problems as seen in the case of Greece. 
 
7.3. Fiscal Federalism 
 
From the interpretative context of Chapter 3, fiscal federalism is examined through the 
lens of public economics and is concerned with the fiscal interactions and functions 
between the different levels of government (EU and Member states), that is, the 
exploratory analysis of how the expenditures and revenues are allocated in the 
governance system (Begg, 2009). Moreover, fiscal federalism mainly focuses on the 
provision of public goods and services, the redistribution of income, the macroeconomic 
stabilization and taxation (Oates, 1999). In this context, it seeks to increase the wellbeing 
of citizens derived from fiscal decentralization. Finally, it utilizes fiscal instruments related 
to taxation and intergovernmental transfers in the form of federal taxes, transfer 
payments, and grants. There are two types for the assignment of these grants to local 
governments: conditional and unconditional. In the first type, the federal government (EU) 
puts certain criteria on the assignment of grants to lower government (Member states) by 
agreeing to its plan of expenditures. In the second type, there are no specific expenditure 
requirements and the grant takes the form of cash or a tax point transfer (Obinger et al., 
2005; Sellers and Lindstrom, 2007).  
First, the main argument, as derives from the theory, is that when the market fails in the 
provision of public goods, state intervention is mandatory, stressing in this way the 
distributive character of power between the different levels of governance through fiscal 
instruments such as subsidies and intergovernmental grants. More explicitly, the theory 
indicates that the internalization of externalities and harmonization of standards 
necessitate EU intervention to secure the single market. From the empirical research in 
Chapters 5 and 6, it emerges that environmental damage as a policy outcome (see 
environmental infringements - e.g. air and water pollution, waste management etc.) has 
cross-boundary impacts and accounts for a market failure requiring central intervention 
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from the EU. The EU, in turn, internalizes the cost of implementing measures by granting 
specific financial programmes (e.g. Cohesion and Structural Funds) to its member states 
such as Greece as a ‘laggard’ (see Chapter 6). These funding programmes aim to achieve 
convergence, namely the bridging of the gap between the member states, ‘leader’ and 
‘laggards’ by supporting policy implementation, increasing environmental standards, 
improving prosperity, offering better environmental services and quality. Reasonably, this 
is not to say that the common market performs at the optimum level, however, evidence 
shows that environmental infringements as policy outcomes during the economic crisis, 
in a first reading, would possibly reflect this form of distortion in the field of the 
environment within the single market (see Chapter 5). In a second reading, they 
essentially reveal the extent and nature of the problem and the policy outcomes at the 
level of the EU and member states. By this analysis, interestingly, one might expect that 
according to the principles of economic liberalism, EU intervention would be regarded as 
a significant barrier largely undesirable affecting the smooth functioning of the single 
market. Based on that, we may argue that the intervention of the European Commission 
is less governmental but more supervisory of the regulatory framework and the correct 
implementation of policies.  
Second, drawing on the theory, we would expect to see that inequalities among the 
member states to be posing serious impediments and threats to the operation of the single 
market and free trade, particularly during the economic crisis. This would make the EU 
internalize the externalities and pressurize for more harmonization of environmental 
standards. Similarly, in protecting the single market there would be central control by 
which the main objective is to identify the inefficiencies and provide remedies in cases of 
unfair competition and protectionist practices by the member states. In the same vein, the 
empirical research concurs with the theory on fiscal equalization as the main driver due 
to economic discrepancies among the member states, especially in the Central-Eastern 
member states. What constitutes a relatively strong basis is the recognition that regional 
inequalities irrespective of the economic crisis have been a significant obstacle in the 
harmonization of environmental standards, prosperity, the high quality of services for all 
the EU citizens and the correct implementation. Bearing this in mind, the granting of 
financial assistance by the EU to member states seeks to secure a level playing field, 
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improve policy implementation and achieve common environmental standards. 
Interestingly, it has not been observed any striking increase or stalling of disbursement of 
European funds in the midst of the economic crisis in the member states, apart from the 
launching of the 7th EAP, which is the follow-up of the previous action programs. 
Third, concerning the relationship between the two levels (EU-Member States), both the 
theory and research findings converge on the crucial role of distribution of power through 
decentralization. This is to say that the EU subsidizes the member states through various 
financial schemes as seen earlier to carry out the implementation of EU environmental 
policy at national level and achieve equal standards by offering high-quality environmental 
services. Empirical evidence shows that, despite the abundance of funding, states such 
as Greece have been great beneficiaries of such an economic aid but still face numerous 
implementation problems (see environmental infringements). The main problem lies in 
the endogenous drivers such as the lack of organizational and administrative capacity of 
the state mechanism to implement efficiently these policies which with the advent of 
economic crisis exacerbated (see Chapter 5). A prime example of that comparison is the 
existence of advisory bodies such as Environmental Agencies in Northern Europe and 
the UK that facilitate the policy implementation. Research evidence from some Greek 
interviewees (1-4) indicates that the role of local authorities is instrumental. They 
explained that local authorities are better informed about the environmental problems in 
their region responding more quickly and effectively to the requests of their citizens due 
to reasons of proximity. Equally important is also the role of public administration such as 
the fragmentation of agencies, overlapping and misallocation of competencies and staff 
affecting the policy implementation. From the Greece’s example, it may be inferred that 
prosperity is not strengthened due to serious problems in the public administration (see 
Chapter 2 and 6). However, in comparison with the literature (see Chapter 2 and 6), this 
could be more likely to happen in the Northern European states known as ‘leaders’, due 
to better administrative capacity and economic condition.  
Fourth, the empirical research does not seem to coincide with the theory in the allocation 
of competencies in light of the economic crisis. Drawing on the theory, it is suggested that 
decentralization allows the EU via the European Central Bank to take over 
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macroeconomic consolidation and member states to undertake the revenue allocation 
(see Chapter 3). While in a multilevel system of governance the EU, through its 
institutions, would be responsible for the macroeconomic consolidation and income 
redistribution, national governments would be preoccupied to use these resources to 
increase environmental standards and prosperity in their jurisdiction. In contrast, the 
research findings show that member states bear the responsibility of retaining the fiscal 
stability of their economies. In doing so, it cannot be deduced that the use of subsidies, 
based on the particular preferences of the member states, end up in strengthening 
economic well-being since national standards may vary accordingly. However, the 
common link between the theory and empirical research is that the distinction of 
competencies makes the supervision of the EU easier and more efficient in detecting 
malfunctions considering the different degree of economic development on each member 
state and the provision of economic financial programmes. 
Fifth, according to the theory, for the ‘leader-laggard’ relationship, we would expect to see 
that the inter-jurisdictional competition creates regional imbalances between the rich and 
poor states leading to economic differences and affecting the policy implementation in 
times of economic crisis. Consequently, this would result in the transfer of financial 
resources in the form of subsidies or grants by the EU or the wealthier to the poorer states 
as a counterbalance to fiscal equalization. From the empirical research is shown that 
there is clearly an economic competition between the member states in the name of the 
single market but not a transfer of funding from the richer to the poorer EU member states. 
In a competitive environment, such as the EU, regional imbalances are developed among 
the richer Northern member states (UK), poorer Southern (Greece) and Central Eastern 
not only in terms of environmental standards as observed in former communist states but 
also on economic growth. Arguably, economic growth is seen as imperative but a more 
significant finding is the weak institutional and administrative capacity of the state and 
public administration as both case studies affirm (see Chapter 6). Alongside, other 
reasons would be the lack of political will, culture such as individualistic mindset combined 
with strong economic interests. Concurrently, a transfer of financial resources has been 
observed from the EU through programmes such as the Cohesion and Structural Funds 
to those that were lagging behind compared to their northern counterparts. Greece is a 
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good example of such a great beneficiary. The gap between the theory and empirical 
research lies in the fact that there is no link that presents any additional transfer of 
financial resources or subsidies from the rich (North) to poor states (East-South) during 
the economic crisis apart from those projected from the EU to the Member states through 
the 7th EAP. 
Sixth, concerning environmental politics, drawing on the theory we would expect to see 
that the way of achieving fiscal equalization hinges on the level of economic growth. This 
means that ‘leaders’, being better off economically, would tackle more efficiently the 
environmental problems. In contrast, ‘laggards’ plagued by economic difficulties would 
not be able to keep up with the ‘leaders’ due to a lack of economic resources. Instead, 
economic growth would be prioritized against the environment. Consequently, this would 
take the form of minimizing the costs of environmental measures since the 
implementation of environmental policies incurs high adaptation costs. Acknowledging 
that these financial programmes have been a bold step towards fiscal equalization, 
research findings concur largely with the theory at this point, arguing that ‘leader’ states 
(UK) enjoying high levels of economic growth, wealth and strong domestic structures 
makes them implement EU environmental policy at a lower cost. On the contrary, 
‘laggards’, (Greece), in the midst of economic problems prioritize economic stability and 
fiscal consolidation at the expense of the implementation of environmental policy in the 
name of growth. For the latter, the high adaptation cost is understandably a critical factor 
that affects the degree of implementation (see Chapter 2). Admittedly, the financial 
programmes as referred to above (Cohesion and Structural Funds) have succeeded to 
reach a certain level of convergence, despite the fiscal inequality in many member states, 
by enhancing policy implementation and capacity, and increasing environmental 
standards to tackle environmental problems.  
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7.4. Critiques on the Federal Approaches 
 
The analysis of the theoretically informed discussion of the empirical findings above offers 
some basic critiques. These are centered on the utility and applicability of the different 
federal approaches addressing the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic and the implementation of 
EU environmental policy (policy outputs and outcomes) during the economic crisis. As 
seen in this thesis, cooperative and regulatory federalism provide a profound analysis 
and explanations on the distribution of power (top-down process), task allocation (EU 
undertakes the policy making/setting standards and the member states the policy 
implementation), interactions between the supranational and national level (mainly 
through cooperative spirit despite the antagonistic relations with some member states 
such as the UK) in a multi-level system of governance such as the EU. Similarly, they 
focus and explain more systematically and methodically the actions of ‘leaders’ (UK) and 
‘laggards’ (Greece) in downloading/implementing policies by pointing out the main 
challenges, policy outputs (transposition, compliance, enforcement and application 
problems) and outcomes (high environmental standards and cleaner environment) as well 
as the endogenous (institutional and administrative capacity, economic condition and 
costs, environmental awareness) and exogenous drivers (environmental protection, 
single market and international agreements). In so doing, a comprehensive picture of the 
implementation patterns in the EU and the two case studies is provided. On the contrary, 
although fiscal federalism develops a good account of the distribution of power through 
decentralization by explaining the inter-jurisdictional economic competition and the need 
of fiscal equalization among the member states during the economic crisis, it appears to 
have some basic gaps. In spite of the attempt to illustrate how ‘leaders’ (UK) and 
‘laggards’ (Greece) implement policies, fiscal federalism cannot fully investigate and 
develop some of the basic functions such as the allocation of competences, the fiscal 
interactions of both levels and the fiscal form of the union thus resulting in more generic 
observations.  
Drawing on these, I will develop the five main criticisms as emerge from the analysis of 
the three federal perspectives. To begin with, the first criticism regards that, at times, the 
line between cooperative and regulatory federalism may become blurred. This is to say, 
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that overlaps in the analysis and understanding despite the rich and comprehensive 
context of both approaches may be seen. Consequently, these overlaps may give the 
sense that a large part of the analysis is somehow ‘duplicated’. The main risk here is for 
the reader to be conceptually disoriented thus ending up to wrong conclusions. A second 
criticism, linked to the previous point, lies in the lucidity and refinement of the conceptual 
context and analysis. In this regard, the lack of clarity may lead to theoretically incomplete 
interpretations regarding the value and contribution of the cooperative and regulatory 
federalism to policy implementation. The third criticism is based on the need for a more 
structured and in-depth analysis of the economic and fiscal interactions in the EU. More 
specifically, according to the above analysis, fiscal federalism is unable to capture and 
explain clearly the relations between the EU and member states and hence the resulting 
implementation trends. To some extent, fiscal federalism may give the impression of a 
simplistic description of the EU as a multi-governance system without addressing 
precisely the implementation dynamics in EU member states. Consequently, further 
lucidity is required to evaluate its impact and long-range contribution to the understanding 
of the fiscal functions of the EU and the 'downloading' of policies.  
The fourth critique is associated with the role of the NGOs in the UK (see Chapter 6). 
Despite the explanatory context, none of the federal approaches above addressed how 
important the influence of the NGO community is in policy implementation. The 
characterization of watchdog or guardian in the monitoring of the environmental policy 
implementation in a 'leader' state (UK) shows the capacity and the strong supervisory role 
of external bodies such as the NGO community (see Chapter 6). Based on that, the 
demand for correct application of policies and better environmental outcomes in the 
context of EU environmental strategies (Europe 2020) during the economic crisis has, 
arguably, attracted the interest and active role of new actors. Their involvement in the 
observation and control of the implementation process apart from the traditional advisory 
bodies of the government seems very positive.  
Finally, the fifth critique is focused on the impact of the economic crisis on policy 
implementation at the level of the EU and member states. While much of the analysis of 
the federal approaches relies on policy implementation (‘top-down’ process) in normal 
196 
 
times, the impact of the economic crisis on the capacity of member states to implement 
correctly and efficiently the EU environmental policies has attributed to this study a great 
interpretative value. This means that, comparatively to prior studies, the interpretation and 
explanation of the implementation of EU environmental policy in terms of policy outputs 
and outcomes during the economic crisis, based on the availability of data, has depicted 
in realistic terms the implementation problems in two case studies, the UK as a ‘leader’ 
and Greece as ‘laggard’. The systematic examination of these two case studies reveals 
that the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic is not subject to shallow or biased accounts but is 
strongly connected to a thorough examination of various political and economic factors 
and drivers at the national and international level. From this perspective, the study of the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic during the economic crisis set the foundations for a better 
understanding and investigation of the issue of policy implementation. 
 
Conclusion  
 
To sum up, the analysis of the theoretically informed discussion shows that there is a 
strong connection between the theoretical framework and the research findings in this 
thesis proving that federal theory justifiably provides a more contemporary view of the EU 
as a multi-level system of governance. The comparison of the theoretical context of the 
empirical research also demonstrated the utility and advantage of federal perspectives to 
explain the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic by focusing on the different functions and 
characteristics. Furthermore, it not only offered the opportunity for a more nuanced 
analysis but also made clear and highlighted how the case studies, Greece as traditional 
‘laggard’ and the UK as a purported ‘leader’ fit into the models of the federal theory. More 
specifically, the analysis provided essentially confirms the strong footprint of cooperative 
and regulatory federalism, where more similarities than differences identified thus being 
a good fit for the theorization of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic. On the other hand, the 
analysis has a relatively weaker fit into fiscal federalism due to a lack of strong evidence. 
Although some useful lessons can be drawn from the latter, in fact, more testing and 
evidence would be required for stronger conclusions. Overall, the systematic and 
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consistent explanations offered by the federal theory within a very analytical framework 
contribute to a better understanding of the EU and the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
 
8.1. Aims and Objectives 
 
As outlined in the introduction of this thesis (see Chapter 1) the main aim of this research 
was to re-examine the implementation of EU environmental policy and the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic after the advent of the economic crisis in 2008. In this regard, the 
employment of the federal theory sought to give a fresh look and a more contemporary 
theorization of the EU and the main goals linked to Europe 2020. A review of the literature 
on EU environmental policy gave rise to four research objectives: 
1) Map the environmental policy implementation patterns in EU member states and the 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic following the 2008 credit crunch. 
2) Produce two in-depth case studies, in the context of the EU, on the environmental 
policy implementation including one purported ‘leader’ (UK) and one traditional ‘laggard’ 
(Greece). 
3) Use federal theory perspectives to explore the influential factors shaping the ‘Leader-
Laggard’ dynamic in EU environmental policy. 
4) Use the theory of federalism for a more contemporary theorization of the EU. 
 
Objective 1 has been addressed in Chapter 5 with the mapping out of the broader 
implementation patterns in EU member states. Initially, from the empirical findings is 
indicated that the impact of economic crisis on the implementation of EU environmental 
policy was important but affected the member states to a varying degree. More explicitly, 
the impact on ‘leader’ states such as Germany, the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands, Austria and the UK was not very strong due to a better economic condition, 
strong policy structures, institutional and administrative capacity, sophisticated public 
administration and high environmental awareness. Interestingly, the inter-comparison of 
the ‘leader’ states has demonstrated that the vast majority continue to have better policy 
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outcomes as witnessed by the low number of environmental infringements (see Table 
5.3.1. in Chapter 5). On the contrary, ‘laggard’ states such Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece were hit more severely by the economic crisis and austerity measures at the 
economic level thus weakening the capacity of their public administrations to implement 
EU environmental policy more efficiently. This is largely due to a weaker economy, 
fragmented policy structures, weak institutions, lack of infrastructure, ineffective public 
administration and low level of environmental awareness. From a cross-country 
comparison including only ‘laggards’ (see table 5.3.1. in Chapter 5) there were significant 
differences amongst them in terms of policy outcomes. More specifically, Ireland and 
Portugal look like more of a ‘leader’ than a ‘laggard’ in contrast to Greece and Spain, 
having a sharp decline of their environmental infringements. Differences in performance 
(policy outputs and outcomes) among the 28 member states shows that systemic and 
structural problems are still dominant in the majority of member states thus making 
implementation a complex and costly process (see also the discussion on implementation 
in Chapter 1). Similarly, policy implementation is subject to strong pressures from 
endogenous factors at the national level (economic position and costs, organizational and 
administrative capacity, environmental awareness) and exogenous at the international 
level (environmental protection, single market and transboundary nature of environmental 
challenges). Finally, economic costs turned out to be a key factor in the implementation 
of EU environmental policy both for the ‘leaders’ (UK) and ‘laggards’.  
Objective 2, was primarily addressed in Chapter 6 with the analysis and comparison of 
two in-depth case studies of a reputed ‘leader’ (UK) and a traditional ‘laggard’ (Greece). 
The study of these two countries revealed that the impact of the economic crisis in Greece 
was stronger than in the UK, not only for economic reasons such as big debts and deficits 
but also for administrative and organizational issues linked to the capacity of the public 
administration. The examination of Greece as a ‘laggard’ showed that the major economic 
problems the national economy reflect largely the structural weaknesses of the state 
apparatus. Given that the implementation performance of Greece has never been 
outstanding, the economic crisis seems to have weakened the actual capacity to 
implement and tipped the balance in favor of economic growth. The UK, on the other 
hand, has demonstrated better implementation performance linked to policy outputs such 
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as better compliance and application of policies than Greece due to strong institutional 
capacity, better economic condition and a sophisticated public administration. The 
economic crisis seems to have operated as a lever for better policy implementation as 
seen by the continuous downward trend of environmental infringements after 2008 (see 
table 5.3.1. in Chapter 5). It may be argued that both for a ‘leader’ and a ‘laggard’ the 
issue of cost is very important. From the empirical findings in Chapter 6, the UK seemed 
more determined than Greece to correct its domestic implementation problems of 
environmental policy since any policy failures entail fines and higher costs, in particular, 
for those countries that in times of austerity are seeking ways to support the domestic 
economy. Interestingly, both countries heavily prioritize economic growth against the 
adoption and implementation of environmental legislation.  
Objectives 3 and 4 were addressed in Chapters 3 and 7 with the use of federalism as the 
main theoretical framework of this thesis upon which a more contemporary theorization 
of the EU was provided. More specifically, in Chapter 3, the different federal approaches 
provided a more subtle analysis on the distribution of power, task allocation, the 
interaction between the EU and member states and policy implementation in a system of 
multi-level governance. Furthermore, in Chapter 7, the analysis of the theoretically 
informed discussion of the theory and empirical findings has shown that cooperative and 
regulatory federalism are a better fit in the analysis of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic for the 
reasons mentioned above than fiscal federalism which, in turn, requires further empirical 
testing. 
 
8.2. Understanding the impact of the economic crisis 
 
As demonstrated in this research, the impact of the economic crisis affected EU member 
states to a varying degree. However, contrary to expectations, the implementation of EU 
environmental policy was not significantly influenced by the economic crisis as many EU 
member states improved their performance (see Chapter 5). In terms of performance, the 
UK as a purported ‘leader’ has seen great improvement in comparison to Greece as a 
traditional ‘laggard’. As analyzed in Chapter 6, some of the reasons lie in the endogenous 
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factors such as the strong administrative capacity and the better economic condition. The 
economic crisis, arguably, questioned the capacity of the states and public administration 
to implement and raised concerns about the cost of environmental policies in times of 
economic crisis. In such a context, the issue of cost became a major issue with the excuse 
of being an additional financial burden that affects the national budgets and the 
competitiveness of EU member states, as seen in the two case studies and the Central-
Eastern European states. However, the better economic position of the ‘leaders’ 
compared to ‘laggards’ played a crucial role to tone down the actual implications, as seen 
in the UK compared to Greece (see Chapter 6). However, it may be argued that the 
obsession of costs regarding policy implementation is not the result of the economic crisis 
but is seen a general feature of the national governments to avoid them on issues of 
minor importance such as the environment. This is clearly reflected in the fierce 
opposition of the UK, Greece and the Central-Eastern European states to the adoption 
and implementation of the environmental legislation. In addition, the economic crisis and 
austerity have affected the level of funding allocation and investments in the 
environmental sector. In some cases, such as Greece, many environmental projects have 
stalled or postponed (see Chapter 6). Amid a climate of uncertainty, many voices have 
argued that funding allocation for environmental activities is a needless luxury that does 
not keep up with current economic conditions, as seen in the UK. From a political 
perspective, the impact of economic crisis lowered the environmental ambitions and 
expectations as well as the political interest to push for stricter environmental standards 
due to economic issues such as fiscal consolidation and stability. Amid the financial 
uncertainty, national governments consciously opt to sacrifice the implementation of 
environmental policy on the altar of growth (see Chapter 5). This would mean that growth 
is more attractive due to high political gains. The dominance of the economic agenda, 
particularly in the cases of Greece and UK (see Chapter 6), points out that national 
governments proved to be quite hesitant or less courageous to support environmental 
policies because of the strong endogenous factors. 
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8.3. Analysis of research findings 
 
Following the impact of the economic crisis the main research findings are developed 
here. The first finding has an administrative dimension related to the issue of the public 
administration and the strong role of NGO community, particularly in the UK. Public 
administration, arguably, represents the main mechanism of the state through which the 
application of policies take shape. From the analysis of Chapter 6 is shown that Greece 
lacks a strong public administrative mechanism compared to the UK to efficiently 
implement the EU environmental policies. This structural and systemic weakness is 
connected to over-regulation, fragmentation of policies, misallocation of competencies 
and staff. On the contrary, while the UK may not live up to its reputation as a ‘Rolls Royce’ 
(see Chapter 2 and 6) public administration, it demonstrates very good compliance and 
implementation of policies due to a sophisticated public mechanism and the involvement 
of advisory bodies such as the Environment Agency. Besides that, the role of the NGO 
community, as seen in Chapter 6, in policy implementation is very critical. More 
specifically, their characterization as watchdog or guardian indicates the high pressure 
exercised on the national government for the correct implementation of EU environmental 
policy in the UK. Simultaneously, it is also witnessed the advantage of ‘leaders’ against 
the ‘laggards’ in engaging, beyond the traditional actors, the NGOs in monitoring the 
implementation process. In a sense, their involvement confirms the value of civil society. 
The second finding has a clear economic aspect related to costs. As shown from the 
empirical findings in Chapter 5 and 6, a large number of EU countries are opposed to the 
adoption of stricter environmental regulations and implementation of environmental 
policies due to economic problems and fiscal deficits which have been compounded by 
the 2008 economic crisis. Therefore, the opposition and resistance of the national 
governments is higher due to costs. This view is corroborated both for the UK as ‘leader’ 
and Greece as ‘laggard’. More specifically, in the UK the issue of costs for the government 
tends to be an obsession as it rests on the idea that environmental regulations entail 
additional costs that cannot be afforded in times of recession thus affecting the 
competitiveness of the British businesses. By this description, it is understood that strong 
lobbying from the industrial and economic sector affects the priorities and decision-
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making of the government. Considering that the UK has always had these concerns about 
the economy, it is not surprising that there is a clear precedence on growth by minimizing 
the economic costs. Likewise, in the case of Greece, the issue of cost is high on the 
political agenda. In an economy mired in recession with high unemployment, the adoption 
of stricter environmental standards and implementation of policies are seen in the eyes 
of the Greek government as an unnecessary burden thus being more reluctant (see 
Chapter 6). The same economic perception is also shared by the Central-Eastern 
countries with regard to environmental legislation (see Chapter 5). This stance, arguably, 
should not be seen as a temporary phenomenon but a condition in which strong domestic 
factors such as high unemployment and the need for growth shape an ‘anti-
environmental’ attitude. A less conspicuous but important factor would be the structural 
economic dependence on fossil fuels that prevents them from advocating a very EU green 
agenda (see Chapter 5). In this context, there is a strong belief that environmental policies 
are seen as costly luxury or unnecessary financial burden particularly in times of austerity. 
In this light, growth is well off of the agenda but the environment is more of a case as a 
luxury in relation to cuts in budget and lifestyles. In this regard, any environmental initiative 
is addressed by high suspicion or reluctance. In view of these costs, national 
governments are less willing to embrace ambitious environmental targets as a 
counterweight to possible social unrest and economic meltdown. On the other hand, 
although costs are significant obstacles to the implementation of policies, this contradicts 
with the EU official quantified assessments and reports (see DG Environment - The costs 
of not implementing the environmental acquis, Final Report, September 2011) which have 
demonstrated that the cost of environmental policy implementation is very low. 
Unsurprisingly, the promotion of a pro-growth agenda for many member states is one-
way to tackle their chronic and current economic problems. 
A third finding is that during the economic crisis there has been an even stronger tendency 
to relax standards in order to stimulate economic activity by both the EU and member 
states. While the European Commission incentivizes actions associated with the upgrade 
of regulatory standards, from the empirical findings in Chapter 5 and 6, is shown that 
there has been a kind of detachment from a stricter environmental regulatory framework 
on the grounds of growth, competitiveness and high costs. In such a way, the nature and 
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level of debate between the EU and the member states have revolved around the 
promotion of fiscal consolidation and stability and the reduction of the scale of regulation 
as a brake on growth. A sign of that was the adoption of "REFIT" process, namely the 
consideration of the burden of environmental legislation. In a sense, these actions imply 
that weakening the environmental regulation can boost economic growth as manifested 
by the political guidelines of the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker. Although this can be interpreted as a clear retreat to the green agenda, 
simultaneously it conceals an internal political dispute at the top EU level. This would 
include the European Parliament known as the green supporter with some member states 
theoretically backed by the European Commission to exercise strong pressures and 
prevent the EU from adopting a strict set of environmental measures that are against 
competitiveness and economic growth, as largely seen in the case of Visegrad countries. 
An additional factor that feeds into these environmental concerns is the lack of strong 
environmental orientation in European strategies which holds the pro-growth agenda up. 
In a strictly developmental context, the environment seems to lose out because the brunt 
is placed mainly on economic targets. An example of this critique is that before the 
beginning of the economic crisis the core priority of the Lisbon Strategy was the 
generation of jobs and growth and now in the run-up to Europe 2020 the main focus still 
remains in the line of competitiveness and growth. More explicitly, the priorities prior to 
economic crisis as set out for the 2007 – 2014 program period, were clearly economic. A 
prime example is the need for growth and jobs as enunciated by the previous President 
of the European Commission, Manuel Barroso. In this context, short-term economic 
objectives are highly prioritized and seen as of immediate action against the long-term 
environmental policies and plans.  
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8.4. Future Research 
As referred to above, the analysis of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in this thesis illuminated 
many of the political and economic aspects in the implementation of EU environmental 
policy. In a broader context, this research laid the foundations for a better understanding 
of the various implementation dynamics and regulatory trends at the domestic and 
supranational level under a more contemporary theorization through federalism. 
However, a critical factor is that much of this research is defined in terms of ‘downloading’ 
by explaining the different implementation patterns without analyzing the ‘uploading’ 
process through specific case studies. A critical stepping stone for future research would 
be the investigation of other policy areas, such as economics, in comparison to the 
findings of this thesis on the implementation of EU environment policy during the 
economic crisis. In a sense, this study would put a stronger focus on the dynamics 
between ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of policies. Alongside, the investigation of fiscal 
imbalances among the member states as a result of debts and deficits and the various 
environmental challenges would be of great interest. Particularly, future research would 
also be based on EU highly publicized goals and growth strategies, such as Europe 2020 
or Europe 2030 with the climate and energy framework and Europe 2050 with low carbon 
economy. The consideration of these objectives would illuminate the political and 
economic dimension in the transition to a sustainable and de-carbonated economy. 
Some of the lessons and experience drawn from this thesis suggest that the selection 
criteria of future case studies could include countries of similar characteristics, such as 
member of the Eurozone, to further test and re-assess the concept of ‘leaders’ and 
‘laggards’. Moreover, it would be useful if the case studies had similarities in the type of 
the political system such as federalism in order to examine the practicality of the federal 
theory both at domestic and the EU level (for example Spain and Germany). The research 
methodology could be based on elite interviews, documentary analysis and descriptive 
statistics. To gain first-hand experience, the researcher could focus on a broad and 
diverse sample of participants from the government and industry sector.  
Finally, undertaking a wider research approach would be vital for the understanding of 
EU’s approach to the increasing challenges of environmental policy in the midst of a 
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continuing economic and identity crisis fueled by Euroscepticism across many parts of 
Europe. Such a case was the recent referendum in the UK (Brexit) which openly 
contested the EU basic principles and policies. In this regard, the EU’s response to this 
ongoing existential crisis is highly anticipated with regard to the environmental policy as 
a success story.  
 
 
8.5. Contributions to knowledge 
 
The completion of this thesis provides some key contributions to knowledge. Although 
many scholars have attempted to rank countries based on their environmental 
performance (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Börzel, 2003; Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et 
al., 2012), and few have done so by analyzing the policy outputs (see Liefferink et al., 
2009; Holzinger et al., 2011; Knill et al., 2012) this thesis has focused mainly on the 
combination of both. This research investigates the implementation of EU environmental 
policy by adopting a comparative approach of a purported ’leader’ (UK) and a traditional 
‘laggard’ (Greece) in order to capture and explain the implementation dynamics and 
regulatory trends during the economic crisis. In the absence of a comprehensive and in-
depth analysis, the employment of different methodologies by prior studies disclosed 
many shortcomings resulting in a rather blurred picture of this dynamic. In some of the 
existing literature, the classification of ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ is accompanied by 
generalizations, stereotypical accounts and outdated analyses first outlined in the 1990s, 
such as the ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ (see Chapter 2). Considering that much of the 
existing research focuses on broad analyses, some of the deeper dynamics occurred may 
be missed. Hence, the generalized and simplified explanations pose the risk of 
misinterpreting the current developments and trends at European or international level 
especially during the economic crisis.  
To reduce the gap in knowledge from the existing studies and enhance the understanding 
of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic, this research was based on a combination of research 
methods to provide a more in-depth and nuanced account of the EU environmental policy 
implementation. By the use of elite interviews, documentary analysis and descriptive 
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statistics (environmental infringements), this thesis sought to interpret more explicitly the 
policy outputs and outcomes as well as the endogenous and exogenous pressures that 
lead to implementation deficit and shape the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic during the 
economic crisis. Therefore, it set out the broader implementation patterns of EU member 
states and used two case studies, one purported ‘leader’ (UK) and one traditional 
‘laggard’ (Greece). Notably, the case studies in this thesis operated as plausibility probes 
to check the applicability and validity of the federal theory and test in practice the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic in two well-established member states but with distinct differences in 
their implementation performance. Additionally, this thesis explored the current condition 
of the EU by the use of federalism. In particular, a more contemporary theorization was 
provided to enhance the knowledge of the EU as a multilevel system of governance. While 
the theories of Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism sought to explain the 
dynamics of the European integration and governance from a state-centric perspective, 
a more contemporary interpretation of the EU integration and ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic 
was deployed far from monolithic accounts. In addition, the state of federalization of the 
EU makes federalism a theoretically attractive theory for the examination of the task 
allocation, distribution of power and interactions between the domestic and supranational 
level and policy implementation. More importantly, as others have used the prism of 
federalism to study the EU, the innovation in this thesis is that federalism seeks to theorize 
the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in the absence of the existing literature. In this light, 
federalism explained the key features and implementation dynamics of ‘leaders’ and 
‘laggards’ in the EU context and made strong comparisons in the ‘downloading’ of 
environmental policy during the economic crisis.  
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Interview questions 
 
In English: 
 
Interview 
1) Introduction 
• Brief overview of the research project (Aim, how long, confidentiality and 
recording issues, how the interviewee wants to be referred) 
 
2) Personal details and experience 
• What is your background? 
• What is your current role and position?  
• How long have you been in this position? 
• What responsibilities does it involve? 
• Which projects have you been involved with? 
 
Main body of the interview 
3) Environment 
• How would you assess the current overall effectiveness of EU 
Environmental Policy?  
• How does current effectiveness differ from past experience? 
• What do you think could be a solution for better implementation and 
monitoring of the EU environmental policies? (Granting of more financial 
resources, decentralization of competencies) Why/why not 
• What is the main driver for having a common environmental policy? 
• Has the relevance of these drivers changed over time? 
• What is the relationship of EU with the Member States as regards the 
environmental policy and vice versa?  Are there any coalitions or 
groupings depending on their interests? Why?]   
• What is the impact of the ECJ rulings regarding environmental violations? 
 
4) Policy making and Implementation 
• At what stage and what kind of obstacles are encountered in the process 
of policy making and implementation? 
• What are the main benefits and losses for the Member States from the 
adoption of EU environmental measures? 
• Why do some Member States seem to be reluctant or willing to assist in a 
more advanced environmental framework? 
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• What is the dynamics of Greece/UK in environmental agenda setting and 
implementation?  
• Are there any third factors taking part in this process? 
 
5) Economic crisis 
• How has economic crisis affected the environmental initiatives and 
objectives of the EU environmental policy? 
• Have austerity measures made an impact in the EU/ Greece/UK? How? 
• Are there any tradeoffs have to be made? (Environmental protection vs 
Economic development) 
• Can the economic status of a country be a significant factor in the 
promotion of the environmental targets? Why/why not 
• To what extent does the economic differentiation between the Member 
States contribute to strict or lax regulatory policies? 
• Is the divergence of environmental standards and tax competition between 
the Member States an obstacle for the integration of EU environmental 
policy? 
• In terms of economic cost how would you characterize the EU 
environmental policy? 
 
6) Domestic Environmental Context  
• How would you describe the environmental performance of Greece/UK? 
• What are the basic characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of domestic 
environmental policy? 
 
7) The end of the interview 
• Are there any other points that you think are important? 
• Can you think of anyone else I should speak to? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
268 
 
In Greek: 
 
Συνέντευξη 
  
1) Εισαγωγή  
• Σύντομη ανασκόπηση του ερευνητικού έργου (Σκοπός, διάρκεια, εμπιστευτικότητα, 
ηχογράφηση, πώς ο ερωτώμενος θέλει να αναφέρεται)  
 
2) Προσωπικά στοιχεία και εμπειρία  
• Ποιο είναι το επαγγελματικό σας υπόβαθρο;  
• Ποιος είναι ο τρέχον ρόλος και η θέση σας;  
• Πόσο καιρό είστε σε αυτή τη θέση;  
• Ποιες ευθύνες περιλαμβάνει;  
• Με τι είδους έργα έχετε ασχοληθεί;  
 
Το κύριο σώμα της συνέντευξης  
 
3) Περιβάλλον  
• Πώς θα αξιολογούσατε την τρέχουσα συνολική αποτελεσματικότητα της 
περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής της ΕΕ;  
• Σε τι διαφέρει από την εμπειρία του παρελθόντος;  
• Τι νομίζετε ότι θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει λύση για την καλύτερη εφαρμογή και 
παρακολούθηση των περιβαλλοντικών πολιτικών της ΕΕ; (Χορήγηση περισσότερων 
οικονομικών πόρων, αποκέντρωση των αρμοδιοτήτων) Γιατί / γιατί όχι  
• Ποια είναι η βασική κινητήριος δύναμη για την ύπαρξη μιας κοινής πολιτικής για το 
περιβάλλον;  
• Υπάρχει κάποια αλλαγή στη σχέση/συνάφεια αυτών των δυνάμεων/δυναμικής με την 
πάροδο του χρόνου;  
• Ποια είναι η σχέση της ΕΕ με τα κράτη μέλη όσον αφορά την περιβαλλοντική πολιτική 
και το αντίστροφο; [τριβή, συνεργασία, ανταγωνισμός; Υπάρχουν συμμαχίες ή ομάδες, 
ανάλογα με τα συμφέροντά τους εκεί; Γιατί;]  
• Ποιες είναι οι επιπτώσεις των αποφάσεων του Ευρωπαϊκού Δικαστηρίου σχετικά με τις 
περιβαλλοντικές παραβιάσεις;  
 
4) Χάραξη Πολιτικής και Εφαρμογή  
• Σε ποιο στάδιο και τι είδους εμπόδια ανακύπτουν κατά τη διαδικασία χάραξης 
πολιτικής και εφαρμογής;  
• Ποια είναι τα κύρια οφέλη/ζημίες για τα κράτη μέλη από την υιοθέτηση των 
περιβαλλοντικών μέτρων της ΕΕ;  
• Γιατί ορισμένα κράτη μέλη φαίνεται να είναι απρόθυμα/διστακτικά ή πρόθυμα να 
βοηθήσουν σε ένα πιο αυστηρό περιβαλλοντικό πλαίσιο;  
• Ποια είναι η δυναμική της Ελλάδας / Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου όσον αφορά τον καθορισμό 
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της περιβαλλοντικής ατζέντας και εφαρμογής;  
• Πιστεύετε ότι τα προβλήματα αυτά είναι μοναδικά/ξεχωριστά στην περιβαλλοντική 
πολιτική ή έχουν ένα πιο ενδημικό χαρακτήρα όσον αφορά τα κράτη που 
ενσωματώνουν την Ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική;  
 
 
5) Οικονομική κρίση  
• Πώς η οικονομική κρίση έχει επηρεάσει τις περιβαλλοντικές πρωτοβουλίες και στόχους 
της περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής της ΕΕ;  
• Υπάρχει κάποιος αντίκτυπος από τα μέτρα λιτότητας στην ΕΕ / Ελλάδα / Ηνωμένο 
Βασίλειο; Πώς;  
• Υπάρχουν κάποιοι συμβιβασμοί που πρέπει να γίνουν; (Προστασία του 
περιβάλλοντος vs Οικονομική ανάπτυξη)  
• Μπορεί η οικονομική κατάσταση μιας χώρας να είναι ένας σημαντικός παράγοντας για 
την προώθηση των περιβαλλοντικών στόχων; Γιατί / γιατί όχι 
• Σε ποιο βαθμό η οικονομική διαφοροποίηση μεταξύ των κρατών μελών συμβάλλει σε 
αυστηρές ή χαλαρές ρυθμιστικές πολιτικές όσον αφορά το περιβάλλον;  
• Μπορεί η απόκλιση των περιβαλλοντικών προτύπων και φορολογικού ανταγωνισμού 
μεταξύ των κρατών μελών να αποτελέσει εμπόδιο για την ολοκλήρωση της 
περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής της ΕΕ;  
• Με όρους οικονομικού κόστους, πώς θα χαρακτηρίζατε την περιβαλλοντική πολιτική 
της ΕΕ;  
 
6) Εγχώριο Περιβαλλοντικό Πλαίσιο  
• Πώς θα περιγράφατε την εγχώρια (μη επιβαλλόμενη απο την ΕΕ) περιβαλλοντική 
επίδοση της Ελλάδας / Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου;  
• Ποια είναι τα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά, πλεονεκτήματα και αδυναμίες της εγχώριας 
περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής;  
 
7) Τέλος της συνέντευξης  
• Υπάρχουν κάποια άλλα σημεία τα οποία θεωρείτε ότι είναι σημαντικά/άξια λόγου;  
• Μπορείτε να σκεφτείτε κάποιον άλλο που θα μπορούσε να μου μιλήσει; 
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Information sheet for the participants 
 
In English: 
 
 
Guide Information/Consent Form for interviews 
 
Title of Research Project  
“Analyzing the “Leader-Laggard” dynamic in the context of EU Environmental Policy: A 
Federal Perspective”  
 
Details of Project 
The current research project is concerned with the environmental policy in European 
Union member states. It explores a ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic comparing the degree and 
speed of adoption and implementation of the EU Environmental policies by the member 
states at the international level. The classification of Leaders and Laggards in 
environmental policy stresses the importance of a significant gap between environmental 
policy adaptation and implementation in some member states after the advent of the 
economic crisis (2008). This has resulted in many inefficiencies, imbalances and 
implementation failures among the member states leading to a two-speed European 
Union (North-South division). The research will provide insights into the feasibility of the 
EU’s plans to link economic recovery to strong or high environmental standards as 
outlined in the various flagship initiatives such as Europe 2020. It will also explore, 
theorize and explain the leader-laggard dynamic between different member states within 
EU environmental policy making. Moreover, it aims at making contributions to the debates 
of the EU in general and environmental policy- making more specifically in light of the 
2008 financial crisis. Finally, the results of this research will be published to academic 
publications. 
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Michail Melidis - Department of Politics, Exeter University, Exeter, Devon, UK.  
mm469@ex.ac.uk  
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with 
someone else at the University, please contact: 
Dr Duncan Russel, d.j.russel@ex.ac.uk, Tel: +44(0)1392 263182 
  
Confidentiality 
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than 
for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them 
(except as may be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied 
with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see 
fit. Your data will be held in accordance with the United Kingdom data protection 
regulations. Recordings and transcripts will be encrypted and stored on a secured hard 
disc. The participants in the research will be coded according to their background (e.g. 
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government officers, non-governmental actors). The material of the interviews will be kept 
in an encrypted format on a secure hard drive for 4 years after the end of the research.       
 
Anonymity 
Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your 
name, but we will refer to the stakeholder group or affiliation of which you are a 
member.  
 
 
Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified 
above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:      DATE…………………………..... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each 
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In Greek: 
 
ΟΔΗΓΟΣ ΕΝΤΥΠΟ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΩΝ / ΣΥΝΑΙΝΕΣΗ ΓΙΑ ΣΥΝΕΝΤΕΥΞΕΙΣ 
 
Τίτλος του ερευνητικού προγράμματος  
"Αναλύοντας τη δυναμική " Ηγετών - Ουραγών ", στο πλαίσιο της περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής της ΕΕ: μια 
Ομοσπονδιακή Προοπτική " 
Λεπτομέρειες της 'Ερευνας                                                         
Το τρέχον ερευνητικό έργο ασχολείται με την περιβαλλοντική πολιτική στα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής 
Ένωσης. Διερευνά την δυναμική "Ηγετών - Ουραγών" χώρων συγκρίνοντας το βαθμό και την ταχύτητα 
υιοθέτησης και εφαρμογής των περιβαλλοντικών πολιτικών της ΕΕ από τα κράτη μέλη σε διεθνές 
επίπεδο. Η κατηγοριοποίηση "Ηγετών - Ουραγών" στην περιβαλλοντική πολιτική τονίζει τη σημασία της 
σημαντικής διαφοράς μεταξύ της περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής προσαρμογής και εφαρμογής σε ορισμένα 
κράτη μέλη, μετά την έλευση της οικονομικής κρίσης (2008). Αυτό έχει ως αποτέλεσμα πολλές 
ανεπάρκειες, ανισορροπίες και αποτυχίες στην εφαρμογή μεταξύ των κρατών μελών οδηγώντας σε μια 
Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση δύο ταχυτήτων (διαίρεση Βορρά-Νότου). Η έρευνα θα παρέχει γνώσεις σχετικά με τη 
σκοπιμότητα των σχεδίων της ΕΕ για τη σύνδεση της οικονομικής ανάκαμψης με ισχυρά ή υψηλά 
περιβαλλοντικά πρότυπα, όπως περιγράφεται στις διάφορες εμβληματικές πρωτοβουλίες, Ευρώπη 
2020. Επίσης θα διερευνήσει, θα προβάλλει ένα θεωρητικό πλαίσιο και θα εξηγήσει την δυναμική 
"Ηγετών-Ουραγών" στο πλαίσιο χάραξης της Ευρωπαϊκής περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής. Επιπρόσθετα, 
στοχεύει να συνεισφέρει στις συζητήσεις της ΕΕ και της περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής εν γένει, ειδικότερα 
υπό το πρίσμα της οικονομικής κρίσης του 2008. Τέλος, τα αποτελέσματα αυτής της έρευνας θα 
δημοσιευθούν σε ακαδημαϊκές δημοσιεύσεις.  
Στοιχεία Επικοινωνίας 
Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες σχετικά με την έρευνα ή τα δεδομένα συνέντευξή σας, παρακαλούμε 
επικοινωνήστε με: Michail Melidis Department of Politics, Exeter University, Exeter, Devon, UK.            
Tel: 00 44 (0) 7534030418, mm469@ex.ac.uk, 0030 6973829627, mixmelidis@yahoo.gr           
Εάν έχετε ανησυχίες / ερωτήσεις σχετικά με την έρευνα που θα θέλατε να συζητήσετε με κάποιον άλλο 
στο Πανεπιστήμιο, παρακαλούμε επικοινωνήστε με: Dr Duncan Russel, d.j.russel@ex.ac.uk, Tel: 
+44(0)1392 263182 
Εμπιστευτικότητα 
Η μαγνητοφώνηση της συνέντευξης και το αντίγραφο της θα πραγματοποιηθούν εμπιστευτικά. Δεν θα 
χρησιμοποιηθούν για άλλους σκοπούς πέραν αυτών που περιγράφηκαν παραπάνω και δεν θα 
επιτρέπεται η πρόσβαση σε αυτά από τρίτα πρόσωπα (εκτός εάν αυτό απαιτείται από το νόμο). Ωστόσο, 
αν το ζητήσετε, θα σας δοθεί ένα αντίγραφο της αναλυτικής συνέντευξης σας, ώστε να μπορείτε να 
σχολιάσετε και να το επεξεργαστείτε όπως επιθυμείτε. Τα δεδομένα σας θα προστατεύονται σύμφωνα 
με τους κανονισμούς του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου και το νόμο περί προστασίας δεδομένων. Οι 
μαγνητοφωνήσεις και τα αντίγραφα θα κρυπτογραφηθούν και θα αποθηκευτούν σε ένα ασφαλές 
σκληρό δίσκο. Οι συμμετέχοντες στην έρευνα θα κωδικοποιούνται σύμφωνα με με το υπόβαθρο τους 
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(π.χ. κυβερνητικά στελέχη, μη-κυβερνητικοί φορείς). Το υλικό των συνεντεύξεων θα διατηρηθεί σε 
κρυπτογραφημένη μορφή σε ένα ασφαλή σκληρό δίσκο για 4 χρόνια μετά το τέλος της έρευνας. 
 
Ανωνυμία  
Τα δεδομένα της συνέντευξης θα διαφυλαχθούν και θα χρησιμοποιηθούν σε ανώνυμη βάση, χωρίς 
καμία αναφορά του ονόματος σας, αλλά θα αναφερθούμε στην ομάδα της οποίας είστε μέλος.   
Συγκατάθεση 
Συμφωνώ οικειοθελώς στην συμμετοχή μου και στην χρήση των δεδομένων για τους σκοπούς που 
αναφέρονται παραπάνω. Μπορώ να αποσύρω οποιαδήποτε στιγμή την συγκατάθεση μου ύστερα από 
επικοινωνία με τους ερευνητές. 
 
ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΤΕ ΕΔΩ:                                                                                     ΗΜΕΡΟΜΗΝΙΑ ................................... 
Σημείωση: Τα στοιχεία επικοινωνίας σας διατηρούνται χωριστά από τα δεδομένα της συνέντευξης σας  
 
Όνομα του ερωτώμενου: .............................................. ............................  
Υπογραφή: ................................................ .................................................  
Email / τηλέφωνο: .............................................. .......................................  
Υπογραφή του ερευνητή ............................................................................ 
2 αντίγραφα πρέπει να φέρουν την υπογραφή του ερωτώμενου και του ερευνητή, ένα φυλάσσεται 
από τον καθένα. 
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